''Muslims are mongrels. They actually descend from rape and slavery. Almost all of them are foul, bold, with miserable character.''
That has more substance than you might have thought; outer appearance correlates to behaviour, and indeed all Abrahamic religions and ideologies are Slave Morals; Islam actually enslaved as violent slaves and raped their genes into what we call muslims today.
While we are downgrading ourselves with gene-niggers, media pop-niggers, musical-niggers, dance-niggering, tolerating all too foreign to us in biological / cultural context; they are updating themselves by raping women of higher quality than their's, having ideals willing to live by and die for linked to ancestral pride; and now installing an eugenics program to filter out beyond human-waste..
Isis is like a parody of a terrorist organization. Pretty soon we'll have "Real Housewives of Isis"
We're already here:
"MRS. TERRAIN: Really, Sam when are you going to do something about these terrorists?
SAM: What? Now? It's my lunch hour." -Brazil (Sam with his mother and her friends having lunch, maintaining a false veneer even as carnage unfolds around them in the dining room)...Which is sort of a deranged or neurotic opposite of the warrior who is able to sleep calmly the night before a big battle.
Shariah – the law derived from Islam’s foundational documents – defines the Islamic doctrine of the universal obligation to jihad against non-believers.
The question is, What is meant by “jihad”? Is it merely a personal struggle to sacrifice for God and be the best possible Muslim? Or does jihad mean holy war, the pursuit of a global Islamic state known as a caliphate, that rules in accordance with shariah?
Sharia law is the law of Islam. The Sharia (also spelled Shariah or Shari’a) law is cast from the actions and words of Muhammad, which are called “Sunnah,” and the Quran, which he authored.
The Sharia law itself cannot be altered, but the interpretation of the Sharia law, called “figh,” by imams is given some leeway.
As a legal system, the Sharia law covers a very wide range of topics. While other legal codes deal primarily with public behavior, Sharia law covers public behavior, private behavior and private beliefs. Of all legal systems in the world today, Islam’s Sharia law is the most intrusive and strict, especially against women.
According to the Sharia law:
• Theft is punishable by amputation of the right hand (above). • Criticizing or denying any part of the Quran is punishable by death. • Criticizing or denying Muhammad is a prophet is punishable by death. • Criticizing or denying Allah, the moon god of Islam is punishable by death. • A Muslim who becomes a non-Muslim is punishable by death. • A non-Muslim who leads a Muslim away from Islam is punishable by death. • A non-Muslim man who marries a Muslim woman is punishable by death. • A man can marry an infant girl and consummate the marriage when she is 9 years old. • Girls’ clitoris should be cut (per Muhammad’s words in Book 41, Kitab Al-Adab, Hadith 5251). • A woman can have 1 husband, but a man can have up to 4 wives; Muhammad can have more. • A man can unilaterally divorce his wife but a woman needs her husband’s consent to divorce. • A man can beat his wife for insubordination. • Testimonies of four male witnesses are required to prove rape against a woman. • A woman who has been raped cannot testify in court against her rapist(s). • A woman’s testimony in court, allowed only in property cases, carries half the weight of a man’s. • A female heir inherits half of what a male heir inherits. • A woman cannot drive a car, as it leads to fitnah (upheaval). • A woman cannot speak alone to a man who is not her husband or relative. • Meat to be eaten must come from animals that have been sacrificed to Allah – i.e., be Halal. • Muslims should engage in Taqiyya and lie to non-Muslims to advance Islam. • The list goes on.
If gynocentrism is the problem of the West, then the problem of the Middle East is andro/phallocentrism, which is much more extreme than gynocentrism is in the West, currently. Although the terms can be challenged on the basis that, if an average group of 100 men and 100 women are left to their own devices and men weren't indoctrinated with chivalry values, the men could easily dominate the women, while the women couldn't do the same to men, so it may be that the human default is a patriarchal society due to sexual dimorphism, but nevertheless I'll stick with those terms.
The West seeks to emasculate both men and women, but because men are more masculine this affects them more and so it may appear that women are becoming more masculine, even if they really are not.
Islam/The Middle East seeks to enforce extreme masculinity in men, and extreme femininity in women. A more natural hierarchy that is more successful, benefits the ideal and the country at large at the expense of individual happiness - men are burdened with extreme responsibility to provide for their family, protect their country and even go to war, attack other countries, and die if need to be, while women aren't allowed to do almost anything and have their genitals mutilated, can be beaten, raped (do they actually do that to their women?), the marriage is consumed when the little girl is 9 years old, which is sick, and women aren't allowed to drive a car cause it would lead to upheaval... lol
Sharia Law can explain why Islam is so successful and on the rise. It is a no bullshit ideology that brutally slaughters anything standing in its path, and it encourages its members to engage in 'Tagiyya', which is outright lying to non-Muslims to advance islam. Is it any wonder that liberal humanistic countries will get butchered unless they reconsider their political affiliations? These imbeciles think that the way to counter Muslims is to try and prove to Muslims how nice, open-minded, and tolerant they are, in hopes that then the jihadists won't kill them... pathetic.
Similarities betwen Sharia extremely phallo/androcentric Law and Modern Western moderately gynocentric law:
- Criticizing or denying any part of the female-decided (as females are the majority in most countries) political system and gynocentric-determined social norms is punishable by social ostracization at best, and prison at worst. - Female testimony is valued more in courts than that of males, and they are generally favored in legal matters - A female can make a man's life a living hell by simply accusing him of rape - Feminists/cultural marxists/liberals engage in word-games, outright lies, denials, appeals to emotion, etc. to advance their ideology - A woman can beat a man, but if he fights back woe be upon him - he'll be lucky if immediate physical retaliation by nearby white knights is all he receives, because he actually risks prison for defending himself
It appears to me that the two poles are natural reactions to one another.
The reality isn't over until it's over, people really underestimate all of this due to repetitive lifestyles and typical expectation. You would be surprised how quickly all this can change into complete chaos, that the shock itself would kill off most people. One only has to study history to see where all this is going..
Basically, in some sense, what it comes down to is, the eastern man vs the western woman..The eastern man is like a ground being, raw in it's form with a real upfront presence. The western woman is created, manipulated into being and relative to system power, the generator, if you will. In any realistic sense, it is more the eastern man vs the global system. The western woman method only works when the eastern man, or anything like it, is suppressed. The woman directly is no match for the eastern man. She is more of a social concept that is only powerful through social means, with a supportive power source. Clearly, the eastern man doesn't really care about the supportive power source in it self, so all else (social concepts) are naturally negated. This is what makes Islam a worthy opponent, with the excessive growth and history it has, it is not naive enough to attack women exclusively or associate all problems with women exclusively the way the western man does.
Islam in itself has integrated functions which guards itself from modern manipulative techniques. such as feminization. The roles of man and women in Islam are clearly defined, in respect to masculinity and femininity. One could even say all positions for man is to increase in masculinity and all positions for women is to increases in femininity, relative to roles and responsibility.
The system realizes this, in an attempt to combat it you have the modification of Islam, this is the moderate and fundamentalist/extreme versions of Islam. An attempt to turn them against each and create a disharmony within, hence the modern feminist muslim woman, which clearly, is an oxymoron of quite a high degree. First, there is no modern, moderate or extreme version of Islam, innovation is also forbidden under the sharia.
There is just "Islam". Islam guards itself from all forms of feminism, the socalled definition of it and the agenda. The definition being..fighting for the equal right and values of both men and women. There is no equal rights and values in Islam under the Sharia. The man legally has one degree over the woman, his opinion, under law, is worth that of two women. He can take multiple wives and not vice versa, he also has overall rights and choice in who she sees, talks to, where she goes, if she works.. etc. we could say, this is the social response from Islam to the definition of feminism, a social domination, where these social feministic constructs will be deactivated almost instantly upon the establishment of the sharia. This has never been a difficulty for Islam, at least on this level, given the nature of women.
Western women, muslim or not, has grown egoistically due to the lack of man, we could say, and this illusion of power has convinced themselves that they really retain such a position, until they meet a typically devout muslim man who follows Islam in the way it is meant to be followed, the east is more closer to this following due to the lack of western social manipulation, that the western muslim man is starting to wake up to and moving towards the more "traditional" islam (real islam)..The Sharia is confrontation to the modern muslim woman, presenting them with a ultimatum, that they either let go of western feministic influence and continue to practice islam in the way the sharia demands, if they refuse to and then she decides to move away from Islam ( after realizing it is not going to change) then she will convicted for apostasy and executed. This is the clearing up mechanism of Islam to prevent further threat.
Why islam is so fundamentally powerful is because the concept is clearly defined with little room for change or modification, this automatically makes it suspecting of everything else which doesn't reinforce the concept itself, which is expands to all areas of life, socially, personally, sexually, politically etc The main root, in this context, being the martyrdom/jihadi concept fueling the reality of islamic domination.
To me, personally, i think the western feminism concept is weak when it comes up against Islam. socially or otherwise. It is also possible that Islam will rise and dominate by default due to the break down of western values and the stronghold between men and women, fusing this with economic collapse and the removal of traditional cultural identity makes the west incredibly vulnerable to the islamic exploit.
"The underlying idea is that a given faith is to be upheld firmly in its full and literal form, free of compromise, softening, re-interpretation or diminution. It presupposes that the core of religion is doctrine, rather than ritual, and also that this doctrine can be fixed with precision and finality, which further presupposes writing.
Fundamentalism is best understood in terms of what it repudiates.
Fundamentalism repudiates the tolerant modernist claim that the faith in question means something much milder, far less exclusive, altogether less demanding and much more accommodating; above all something quite compatible with all other faiths, even, or especially, with the lack of faith. Such modernism extracts all demand, challenge and defiance from the doctrine and its revelation.
One major source of this tradition is the famous nineteenth-century Danish theologian and writer Søren Kierkegaard. He is associated with the idea that religion is of its essence not persuasion of the truth of a doctrine, but commitment to a position which is inherently absurd, which, to use his own term, gives offence. We attain our identity, he says, by believing something that deeply offends our mind. This makes it sound very, very difficult. To exist, we must believe, and believe something dreadfully hard to believe. You cannot come to exist by just believing something plausible. This is the existentialist twist which links faith to identity rather than evidence.
But there are many other variants. Faith can be seen, not so much as commitment, as the celebration of community. Affirmation of the supernatural is de-coded as expression of loyalty to a social order and its values. The doctrine de-coded along these lines is no longer haunted by doubt—for there isn’t really any doctrine, only a membership, which for some reason employs doctrinal formulation as its token.
The cosmogony of a given faith, in such softened modernist re-interpretations, is in effect treated not as literal truth, but merely as some kind of parable, conveying ‘symbolic’ truths, something not to be taken at face value, and hence no longer liable to be in any kind of conflict with scientific pronouncements about what would, on the surface, seem to be the same topic. For instance, ‘modernist’ believers are untroubled by the incompatibility between the Book of Genesis and either Darwinism or modern astro-physics. They assume that the pronouncements, though seemingly about the same events -the creation of the world and the origins of man—are really on quite different levels, or even, as some would have it, in altogether different languages, within distinct or separate kinds of ‘discourse’. Generally speaking, the doctrines and moral demands of the faith are then turned into something which, properly interpreted, is in astonishingly little conflict with the secular wisdom of the age, or indeed with anything. This way lies peace—and doctrinal vacuity.
Fundamentalism firmly repudiates this kind of watering down of the religious claims. Fundamentalism occurs in many religions, though not with the same vigour. In our age, fundamentalism is at its strongest in Islam.
The doctrines of religion are in conflict with those of science, which in turn are endowed with enormous prestige, and which constitute the basis of modern technology, and thereby also of modern economy. Therefore, religious faith declines. Its prestige goes down as the prestige of its rival rises. Alternatively, one may give structural reasons: religion is linked to the celebration of the community, and in the atomized world of modern mass society, there is little community to celebrate, other than possibly the national state—and that state has found its own new ritual and set of values in national-ism. So the erosion of community life is reflected in the loss of faith, and the diminished appeal of ritual. There are many variants of this theory. What matters is that, by and large, the secularization thesis does hold. Religious observance and participation are low. When they are higher, the content of the religion is often visibly social rather than transcendent: formal doctrine is ignored, and participation treated as a celebration of community not of conviction. Religious issues are seldom prominent. Where community survives, it seems to prefer to celebrate itself almost directly, without seeing itself through the prism of faith.
In North America, religious attendance is high, but religion celebrates a shared cult of the American way of life, rather than insisting on distinctions of theology or church organization, as once it did. Apparent exceptions to the trend towards secularization turn out on examination to be special cases, explicable by special circumstances, as when a church is used as a counter-organization against an oppressive state committed to a secular belief-system.
But there is one very real, dramatic and conspicuous exception to all this: Islam. To say that secularization prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false. Islam is as strong now as it was a century ago. In some ways, it is probably much stronger.
At the end of the Middle Ages, the Old World containedfour major civilizations. Of these, three are now, in one measure or another, secularized. Christian doctrine is bowdlerized by its own theologians, and deep, literal conviction is not conspicuous by its presence.5 In the Sinic World, a secular faith has become formally established and its religious predecessors disavowed. In the Indian World, a state and the élite are neutral vis-à-vis what is a pervasive folk religion, even if practices such as astrology continue to be widespread. But in one of the four civilizations, the Islamic, the situation is altogether different.
Why should one particular religion be so markedly secularization-resistant?
A certain kind of separation of powers was built into Muslim society from the very start, or very nearly from the start. This version of the separation of powers did not need to wait for some Enlightenment doctrine concerning the desirability of a pluralist social order and of the internal balance of independent institutions. It subordinates the executive to the (divine) legislature and, in actual practice, turns the theologians/lawyers into the monitors of political rectitude-whether or not they always have the power to enforce their verdicts.7 The principle that ‘the community will not agree on error’ may endow communal consensus, rather than the political centre, with a kind of legislative authority. Within this communal consensus, the voice of the learned is liable to possess special weight. After all, the community must heed an already existing law and it is natural to respect the opinion of those better informed.
So, once the idea of a final and divine law came to be accepted, a law which in principle was to receive no further divine additions, and not to allow any human ones, the (human) executive became in the very nature of things distinct from the (divine, but communally mediated) legislative arm of government. Law could be extended at best by analogy and interpretation. Society was thus endowed with both a fundamental and concrete law, each in its way entrenched, and usable by its members as a yardstick of legitimate government.
Another striking and important feature of Islam is the theoretical absence of clergy. No distinct sacramental status separates the preacher or the leader of the ritual from the laity. Such a person is naturally expected to be more competent, above all in learning, but he is not a different kind of social being. Formally, there is no clerical organization. Muslim theology is in this sense egalitarian. Believers are equidistant from God.
The three central, pervasive and actually invoked principles of religious and political legitimacy within it are: the divine Message and its legal elaboration, the consensus of the community, and, finally, sacred leadership (by members of the House of the Prophet, or by specially selected members of it). It is the difference of relative stress on these three principles which separates the sects. Shi’ites (subdivided further) revere divine leaders, who are usually, but not in all cases, in ‘occultation’, in hiding in this world or another, and due to return from it at some unspecified future date; Kharejites are the most egalitarian and ‘puritan’ of the sects; whilst the Sunnites represent a central compromise with a heavy stress on the ‘Sunna’, i.e. corpus of the original revelation plus scholarly elaboration, and with a relatively mild insistence on the political privileges of the members of the House of the Prophet.
Islam knew rapid and early political success, which is perhaps one of the reasons why a church/state dualism never emerged in it: the original charismatic community had no need to define itself as against a state which still remained alien. It was the state from the very start.
Leaving aside the sectarian schism, the really central, and perhaps most important, feature of Islam is that it was internally divided into a High Islam of the scholars and the Low Islam of the people. The boundary between the two was not sharp, but was often very gradual and ambiguous, resembling in this respect the related but not identical line of demarcation between territories governed effectively from the political centre and territory governed by local tribes and their leaders. Muslim states, however autocratic in theory, in practice had to accommodate themselves to the local autonomy of self- administering tribes.
What is the difference between the two religious styles? High Islam is carried by urban scholars, recruited largely from the trading bourgeoisie (which often combines scholarship with trade), and reflects the natural tastes and values of urban middle classes (at least if one thinks primarily of Edinburgh, Geneva, Fez or Amsterdam, rather than of Venice, Florence or Kathmandu). Those values include order, rule-observance, sobriety, learning. They contain an aversion to hysteria and emotional excess, and to the excessive use of the audio-visual aids of religion. This High Islam stresses the severely monotheistic and nomocratic nature of Islam, it is mindful of the prohibition of claims to mediation between God and man, and it is generally oriented towards puritanism and scripturalism.
Low Islam, or Folk Islam, is different. If it knows literacy, it does so mainly in the use of writing for magical purposes, rather than as a tool of scholarship. It stresses magic more than learning, ecstacy more than rule-observance. Rustics, you might say, encounter writing mainly in the form of amulets, manipulative magic and false land deeds. Far from avoiding mediation, this form of Islam is centred on it: its most characteristic institution is the saint cult, where the saint is more often than not a living rather than a dead personage (and where sanctity is transmitted from father to son). This form of the faith is most visible through those loose associations of ranked saints and saint-centres, generally known in the literature as religious brotherhoods, Orders or fraternities.
Each of these two religious styles has its place in the social structure. Saint cults are prominent in the tribal or semi-tribal countryside, and provide invaluable services in the semi- anarchic rural conditions: mediation between groups, facilitation of trade by associating it with pilgrimage, and, last but not least, provision of the symbolism by means of which illiterate rustic believers can identify enthusiastically with a scriptural religion.
It was the alliance of such tribes, temporarily united by enthusiasm for divine law brought to them by an inspired and revered preacher, which constituted the permanent menace to the existing state. So their absolutism of the polity was in fact limited, on the one side, by the actual power of tribes, and, on the other, by the independent and un-manipulable legitimacy of divine law.
The difference between the two styles would be politely ignored, and their practitioners could co-exist amicably. At times, however, the latent tension between the two styles re-emerged, and, periodically, High Islam would launch a kind of internal purification movement, and attempt to re-impose itself on the whole of society. In the long term they were never successful, so that the resulting pattern was one of what might be called an eternal or cyclical reformation. Ibn Khaldun noted this pattern, as did David Hume. Friedrich Engels also commented on it,13 remarking on the fact that whilst in both Christianity and Islam the idiom of political struggle was religious, in Christianity it led to a real change, whereas in Islam it merely led to a repetition and a rotation of personnel in an unchanging social order.
The preacher unites a group of tribes, upbraids them for their own ignorance and laxity, but at the same time urges them to support him in cleaning up the corruption in the city and its court, which incidentally means booty for them. If Paris is worth a Mass, then the tribesman generally reckoned that Fez (or some similar city) is worth a bit of purity. It is in this form that the circulation of élites operated in traditional Islam.
This pattern of state-formation or dynasty-initiation occurred quite frequently, well into modern times. Some of these movements occurred just a little too early to be explained in terms of the impact of the West: the Wahabi movement in central Arabia, Osman dan Fodio’s jihad in Northern Nigeria, the Sanussiyya in Cyrenaica, the Mahdia in the Sudan. Others were clearly reactions to Western expansion: Abd el Kader in Algeria, Abd el Krim in Northern Morocco, the ‘Mad Mullah’ in Somaliland, Shamil in the Caucasus. The Wahabi movement and that of Osman dan Fodio continue to this day to be the foundations of the political order in their respective countries.
There has been an enormous shift in the balance from Folk Islam to High Islam. The social bases of Folk Islam have been in large part eroded, whilst those of High Islam were greatly strengthened. Urbanization, political centralization, incorporation in a wider market, labour migration, have all impelled populations in the direction of the formally (theologically) more ‘correct’ Islam.
The average believer can hardly continue to identify with his local tribe or shrine. The tribe has fallen apart, the shrine is abandoned.
Islam provides a national identity, notably in the context of the struggle with colonialism—the modern Muslim ‘nation’ is often simply the sum-total of Muslims on a given territory. Reformist Islam confers a genuine shared identity on what would otherwise be a mere summation of the under-privileged.
Shi’ism has some of the features characteristic of Folk Islam within Sunnism, notably the very important tendency towards a cult of personality: Shi’ism is virtually definable in terms of reverence for, and attribution of ultimate political and theological sovereignty to, the ‘Hidden Imam’. The situation is complicated by the fact that this divine personage is generally in hiding, so that in the meanwhile, pending his return, the tasks of political and religious administration must needs be undertaken by someone else. One is tempted to say that those very psychic or social forces which in later centuries led Muslims towards saint-worship (but which then no longer led, in most cases, to schism), had led, during the early, inchoate stage of the crystallization of faith, to the Shi’ite secession, inspired by devotion to sacred leaders and martyrs.
But if what makes Islam so acceptable in the modern world is its puritanical, egalitarian, scripturalist face, why has its greatest, most dramatic political success been scored by a version of the faith which lacks these traits, and is on the contrary endowed with their opposites? The paradox of the Iranian revolution is that whilst, on the one hand, Khomeini’s movement benefited enormously from the distinctively Shi’ite characteristics in the process of revolutionary mobilization, nevertheless, in the process of attaining success and political power, Khomeini shifted Iranian Shi’ism firmly in the direction of a kind of ‘Sunnification’. He took it very close to the puritan version of Sunni High Islam.
Shi’ism is heavily centred on the reverence of sacred, divine personalities, and above all on its martyrs. Their martyrdom is kept vividly alive in folk memory by annual passion plays. Shi’ism has a certain resemblance not merely to Folk Islam but also to Christianity. The centrality of the martyrs means that Shi’ite scholars are not merely lawyer-theologians, but also experts on the biography of the crucial martyr.21 This means that they are much better equipped to communicate with the masses in a state of political effervescence than are their Sunni counterparts. Martyrdom is rousing stuff, more so than pedantic points of theology and law. The fact that the original martyrdom was imposed by a formally Muslim ruler makes the invocation of precedent against a Muslim tyrant particularly effective. All this was used very effectively, during that building-up of mass hysteria which induced the revolutionaries to allow themselves to be mown down by the Shah’s men in such numbers that eventually they broke the nerve of the opposition.
But though these personal martyrdom themes were heavily and decisively employed in the revolution itself, the Shi’ism eventually presented by Khomeini as the charter of the new régime was quite different.
The essence of government on his view was the implementation of divine law, neither more nor less. It should be implemented neither more nor less severely before or after the return of the Hidden Imam. It would be the same law and the same severity, neither diminished nor enhanced. It was the law which mattered, not he who implemented it.22 So the centrality of law replaced that of the person.
To continue the argument: in Islam, we see a pre-industrial faith, a founded, doctrinal, world religion in the proper sense, which, at any rate for the time being, totally and effectively defies the secularization thesis.
The dilemma under-developed countries face is: should we emulate those whom we wish to equal in power (thereby spurning our own tradition), or should we, on the contrary, affirm the values of our own tradition, even at the price of material weakness?
It is painful to spurn one’s own tradition, but it is also painful to remain weak. Few under-developed countries have escaped this dilemma, and they have handled it in diverse ways. But what is interesting, and crucial for our argument, is that Islam is ideally placed to escape it.
The trauma of the Western impact (appearing in diverse Muslim countries at different points of time, stretching from the late eighteenth to the twentieth centuries) did not, amongst Muslim thinkers, provoke that intense polarization between Westernizers and Populists, à la Russe.
The urge to reform, ever present in Islam, acquired a new vigour and intensity. No doubt it also acquired some new themes and additional motivation: why has the West overtaken us, why is it such a menace to us?
But the dominant and persuasive answer recommended neither emulation of the West, nor idealization of some folk virtue and wisdom. It commended a return to, or a more rigorous observance of, High Islam.
So self-correction did not need to go outside the society, nor seek pristine virtue in its social depths: it could find it in its own perfectly genuine and real Higher Culture, which had indeed only been practised by a minority in the past, but which had been recognized (though not implemented) as a valid norm by the rest of society. Now, seemingly under the impact of a moral impulse and in response to preaching, but in fact as a result of profound and pervasive changes in social organization, it could at long last be practised by all. Self- reform in the light of modern requirements could be presented as a return to the genuinely local ideal, a moral home-coming, rather than a self-repudiation.
It is this vision which has now conquered the Muslim world. As an ideology of self-rectification, of purification, of recovery, it has a number of very considerable and striking advantages. It does not appeal to an alien model; it appeals to a model which has unquestionable, deep, genuine local roots.
In the West, we have become habituated to a certain picture, according to which puritan zeal had accompanied the early stages of the emergence of a modern economy, but in which its culmination was eventually marked by a very widespread religious lukewarmness and secularization. The sober thrifty work-oriented spirit, which helps amass wealth, is then undermined by the seductions brought along by that which it has achieved. The virtue inculcated by puritanism leads to a prosperity which subverts that virtue itself, as John Wesley had noted with regret.
In the world of Islam, we encounter quite a different situation. Though long endowed with a commercial bourgeoisie and significant urbanization, this civilization failed to engender industrialism; but once industrialism and its various accompaniments had been thrust upon it, and it had experienced not only the resulting disturbance but also some of its benefits, it turned, not at all to secularization, but rather to a vehement affirmation of the puritan version of its own tradition. Perhaps this virtue has not yet been rewarded by a really generalized affluence, but there is little to indicate that a widespread affluence would erode religious commitment. Even the unearned oil-fall wealth has not had this effect.
Things may yet change in the future. But on the evidence available so far, the world of Islam demonstrates that it is possible to run a modern, or at any rate modernizing, economy, reasonably permeated by the appropriate technological, educational, organization principles, and combine it with a strong, pervasive, powerfully internalized Muslim conviction and identification. A puritan and scripturalist world religion does not seem necessarily doomed to erosion by modern conditions. It may on the contrary be favoured by them." [Postmodernism, Reason and Religion]
Face: “His face shone like the moon.” - (Hind bin Abi Hala) “His face was round like the moon.” – (Bara bin Azib) “His face was not quite round but inclined to roundness.” – (Hazrat Ali(R.A)) “Broad forehead, slanting thick brows parted in the middle. A vein protruded between the two parts which became more prominent in anger.” (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Color: “Neither white like lime, nor tanned, but brown with whiteness predominant.” – (Hazrath Anas(R.A)) “White, reddish.” – (Hazrath Ali(R.A)) “White but wholesome.” – (Abu Tufail) “White and bright.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Eyes: “Black, with long eyelashes.” (Hazrath Ali) “Black and drooping. Habit of looking from the corner of the eyes in shyness.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala) “Red lines in the white parts, wide sockets, and natural grey corners.” – (Jabir bin Samra)
Nose: “Somewhat high with unique brightness whereby it looked large at first sight.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Cheeks: “Even and soft, a bit of flesh drooping at the lower end.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Mouth: “Wide.” – (Jabir bin Samra) “Moderately wide.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Teeth: “Thin and bright, symmetrical, openings in front teeth.” – (Hazrath Ibn Abbas) “When talking a light seemed to sparkle from the teeth.” – (Hazrath Anas) Beard: “Full and thick.” - (Hind bin Abi Hala) Neck: “Thin and long, beautifully chiselled like a statue Colour of the neck white like silver and handsome.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Head: “Large but symmetrical.”- (Hind bin Abi Hala)
Hair: “Neither quite straight, nor sheep like.” – (Qatada) “Slightly curly.” – (Hazrath Anas) “Thick, sometimes touching ear lobes and sometimes reaching upto shoulders.”- (Bara bin Azib) “Parted in the middle.” - (Hind bin Abi Hala) “The body did not have much hair. A line of hair running from the chest to the navel.” – (Hazrath Ali and Hind bin Abi Hala) “There were some hair on shoulders, arms and upper chest.” (Hind bin Abi Hala)
General Structure: “Body well built, bones joining limbs large and strong.”- (Hind bin Abi Hala) “Body was not fat.” (Hazrath Ali) “Neither tall nor short, small but middle-sized.” – (Hazrath Anas) “Inclined to be tall. Among the people he appeared to rise higher than others.” – (Bara bin Azib) “The abdomen was not protruding.” – (Umme-e-Mabad) “Despite has poor conditions and lack of proper food his body was stronger and more virile than those of better nourished persons.” – (Al-Mawahib) “I have not seen a braver and stronger man than the Prophet.” – (Ibn Umar)
Shoulder and Chest: “Chest broad and even with the abdomen.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala) “Chest broad.” – (Bara bin Azib) “Width between shoulders more than usual.” – (Hind bin Abi Hala and Bara bin Azib) “Portion between shoulders fleshy.” – (Hazrath Ali) Arms and Hands :“Wrists large, palms wide and fingers symmetrically large.” (Hind bin Abi Hala) “I have not touched any thick or thin silk or anything else which was softer and fleshier than Prophet’s palms.” – (Hazrath Anas)
Calfs and Feet: “Calfs were not fleshy but symmetrical.” – (Jabir bin Samra) “Feet were fleshy, lower parts of feet little hollow and feet so smooth that they could not retain water.” – (Jabir bin Samra) “Very little flesh on heels.” – (Jabir bin Samra)
The most graphic description of the Prophet was given by an old woman at whose house the Prophet stopped on his way from the cave of Thaur to Medina and her goats gave so much milk that the Prophet and his companions were fully satisfied and yet there was much left over. When the old woman’s husband returned home and expressed his surprise, the woman gave the description of the Prophet as follows: “Handsome features, bright face, likeable temperament, neither the abdomen protruding nor hair of the head fallen out, graceful, handsome, eyes black and large, hair long and thick, voice clear, long neck, bright black of the eye, natural grey corners, thin and drooping eyelashes, black and curly hair, silent with dignity inclined to cordiality, graceful and captivating at a distance and very sweet and most handsome from near, talk sweet and words clear, neither more nor less than necessary, all talk consistent, middle-sized, neither short so as to look insignificant nor tall to look unbecoming, a fresh twig of handsome plant, charming to look at and well- built. His companions are so devoted that they always surround him, quietly listen to what he says and promptly obey what he orders. Obeyed, liked, neither verbose nor cryptic.”
Race in Islam(ic societies)
Al Jahiz ''The Zanj say to the Arabs: You are so ignorant that during the jahiliyya you regarded us as your equals when it came to marrying Arab women, but with the advent of the justice of Islam you decided this practice was bad. Yet the desert is full of Zanj married to Arab wives, and they have been princes and kings and have safeguarded your rights and sheltered you against your enemies.''
Even he stated a difference between Arabs and Zanj..
The following quotes are from a North African Arab / Moor living in former Al-Andalus; a Visigoth / Arab / Berber / Spaniard Islamic province, long before European colonialism took place. Ibn Khaldun 1332 - 1406:
1. "The only people who accept slavery are the Negroes, owing to their low degree of humanity and proximity to the animal stage. Other persons who accept the status of slave do so as a means of attaining high rank, or power, or wealth, as is the case with the Mameluke Turks in the East and with those Franks and Galicians who enter the service of the state in Spain." 2. "Beyond known peoples of black West Africa to the south there is no civilization in the proper sense. There are only humans who are closer to dumb animals than to rational beings. They live in thickets and caves, and eat herbs and unprepared grain. They frequently eat each other. They cannot be considered human beings." 3. "Therefore, the Negro nation are, as a rule, submissive to slavery, because [Negroes] have little [that is essentially] human and have attributes that are quite similar to those of dumb animals, as we have stated."
It is your folly to fight the Apostle, for Allah’s army is bound to disgrace you. We brought them to the pit. Hell was their meeting place. We collected them there, black slaves, men of no descent.
Ishaq 450 The black troops and slaves of the Meccans cried out and the Muslims replied, ‘Allah destroy your sight, you impious rascals.’
Ishaq 374 Ham [Africans] begat all those who are black and curly-haired, while Japheth [Turks] begat all those who are full-faced with small eyes, and Shem [Arabs] begat everyone who is handsome of face with beautiful hair. Noah prayed that the hair of Ham’s descendants would not grow beyond their ears, and that whenever his descendants met Shem’s, the latter would enslave them.
Tabari II 21 Shem, the son of Noah was the father of the Arabs, the Persians, and the Greeks; Ham was the father of the Black Africans; and Japheth was the father of the Turks and of Gog and Magog who were cousins of the Turks. Noah prayed that the prophets and apostles would be descended from Shem and kings would be from Japheth. He prayed that the African’s color would change so that their descendants would be slaves to the Arabs and Turks.
Tabari II 11 I heard the Apostle say: ‘Whoever wants to see Satan should look at Nabtal!' He was a black man with long flowing hair, inflamed eyes, and dark ruddy cheeks…. Allah sent down concerning him: ‘To those who annoy the Prophet there is a painful doom." [9:61] "Gabriel came to Muhammad and said, ‘If a black man comes to you his heart is more gross than a donkey's.'
Ishaq 243 Narrated Anas bin Malik: Allah's Apostle said, "You should listen to and obey, your ruler even if he was an Ethiopian (black) slave whose head looks like a raisin."
Sahih Bukhari 9:89:256, See Also Sahih Bukhari 1:11:662, Sahih Bukhari 1:11:664 "Abu Darda reported that the holy prophet said: Allah created Adam when he created him (sic). Then He stroke (sic) his right shoulder and took out a white race as if they were seeds, and He stroke (sic) his left shoulder and took out a black race as if they were coals. Then He said to those who were in his right side: Towards paradise and I don't care. He said to those who were on his left shoulder: Towards Hell and I don't care.-Ahmad" (Mishkat ul-Masabih, translated by Karim, v. iii, p. 117)
President Vladimir Putin opened Moscow's new grand mosque on Wednesday, urging Russia's Islamic leaders to stand against extremism at a time when some 2,400 Russians are fighting with Islamic State in the Middle East.
Russia, home to some 20 million Muslims, has fought two wars against Chechen separatists in the mainly-Muslim North Caucasus region where an Islamist insurgency is still simmering and some rebels have sworn their allegiance to IS.
Unveiling the new mosque built of light stone, capped with turquoise and golden cupolas, Putin said Russia must educate its Muslim youth to prevent them from becoming religious extremists.
"This work is particularly important today as attempts are undertaken to exploit religious feelings for political purposes," Putin said during the opening of the mosque, which is said to cost some $170 million.
"We see what's happening in the Middle East where terrorists of the so-called Islamic State discredit the great world religion, discredit Islam by sowing hate, killing people... destroying the world's cultural heritage in a barbaric way."
"Their ideology is built on lies, on open perversion of Islam. They are trying to recruit followers in our country as well."
1- It is reported that the Prophet said “In your days Friday is the best of the days as Adam was created on that day and died on the same day. And on this day will be ‘Blowing’ (of Trumpet) and ‘Lightning’; So on this day increase your blessing prayers for me (Salat-alan-Nabi) because your prayers are presented (offered) to me.” The Companions said: “O Prophet how is it possible when you are dust [i.e. your body consumed by the earth upon your demise]” and the Prophet replied, “God has forbidden the earth to consume the bodies of the prophets. (Musnad Ahmed)
Imam Bukhari has criticized this hadith (tradition) because of a fault in the chain of narrators. According to him, first, the hadith is narrated by an unreliable narrator—Adur-Rehaman bin Yazid bin Tammem—and second, another narrator—Hussain bin Ali al-Jaffai—has intentionally changed the liar’s name to Abdur-Rehman bin Yazid bin Jabbir. (Bukhari, Tarikh al-Kabber) Imam Abi-Hatim al-Razi has also rejected this narration (Illal-al-Hadith).
Furthermore, in another tradition the Prophet had said that “every son of Adam is eaten up by dust” (Kullu Ibnu Adam yakkuluhu turab). Here no exception is mentioned for Prophets, saints, or ordinary human beings. On the other hand, the Quran says that all deeds and matters are reported back to God (for decisions) (Holy Quran 3:109). Therefore, it should be clear that the prayer for the blessings of the Prophet, as well as all human acts and prayers go back to God Almighty alone, the disposer of all affairs.
2- To further support the cultic practices of dead worship, it is said that martyrs of Battle of Badr and Uhud are alive in their graves; but this is not correct either. The Quran says that those martyrs are “nearer to God and getting their sustenance” (Holy Quran 2:154 and 3:169).
The Prophet further explained that the martyrs’ souls are in the bodies of birds residing in Paradise and their nests are hanging by the Holy Throne. The martyrs move in the Paradise as they like and then return to their dwellings. When the martyrs found such an honor they asked God Almighty that their souls be returned to their bodies (so that once more they can die in God’s cause and inform their companions of such a great reward) (Sahih Muslim, Kitab-al-Imara). But as is ordained by God Almighty that man will have only “one earthly life” (explained below), their request was not granted, but through revelation to the Prophet it was told that they are in the best of abodes.
The Holy Quran says that there is a “Burzakh” (barrier, partition) between the departed soul and the world. By definition, Burzakh is a hindrance that could not be crossed over. As is explained in Surah Mominnon (believers), when the souls ask God Almighty to be returned to the world in order to perform the good deeds again, their request is rejected in these words: “before them (dead people) is a Burzakh till the day they are raised again” (Holy Quran 23:100).
Imam Muslim has further clarified that after death the soul is taken by the angels, and they go all the way up to the heavens until they reach the Divine presence. There it is commanded by God Almighty that the soul be kept in place until the day of resurrection (Sahih Muslim, No. 5119, Kitab-al-Janna wa Siffat).
3- Contrary to the above mentioned facts, the vast majority of Muslims believe that after death the soul of the deceased person is again reunited with his dead body in his worldly grave. In support of this belief a weak narration (reported by Barra bin Azzib) is presented claiming that the soul of the dead person, whether righteous or evil, returns to the body in the worldly grave, where it experiences the pleasure of heavens or torments of hell depending on its deeds. This lengthy narration is reported in Musnad Ahmed and Abu Dawood, et al.
First of all, the narration is in complete contradiction to Quranic teachings, which say that there are only two lives and two deaths for each human being (Holy Quran 2:28). The Holy Quran says that on the Day of Judgment the people will exclaim, “O God, you have given us two lives and two deaths” (Qallo Rabbana Amittana Ithnatain wa Ahyyaittana Ithnatain) (Holy Quran 40:11). This makes the matter very clear for us that for each living soul we have:
- one death (era of non-existence) - one life (this worldly life) - second death (the death upon termination of this worldly life) - second life (yet to come on the day of resurrection)
Therefore it is not possible for a dead body to receive its soul back and become alive in this “worldly” grave again.
Second, the narration of Barra bin Azzib is reported by untrustworthy narrators. Third, it is the rule of hadith scholarship that if a narrator reports something in support of his cultic ideas, such report should be rejected (Nakhbbatul-Fikar). The hadith under scrutiny is reported by the Shiite narrators who held the cultic views of grave worshipping. The narrators of this report are Minhal bin Umr and Zazzan; both are stalwart Shiites per Ibn Hajar and Jozzjani.
Although some Sunni scholars like Ibn-Qayyam have accepted this hadith as an authentic one, and therefore a source of inspiration to many Sunni sects believing in life after death in a worldly grave, for others the jury is still out. The report further claimed that after the soul is questioned on the seventh heaven, God commands that “soul be returned to body as it is created from dust.” This idea of the soul being created from dust cannot be found in any other tradition and is in direct contradiction with the hadith of Sahih Muslim, which states that soul is kept in “place” until the day of resurrection (discussed above).
It follows, therefore, that the idea of a “third” life in the worldly grave is neither found in the Quran nor is supported by any authentic hadith from Prophet Mohammad and therefore should be questioned. Those in favor of this preconceived idea draw erroneous conclusion from the following report in Sahih Bukhari, which states that after the battle of Badr the prophet commanded that the dead bodies of the pagans which were laying in the battle field be thrown into a well (for mass burial). He then stayed in the battle field and on the third day went up to the well with his companions and with a loud voice called upon the names of the famous personalities of Qurayshi pagans and asked ‘Have you not found the promise of God; A truth?’ (Sahih Bukhari)
It is argued that the dead people become alive to hear what the Prophet had to say and that this proves their point of view. In fact, the matter was made clear by another authentic hadith reported in Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim where Ayesha (the Prophet’s wife) said that this illustrates the fact that those pagans by then had known the truth (of Islam) and then she quoted the verse from the Holy Quran in which it is said that dead cannot be made to listen (27:80) and those who are dead and those who are living are not the same. On the other hand, Abdullah bin Umar looked upon this event as a miracle of Prophet Mohammad where dead pagans were made to hear on that particular day. A miracle by definition is something unusual that happens in extraordinary circumstances (Sahih al-Bukhari). Finally, in the Holy Quran, in a number of places, Prophet Abraham had spoken to idols, saying “why are you not eating?” Of course, he did not hold the belief that idols can listen; this is just an example of a figurative speech. This is exactly what Prophet Mohammad had shown in the battle field of Badr.
4- In another weak narration it is told that the Prophet’s soul is “returned” to his body whenever someone says Salam (peace) upon him (reported in Masnad Ahmed). This is, of course, quite strange. Are we to believe that multiple times the soul is given and taken out of Prophet’s body, as millions of Muslims send peace blessings to him each day? The use of the word “return” is quite disturbing here, as there is no explanation justifying its use. A number of scholars have rejected this report, and many others have accepted it with no sound reasoning.
Here it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of sleep and death as is explained in the Holy Quran. In Chapter Anam (Cattle) the Holy Quran says: “It is He Who doth take your souls by night and hath knowledge of all that ye have done by day. By day doth He raise you up again; that a term appointed be fulfilled; in the end unto Him will be your return, then will He show you the truth of all that ye did” (Holy Quran 6:60–61). Then in Chapter Zumur (Troops) it says: “It is Allah that takes the souls (of men) at death: and those that die not (He takes) during their sleep: those on whom He has passed the decree of death: He keeps back (from returning to life) but the rest He sends (to their bodies) for a term appointed. Verily in this are Signs for those who reflect” (39:42). In these verses a clear analogy between sleep and death can be appreciated except the fact that upon one’s death the soul is “kept back” from returning to the earthly body until the day of resurrection.
Precisely for these reasons, upon the demise of Prophet Mohammad a consensus was reached between the Companions of the Prophet that he in fact had passed away. The final words of the first Caliph, Abu Bakar Siddiq are on record that “Whoever worshiped Mohammad must know that he is dead” (mun kanna ubbudu mohammad fa inn-na mohammadan qad maat) and the matter was concluded on that same day. We know that the Prophet died on Monday and was buried on Tuesday. Clearly many among the Companions must have sent prayers of blessing to the Prophet after his demise but none witnessed or reported the phenomenon of his soul returning to his body. It was years later that such falsehood was concocted in his name.
We also know that the prophet has commanded Muslims to pray for him that he gets the best dwelling place, called “Al-Waseela,” in Heaven, which will be given to only one person, and he wished it for himself. (Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Salat, No. 577) The Prophet himself said that he had been shown a cloud-like dwelling in the heaven, where he will come after his death. (Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Jannaiz, No. 1297) In the presence of these reports it is clear that the Prophet is in his dwelling in the heaven. The Prophet opted to go into the divine presence instead of staying here on this earth, as at the time of his demise his last words were “Allahuma Rafiqul Aala” (O God, you are the best of Companions). Grave and ancestor worship is strictly forbidden in all three monotheistic religions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Though the prophets fought against such ideas, time and again pagan influences have corrupted the true monotheism of Abrahamic faiths.
Inferiority complex, it always surprises me how these scum have the audacity to demand and complain in someone else's country trying to make it their own...
I mean like, ever seen a negro, refugee etc that didn't walk on the streets as if they owned the place/country? They never feel shame or are humble, all their behavior is disrespectful (unconscious or not). If I was go to a country and they gave me everything free, I could not walk on the street holding my head up high and hang around in the public places to show around my tax paid clothes and hit on their women. Pure scum... (not that I could do this as a tourist either or without approval, shameful)
There should be a law against attitudes, vigilantism that makes it legal to physically teach respect, but nowadays everyone are shameless.