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PostSubject: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sat Mar 01, 2014 11:55 pm

I find hume's guillotine to be annoying argument, because there is no easy punchline to destroy, and it is very simple dualistic and absolute position in itself.

I find that natural order ought to be the supremacy of the fittest, but in a a wrld  of modern man the best, strong, intelligent, supreme are tangled by the avarage and their slave/herd morality.

So Hume claims that you cant make moral "ought/should"-claims from an observation of what an object is. So let's say that the object is a person or a group, and "ought to"-claim is forming an naturalistic ontological porpuse for the said individual/group.  Isn't person/group's identity by itself insight of the porpuse by will to power?  If there is an identity, then there is a common goal or will, and that will by itself is aknowledgement of what ought to be? Yourh thoughts.

Ps sorry for my grammar
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 12:32 am

sorry. I didn't read this thread first.

http://knowthyself.forumotion.net/t1393-values
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 1:02 am

Vrilseeker wrote:
So Hume claims that you cant make moral "ought/should"-claims from an observation of what an object is. So let's say that the object is a person or a group, and "ought to"-claim is forming an naturalistic ontological porpuse for the said individual/group.  Isn't person/group's identity by itself insight of the porpuse by will to power?  If there is an identity, then there is a common goal or will, and that will by itself is aknowledgement of what ought to be? Yourh thoughts.

Ps sorry for my grammar

Hume thinks that you cannot derive normative evaluations from descriptive facts. As you said, there’s nothing about the way the world is that tells you how it ought to be. I think Hume is wrong about that.

We don’t need to stand in dumb indecision before the question of whether a watch that keeps neither time nor anything else is a “good” watch. (“Not good” is an evaluative term, which is derived from descriptive facts about what the watch actually is).

If you think that a person has an intrinsic purpose, just based on what he is, his physiology etc, then you will think that normative evaluations can be derived from descriptive facts. But then, you will have just disagreed with Hume from the start. It’s interesting to think about why Hume might be wrong. It’s a puzzle.

You mentioned the will to power. You might want to think that Nietzsche’s will to power characterizes the bedrock of what you are, and then try to derive normative conclusions from there. That would be problematic.

‘Power’ simply refers to an ability-to-do-something. Conceptually, it’s empty. ‘Power’ is not a goal, anymore than money is---they are both simply the means to whatever your goal happens to be. So, ought you to strive to expand your power, (your abilities), simply because you are expanding your abilities? Or, does that strike you as missing something---like a goal? By analogy, do you want to make money, just so that you can make more money, and then eventually make more money, to ultimately make money?

I don’t agree with Hume’s conceptual distinction between facts and values. I think facts just are a kind of value, and that value colors the world and is inextricably bound up with it. However I also don’t think that you can derive a normative conclusion solely by thinking that you are the will to power, and nothing besides.

Anyways, just thinking out-loud. I think the plot has to thicken…

ADD ON:

Quote :
I find that natural order ought to be the supremacy of the fittest, but in a a wrld  of modern man the best, strong, intelligent, supreme are tangled by the avarage and their slave/herd morality.

It just occurred to me that if you think the world 'ought' to be the survival of the fittest, or whatever, but you also think the world is not currently that way, then you have derived a normative conclusion about the world NOT from descriptive facts about the world.

I.e., You can't bemoan the fact that the world is not the way you think it should be---and at the same time think that the place you are deriving your evaluation from is the world itself.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 3:53 am

Mo wrote:
You mentioned the will to power. You might want to think that Nietzsche’s will to power characterizes the bedrock of what you are, and then try to derive normative conclusions from there. That would be problematic.

I see will to power not as the norm, as there are very few who actually are "alpha". Will to power as I see it, is a active norm, in which the identity/animal has woken to the struggle for power. I observe too much apathy, and nihilism in my surrounding world to suggest that will to power would be standard of our existance. People endure because they are subjected from the very begining to paternalism and easy living.

Mo wrote:
It just occurred to me that if you think the world 'ought' to be the survival of the fittest, or whatever, but you also think the world is not currently that way, then you have derived a normative conclusion about the world NOT from descriptive facts about the world.

I actually think that this nihilistic world has hyper paternalism to thank for the absolute emasculation and apathy, and that the current world is reflection of the anti-naturalism, which has hyper extended the natural reactionary beta froms seen in nature.

Will to power = active  drive = alpha mentality
Survival =  passive, reactionary = beta mentality.

The two psychological form found in nature and in existance of identity.

Now I see this fairly obvious and logical to want to be better and more active role, especially if the existance for survival needs more alpha attitude. Identity is form of existance. The way a biological being expresses himself and projects himself by comparing it to his surroundings, and peers.

Identity is a sign of a will, and will is a sign of porpuse. Thus all identities have some kind of porpuse of succeeding in what they proseed to be their porpuse. Now we humans have the mental capacity to understand time, and abstract thinking due to our memory and linquistic skills. This also makes it easy to make abstract nihilistic and totally illogical and unnatural abstract constructs, which are not observable in reality. And because person is capable for doing so, he is also able to lie to himself do to his nihilistic tendencies of his psychology, which wasnt meant to undertand world as so. This makes human's understanding more decieving when comparing moral and logic.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 4:23 am

When I was reading Satyr's views on values, I came a cross the claim that values are not internal but external. That materialistic world has value by itself outside of subjective messurement.

But we as a people can judge and ignore natural and external values because of strong paternalism, and in our nihilism we have made a totally new value system that are far away from nature. This of cource hasn't happend reseantly by the modern man, but by the early man who was able to conquer nature by using his intellect.

We still see unified external value such as beauty of timeless art, monuments, and good tasteful food, because it resonates in more primitive mindset, and symbolizes excelence, and dominace. Timelesness of art is more real value, and good evidence of external value going down generation and resonating into the human psychie.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 6:56 am

Life is antagonistic towards reality.
It resists, as it is an ordering in the disordering.
This is a relationship of conflict, that can reach the extreme of Nihilism/Modernity, where the human part of reality is trying to impose an "ought" which totally reverses what "is".

There are philosophical, spiritual positions, other than the nihilistic, modern Judeo-Christian ones, which try to harmonize with nature, rather than antagonize.
This is the conflict between the masculine and feminine drives....and Paganism/Polytheism vs. Monism/Nihilism.

Since man is the product of reality this conflict takes on an internal, psychological, form.
Nihilism is, essentially, man imposing an "ought" which completely contradicts the "is" of his nature.
Modernity is a masculine ideal imposing itself upon a feminine drive.
This is why I said that feminism does not liberate females from paternalism, it simply gets rid of the middle-man, the biological representation, offering her direct access to the still dominating alpha now abstracted as an institution. This institutionalized, abstracted "male", appropriates feminine nature. He uses woman, her natural genetic filtering role, to bring about his own ideal...which is anti-nature, and so anti-female.
He masks his destructive, spirit, his nihilism, behind vague words, such as equality, freedom, humanity...
His goal is internal harmony, not harmony with nature, but contrary to nature, which is agon, an internal uniformity, stability, which is contrary to natural processes.
This is the emergence of a SuperOrganism.
The values forming within this SuperOrganism will unavoidably be contrary to the values, the standards of evaluating, which exist, existed, outside the SuperOrganic framework.

In nature value is determined by nature's processes - what is useful, what is rare, what is beneficial, what is not...
Within the SuperOrganism, all of this is controlled, manufactured, directed.
Supply/Demand within this SuperOrganism are determined by human interventions upon natural processes. not only upon the environment, but upon the human being itself...his psychology, his manufactured beliefs and standards of evaluating value.        

Values are related to motives, ideals.
The meme determines the standard by which something has value.
Memes emerge out of genetic natural selection, therefore, the first values are naturalistic, nature based, determined by survival within a natural environment.
Modernity is a meme that detaches from nature. This is reflected in the standards, how it evaluates.  
If the meme is contrary to genetic predisposition its values will be contrary to nature, and natural processes, if it is more in tune, in harmony with nature, then the standards, and so the values, will be more  in agreement with nature and natural processes.

Even the Nihilist, the Modern, cannot escape his basic needs, which determine the underlying values he applies.
He can change their names, dismiss them, forget them, deny them, but he cannot change them.
Modern man is in conflict with himself, so as to contradict nature, through himself.
When he detaches from nature, he is detaching from his own self.

This changes the standards and the evaluations he makes. He wants to makes values independent from the world that made him possible - become a God who determines himself, is master of his own fate.
This is a anti-nature nihilistic drive.
He dehamronizes with nature, so as to harmonize with an ideal - conflict of real and ideal.
His values reflect this destabilizing, disharmony. He creates paradoxes, and self-contradictions, in his wake.

His ideals because they are unreal, unnatural, are contradicted by nature, by reality.
This is why he desperately seeks to detach the concept from the perceived...attaching it to a word, which refers to an abstraction.
This is solipsism.
The concept, an abstraction, let's say equality, refers back to another abstraction.  

Because it has no reference outside the human brain, is hypothetical in other words, the sensual is replaced by the emotive.
Man feels its validity, does not perceive it anywhere.
The absence of a sensual, empirical, object/objective, is compensated by placing in its place an emotion.
The emotion is then projected beyond the immediate, where it can be contradicted and exposed as what it is, to the furthest beyond - in modern secularism it is this coming Future.

Love = God.
The emotion IS the abstraction, which is nowhere in evidence.
Sex/Lust = Love ---- Eros = Agape ---- Emotion = Reason
Love = Humanity, Oneness.
Hate = Inhumanity.
See?

The emotion facilitating survival strategies becomes a Holy thing. It is purified by making it a pure abstraction, felt as an emotion.
It is mystified by turning it into a vagueness with no reference anything but back in the human mind.

Man becomes special....only in him do these holy abstractions take vague form.
He is other than animal.
Arrogance via feigned humility.
Only a christian mind would think that it deserves eternal life.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 7:24 am

when a mind is detached form nature, his own primarily, he feels liberated from any external standard. His values are subjective, as they refer back to himself.
But he believes wrongly, because he is institutionalized, raised to think he is free, when in fact he is being shaped by memetic factors, by socioeconomic, cultural ideals...which takes his inescapable genetic predispositions and direct them, sublimate them, repress and enhance them, selectively.

His subjective values are cultural values. He, as an organism, is now totally immersed within the SuperOrganic structures.
His abstractions refer back to his own emotions, because emotions are primal, instinctive, the nexus between mind/body, not rational, automatic.

This turns the human into an easily manipulated brain.
His values are not reasoned, reasonable, but emotional, sensational.
Emotions can be connected, as automatic responses, to whatever stimuli.
The mind does not need to know why or how, he just feels the truth of it, the value of it.
He feels it in himself, his primal, reptilian brain, and so he thinks all values are subjective, with no objective substance.

He feels the value and since there is no objective standard his feelings are enough.
He is free to think as he wishes...his judgments, values, have no consequences, except for the trivial.  

This also frees him from other, and their judgments...their values.
An autoimmune defensiveness...individuality: divide and conquer.
A Zombie is culturally free, mentally liberated from human civilization...no sense of community, no past, no culture...pure need/hunger...yet totally dependent on human civilization, because it feeds on humans and emerges as a dis-ease within it.

A Zombie follows its own innate sensations.
It needs warm human flesh to consume - easily manipulated primary need.
It does not know why or for what reason, it just knows the hunger it feels inside itself.

It may come in huge shuffling numbers, but this is ineffective, not threatening, because each Zombie is free, liberated from its past. It amasses with no shared direction, except that dictated by hunger/need.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 3:26 pm

Mo wrote:


You mentioned the will to power. You might want to think that Nietzsche’s will to power characterizes the bedrock of what you are, and then try to derive normative conclusions from there. That would be problematic.

‘Power’ simply refers to an ability-to-do-something. Conceptually, it’s empty. ‘Power’ is not a goal, anymore than money is---they are both simply the means to whatever your goal happens to be. So, ought you to strive to expand your power,

No; you Are the Power, and you Tend to want to expand yourself, to grow more, become more...


Quote :
(your abilities), simply because you are expanding your abilities? Or, does that strike you as missing something---like a goal? By analogy, do you want to make money, just so that you can make more money, and then eventually make more money, to ultimately make money?

What is Amor Fati if one doesn't embrace the whole gamut, the whole process of willing itself for itself, life - as the ring's thirst for itself; self-joy to be again and again...
Saying, "yes, once more!"...



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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 4:02 pm

Lyssa wrote:
Quote :
You mentioned the will to power. You might want to think that Nietzsche’s will to power characterizes the bedrock of what you are, and then try to derive normative conclusions from there. That would be problematic.
No; you Are the Power, and you Tend to want to expand yourself, to grow more, become more...

Right. Here's the problem for trying to derive a normative conclusion from the view that 'will to power' is what you are. Power is not a goal---it's simply an ability, or a means, like money is. Power for power's sake, is like trying to make money for the paper it's printed on. Money is only worth what it can get you. And the same applies to power. If money (or power) can get you what you want, then it is only as valuable as the target of your wants, to you.

Any normative evaluation (e.g., "good or bad") that is taken from descriptive facts about a creature relies on the notion that that creature has some purpose built into its physiology, or else built into other descriptive facts about the world. For example, the wrist-watch is a bad wrist-watch because it doesn't keep time. But if keeping time was NOT the purpose of the watch, then I couldn't say it was actually a 'bad' watch. The same applies to humans.

Have you seen the comedy movie "Joe Dirt", about the white trash janitor who's life philosophy was to "keep on keepin' on"?

The problem for Nietzscheans is that 'power' is not a telos. Or, if you try to make it a purpose of creatures such as us, you start to look like Joe Dirt. That's if you think of 'power' as "an ability to". If power, or 'the will to power' has any value at all, it is only because some actual purpose is built into whatever creature we're talking about. If no purpose, then no chance of saying that the creature has succeeded or failed---no normative evaluation, etc.

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EDIT:

How empty is 'will to power' as a goal/purpose? Here's Nietzsche in his own words, in 1887, a few years before breakdown.
- "It is only late that one musters the courage for what one really knows. That I have hitherto been a thorough-going nihilist, I have admitted to myself only recently" (Will to Power 25).

So at least he's not Joe Dirt...
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 4:24 pm

Will to power...not Omnipotence.


will TO....
A movement towards an object/objective...a projected destination never to be attained.
Will to LIFE...not immortality.
Will to KNOWLEDGE...not omniscience.
Will to Power...not omnipotence.
Will to Being, Becoming...not God.

It is the towards which gives the traveler his character, his nature, not the attainment of the absolute, which is always absent, but the quality of the projected object/objective, motivating, driving, inspiring him...and the degree of his approach.

Retards continue to use words in absolute ways, when it suits them...and then use them vaguely when it suits them.
Words are artistic, symbolic, metaphorical.

In math there is no nil or one outside human brains.

No teleos, that would be Nihilistic.

Will to God, same thing.
Will to oneness, same thing.

The attainment? Impossible. the need, the drive, the desire to attain it...it exposes the traveler's psirit of Becoming.
Will to uniformity, equality, parity....same thing.

Will (aggregate energies focused)...TO(movement, action, direction)...POWER (an ideal)...it can be replaced by anything, but power implies energy, action, not a static thing, a teleos, an absolute.

All value judgments are comparisons.
Power - not omnipotence,  one is more or less powerful in relation to another, a something.
Knowledge/Awareness - not omniscience,  one is more or less aware in relation to another, a something.
Beauty - not perfection, one is more or less beautiful, symmetrical in relation to another.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 5:13 pm

Satyr wrote:
Will to power...not Omnipotence.

will TO....
A movement towards an object/objective...a projected destination never to be attained.
Will to LIFE...not immortality.
Will to KNOWLEDGE...not omniscience.
Will to Power...not omnipotence.
Will to Being, Becoming...not God.  

It is the towards which gives the traveler his character, his nature, not the attainment of the absolute, which is always absent, but the quality of the projected object/objective, motivating, driving, inspiring him...and the degree of his approach.  

Retards continue to use words in absolute ways, when it suits them...and then use them vaguely when it suits them.

Retards continue to talk to themselves, about someone who is not in the thread, or abstractly about some phantom that they imagine they are talking to.

'Power' = 'ability-to'. There's no goal there. Power on its own is not a goal any more than any means is---any tool---it is simply a means.

It has zero to do with omniscience, any of the omni's, immortality, or anything else. There's not a single goal, no matter how worldly, no matter how comparative, in the concept of power. Power is a means, the same as money, the same as any tool. You don't love money because it is money, nor power because it is power---you want them because of what they can help you get, which is entirely absent in the concept of 'will to power' itself. Whether that goal is elsewhere in Nietzsche is a separate topic.

Excellence at what you are.
Beauty by the forms of who you are.
Understanding of things.
---Those are goals. Power alone is not.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Sun Mar 02, 2014 6:37 pm

You keep thinking in absolutes, turd.

Power is not a thing.
The point you are making is only one minds like yours make.
You are stating the obvious.

Power is a relationship, an activity.
You can call it "means".

Power for the sake of power means power to act freely, without limitations.
Infinite possibility.
To have on-standby the ability to be anything, at any time.
Like beauty...a form of power - order, symmetry. Not for its own sake, but as a "means."
Let's use your words.  

Nobody claimed power was a goal, but only an object/objective, a value in relation, in comparison.
Power so as to not have your actions limited.
A towards increasing probability.

Mo wrote:
Retards continue to talk to themselves, about someone who is not in the thread, or abstractly about some phantom that they imagine they are talking to.
Indeed.
Who has claimed power to be attainable, or a thing?

You are debating the straw-men you've built about KT.

Power = energy, (inter)activity.

"Ability to" turd = possibility, absolute possibility being the attainment of all possibility.

Omnipotence = absolute possibility(the singularly probable), infinite possibility = the nil.
GOD.

The negation of the possible through the attainment of all that is possible.
Possibility as a singularity of the absolutely probable.
The negation of activity...no more "will to".

You use it as an absolute so as to then deny it.
Nobody here claims otherwise....perhaps on ILP.   

Existence = (inter)activity.
Beauty not for its sake, but as a means.
Life, as a means.
Knowledge....
Every fuckin' word.

Even omnipotence, omniscience implies a means.

Race = manifest (inter)activity.
Inherited "will to"...inherited possibility, potential.
No absolute, no thing, no being.

Nature = sum of all nurturing...not a thing.
A process.  

Female/Male, action...the act of behaving as a female/male, femininity/masculinity, in relation to a role, a means.

Femininity/Masculinity = the behavior, activity, thinking, as a male, as this facilitates a particular role - a means....towards REPRODUCTION.
Gender, the symbols this behavior/thinking acquires within particular cultural circumstances.

Maleness...not as a goal, a thing, but as a means.
A relationship with a female, the other role, in the heterosexual "will to...".

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 6:27 am

Mo wrote:
Lyssa wrote:
Quote :
You mentioned the will to power. You might want to think that Nietzsche’s will to power characterizes the bedrock of what you are, and then try to derive normative conclusions from there. That would be problematic.
No; you Are the Power, and you Tend to want to expand yourself, to grow more, become more...

Right. Here's the problem for trying to derive a normative conclusion from the view that 'will to power' is what you are. Power is not a goal---it's simply an ability, or a means, like money is. Power for power's sake, is like trying to make money for the paper it's printed on. Money is only worth what it can get you. And the same applies to power. If money (or power) can get you what you want, then it is only as valuable as the target of your wants, to you.

Any normative evaluation (e.g., "good or bad") that is taken from descriptive facts about a creature relies on the notion that that creature has some purpose built into its physiology, or else built into other descriptive facts about the world. For example, the wrist-watch is a bad wrist-watch because it doesn't keep time. But if keeping time was NOT the purpose of the watch, then I couldn't say it was actually a 'bad' watch. The same applies to humans.

Do I need a reason to affirm myself?

Do I need a reason to affirm life?

Do I need someone to give me my purpose for me?

Your problem is a way of asking Who decides what is noble and what is not?

The forms Nihilism takes acc. to him:

Quote :

1. "What all these notions have in common is that something is to be achieved through the process-and now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nolhing.- Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of nihilism..."

Quote :

2. "Nihilism as a psychological state is reached, secondly, when one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, and underneath all events, and a soul that longs to admire and revere has wallowed in the idea of some supreme form of domination and administration (-if the soul be that of a logician, complete consistency and real dialectic are quite sufficient to reconcile it to everything). Some sort of unity, some form of "monism": this faith suffices to give man a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a mode of the deity.- "The well-being of the universal demands the devotion of the individual"-but behold, there is no such universal!
At bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such a whole in order to be able to believe in his own value."

Quote :
3. "The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-some thing-true, is necessarily false because there simply is no true world. Thus: a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us (in so far as we continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified world).
-That it is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies.
To this extent, nihilism, as the denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way of thinking."


"Can we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this?- This would be the case if something were attained at every moment within this process - and always the same. Every basic character trait that is encountered at the bottom of every event, that finds expression in every event, would have to lead every individual who experienced it as his own basic character trait to welcome every moment of universal existence with a sense of triumph. The crucial point would be that one experienced this."

"It is your dearest Self, your virtue. The ring`s thirst is in you: to reach itself again struggleth every ring, and turneth itself."


"Will strives for what it wills not just as for something that it does not yet have. Will already has what it wills. For will wills its willing. Its will is what it has willed. Will wills itself. It exceeds itself. In this way will as will wills above and beyond itself, and therefore at the same time it must bring itself beneath and behind itself. This is why Nietzsche can say all amounts to the will to become  stronger, the will to grow. . . " where "stronger" indicates "more power," and that means: only power. For the essence of power is to be master over the level of power attained at a particular time. Power is power only when and only for as long as it is an increase in power and commands for itself "more power."  halt the increase of power only for a moment, merely to stand still atone level of power, is already the beginning of a decline in power.

In the expression "Will to Power" the word "power" gives the essence of the mode in which will wills itself to the extent that it is command. As command, will joins itself to itself, i.e., to what it has willed. This self-gathering is the empowering of power. Will exists for itself no more than power for itself. Will and power, therefore, are not subsequently linked by  the will to power; rather, will, as the will to will, exists as the will to power in the sense of the empowerment of power. Power, however, has its essence in the fact that it stands in relation to will as the will that is inside the will. The will to power is the essence of power. It indicates the absolute essence of will which wills itself as sheer will. Hence the will to power cannot be dropped in favor of a will to something else, e.g., the "will to nothing"; for this will too is still the will to will - that is what enables Nietzsche to say (On the Genealogy of Morals, Third Treatise, § i, from 1887): "it [the will] will will nothing rather than not will." [Heid. on N.'s WTP]

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There is no external telos, there Needs to be No external telos as this is real-ized within the basic feature of living itself.

Who says what is noble and what is not then?

If the basic feature of life is self-affirmative growth and directing itself to its own near-recurrence, then that kind of life or living embodying and mirroring this very life itself is most noble.
Life's affirmative joy for itself - the whole web of nausea, is the Norm.
Ignoble is what cannot affirm that web of nausea, what calls the intolerable-to-it as Evil, as Fascists,... whatever.
Affirmation every minute of the whole Past, the whole cross-section of life as its Self...

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 11:45 am

Lyssa wrote:
Do I need a reason to affirm myself?
Would you have a problem if just anyone and everyone affirmed themselves, always, no matter who they were or what they did? (Or, do you think that some people are not automatically deserving of their own high opinion of themselves?) ---Because if so, then yes, you also need a reason why you are worth your own affirmation.

Quote :
Do I need a reason to affirm life?
Would you cling to life-in-general at all costs, no matter which of your values you had to disgrace in the process? If no, then yes, you need a reason to affirm life-in-general.

Quote :
Do I need someone to give me my purpose for me?
No, of course not. But you cannot think that your purpose is good just because you think it is. You don't get to decide certain things, anymore than you get to decide whether you have a spleen, or whether you need it. That doesn't mean someone else does, though.

Quote :
Your problem is a way of asking Who decides what is noble and what is not?
Hm? No, I don't think so.

Quote :
If the basic feature of life is self-affirmative growth and directing itself to its own near-recurrence, then that kind of life or living embodying and mirroring this very life itself is most noble.
Life's affirmative joy for itself - the whole web of nausea, is the Norm.
Ignoble is what cannot affirm that web of nausea, what calls the intolerable-to-it as Evil, as Fascists,... whatever.
Affirmation every minute of the whole Past, the whole cross-section of life as its Self...
Nietzsche thought that the idea of an eternal recurrence would be a terror for some people, worse than hell. He thought that because your life is not automatically worthy of an encore, by default. So to have it repeated could, for some people, be a torture played out eternally. That does not mean there's some transcendent, exterior purpose of things (or you), independent of what you are.



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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 11:58 am

Mo wrote:
No, of course not. But you cannot think that your purpose is good just because you think it is. You don't get to decide certain things, anymore than you get to decide whether you have a spleen, or whether you need it. That doesn't mean someone else does, though.

Making an absolute split(biological "uncontrollables"... "certain" things) and transferring that to a relativity of decision making?
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 12:55 pm

Mo wrote:
Lyssa wrote:
Do I need a reason to affirm myself?
Would you have a problem if just anyone and everyone affirmed themselves, always, no matter who they were or what they did?

Am I concerned with my subjective opinion of how I "would like" things to be or am I talking about an objective reality of the world "as it is"... i.e. to say, anyone and everyone DO affirm themselves no matter who they were - from saints to monsters...
Will-to-Power of one's self - to be more self-same - is the basic feature of every living kind.
With some, this will-to-power is auto-self-affirmative, and with some, this WTP manifests as affirmation-through-ressentiment-of-other...
Whatever the case, strong/weak, that one wants to grow more, that everything wills its own self-preservation to become more is an objective feature of our reality,, and my having/not having a problem has nothing to do with it.

In terms of building a society, that culture thrives best which in fact does promote Everyone affirming themselves to the max. no matter who they were and what they did... increasing conflict but without letting it de-form into an an-archy. And that's the problem with today's modernism - not everyone is allowed to affirm themselves; conflict is stiffled maneuvering it into harmless channels of release, and the masculine spirit is domesticated, en-blanked out of its past and heritage, no scope for affirmation...

Quote :

(Or, do you think that some people are not automatically deserving of their own high opinion of themselves?) ---Because if so, then yes, you also need a reason why you are worth your own affirmation. Would you cling to life-in-general at all costs, no matter which of your values you had to disgrace in the process? If no, then yes, you need a reason to affirm life-in-general.

HA. Asking for a reason, a rational justification for my self-worth is the germ of nihilism growing; would I pause to ask if its worth breathing?
Who/what should give me my justification for my self-worth for me?
Even the dumbest dumb show Health when they exercise their will to power through cunning, through any means necessary to preserve themselves...
Even the most miserable show Health when they persevere with no hope at all into the future, by becoming slaves to masters, letting themselves be conquered...
Even the most lunatic imbecile shows Health when he/she thinks they deserve to live...

Whether I want so and so to live or not live is a different issue.

The one who goes to die in battle without clinging to life is as affirmative of himself and life at large, just as much as the one who clinging to life and enduring any disgrace hides about to survive and extend his purpose whatever it may be.

There is affirmation of life - which is what I'm talking about;
and there is affirmation of Kinds of life - which is what you're talking about.

Would a noble pagan need to justify his life to himself when compelled to bow his head before a Xt. bishop or face death? Yes; he would need to justify his choices to himself, and that justification is derived from his own code of honour set by himself. Who needs to give him that?

Would a noble pagan need to justify living his life according to his inner design that demands his own set of laws? No.

Quote :

Quote :
Do I need someone to give me my purpose for me?
No, of course not. But you cannot think that your purpose is good just because you think it is. You don't get to decide certain things, anymore than you get to decide whether you have a spleen, or whether you need it. That doesn't mean someone else does, though.

Why is it always about medical health and vitamins to you when it comes to metaphors? Just curious.

And no, if my purpose, promotes my health, my well-being, yes it is Good-for-me - is what I would say if I were noble.
Good-for-all is what the herd would say.

In general, no one gives no one their purpose; every thing affirms what helps it grow, flourish, expand, etc.

Quote :

Quote :
Your problem is a way of asking Who decides what is noble and what is not?
Hm? No, I don't think so.

I think so; esp. from the watch comment.
You said one cannot say a watch is good or bad if it lacks the very purpose keeping time.
And power being no telos that way - and therefore not a good barometer of a normative for determining if this way or life or that is good, noble, etc.

Quote :

Quote :
If the basic feature of life is self-affirmative growth and directing itself to its own near-recurrence, then that kind of life or living embodying and mirroring this very life itself is most noble.
Life's affirmative joy for itself - the whole web of nausea, is the Norm.
Ignoble is what cannot affirm that web of nausea, what calls the intolerable-to-it as Evil, as Fascists,... whatever.
Affirmation every minute of the whole Past, the whole cross-section of life as its Self...
Nietzsche thought that the idea of an eternal recurrence would be a terror for some people, worse than hell. He thought that because your life is not automatically worthy of an encore, by default. So to have it repeated could, for some people, be a torture played out eternally. That does not mean there's some transcendent, exterior purpose of things (or you), independent of what you are.

Never claimed the bolded.

Let me add; N. thought the ER would be a terror for some people precisely because it would be the ground that would force everything to acknowledge WTP as its basic feature of life, and therefore from the slave to the master, everything would be brought on the Same EVEN ground, same plane of "having to" confront each other - levelled by this equality - this equality of facing the slave is an expression of WTP just as much as the master too is an expression of his WTP.
ER becomes a levelling device forcing everything to affirm themselves - the false comfort of morality being taken away, no refuge for the weak to hide in religions of comfort and pity like J.-Xt. Open War - clashes of diff. degrees & kinds of WTP.[/quote]
[/quote]

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 2:14 pm

perpetualburn wrote:
Making an absolute split(biological "uncontrollables"... "certain" things) and transferring that to a relativity of decision making?
I'm not sure what you're asking, or objecting to.

Lyssa wrote:
Am I concerned with my subjective opinion of how I "would like" things to be or am I talking about an objective reality of the world "as it is"... i.e. to say, anyone and everyone DO affirm themselves no matter who they were - from saints to monsters...

That anyone and everyone does affirm themselves always... is not what I see when I look at the world. I also don't think it is something that Nietzsche said, as a descriptive claim about the world. Though I could be wrong about that. But if he thought that that was actually what people already do, and can't help but do, then there'd be no reason to normatively prescribe it for some people---which I think he did.

Quote :
Whatever the case, strong/weak, that one wants to grow more, that everything wills its own self-preservation to become more is an objective feature of our reality,, and my having/not having a problem has nothing to do with it.
Self-preservation is not the same thing as self-enhancement, and they often conflict, as in the case of almost every risk you take. Nietzsche's WTP is not the same thing as Schopenhauer’s 'will-to-live'.

Leaving aside Nietzsche for the moment, my question is whether you think that 'power' is actually a goal for creatures such as us. Or, is someone who accumulates power their whole life without any other direction like someone who accumulates hammers and tools, but never uses them to build something, or like someone who accumulates money for its own sake, and never to spend it on anything else.

This is a problem that I think Nietzsche confronted, when he realized that without more to say he was still teetering on nihilism. Anyways, whatever the reason you pursue power, it does not have to be some reason outside yourself---but I tend to think you need to say something more than just "power for power's sake".

Quote :
HA. Asking for a reason, a rational justification for my self-worth is the germ of nihilism growing; would I pause to ask if its worth breathing?
No, asking for a reason why you value what you value is basic. ---That was Nietzsche's entire life-project, in a nutshell---i.e., questioning the value of our values.

To ask for a reason why you do what you do is essential to keep you from twiddling your thumbs for the rest of your life, and yet thinking that it's all good because you're affirming yourself, and that you're valuable by default.

Quote :
Why is it always about medical health and vitamins to you when it comes to metaphors? Just curious.
It fits with the general Nietzsche-speak of 'strong' and 'weak', physiology, non-transcendence, etc. Physical health is also a good example of a domain of things that are opinion-independent, but also subject-dependent.

Quote :
Let me add; N. thought the ER would be a terror for some people precisely because it would be the ground that would force everything to acknowledge WTP as its basic feature of life, and therefore from the slave to the master, everything would be brought on the Same EVEN ground, same plane of "having to" confront each other - levelled by this equality - this equality of facing the slave is an expression of WTP just as much as the master too is an expression of his WTP.
ER becomes a levelling device forcing everything to affirm themselves
WTP and ER are separate, and separable. One isn’t any kind of support for the other.

ER is compatible with the notion of a 'will to laying on a beach', just the same as a WTP.
WTP is compatible with a crash and burn view of the universe, rather than a cyclical one, or most anything else. If you disagree with that, you can say why.[/quote]
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 2:31 pm

Mo wrote:
No, of course not. But you cannot think that your purpose is good just because you think it is. You don't get to decide certain things, anymore than you get to decide whether you have a spleen, or whether you need it. That doesn't mean someone else does, though.


perpetualburn wrote:
Making an absolute split(biological "uncontrollables"... "certain" things) and transferring that to a relativity of decision making?

Mo wrote:
I'm not sure what you're asking, or objecting to.

I was trying to tease out what you were getting at and seeing if you agreed or not with my assessment. You say some things cannot be decided(there's an implication, though not necessarily definite I guess, of an absolute in not getting to decide) and then go on to say that even though you don't get a say in some things, it doesn't necessarily mean others do... so my implications to relativism... Or maybe an ambivalence to the construction of things and thus an ambivalence to decision making.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 3:04 pm

perpetualburn wrote:
Mo wrote:
No, of course not. But you cannot think that your purpose is good just because you think it is. You don't get to decide certain things, anymore than you get to decide whether you have a spleen, or whether you need it. That doesn't mean someone else does, though.

I was trying to tease out what you were getting at and seeing if you agreed or not with my assessment.  You say some things cannot be decided(there's an implication, though not necessarily definite I guess, of an absolute in not getting to decide) and then go on to say that even though you don't get a say in some things, it doesn't necessarily mean others do... so my implications to relativism... Or maybe an ambivalence to the construction of things and thus an ambivalence to decision making.

I'm not sure what you mean by an 'absolute'.
If you mean something that applies across all time and space, to everyone regardless of context, then no. I don't have a stock of those. But side point, if that's what you mean, then Nietzsche's WTP fits the definition of an absolute. It's a claim that catches all.
If you mean something transcendent, beyond the world, then no. I wouldn't be claiming that either.

I think that to make an evaluation of any given evaluation---which is what Nietzsche was doing when he was judging the value of our values---you have to presume that the truth of your evaluation is independent of your opinion, or the opinion of anyone else. If it were only the opinion of people that made their values valuable, then you wouldn't be able to declare yours better---because you just granted that your opinion had no firmer footing than theirs. --THAT would be relativism.

Ultimately, there's a difference between saying, "This is valuable, for me", and saying" This is valuable because I think it is". The latter is relativism, the former is probably just a kind of perspectivism. That's an important difference I think. You can ground one in a kind of objectivity (or opinion independence), based on facts about what you are.
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Mon Mar 03, 2014 5:09 pm

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Value is a construct based on the past, projected as a future usefulness.

Since the past is immutable, and not a personal construct, the projection of usefulness can be manufactured by manipulating the knowledge and/or understanding of what has been, affecting the projected usefulness in the future.

Nature is another way of saying "past", and it includes more than the past beginning at an organism's birth.
The past, essentially, includes memetic and primarily genetic nurturing, the former being a more shallow, effect, since nature, natural environments, precede the emergence of culture, manmade environments.

The immediacy of the effect makes it a stronger factor, even if it is shallow in perspective.
The shallower ones perspective the shallower the accuracy of the projected intent, the usefulness.

--------------------

All value judgments are comparisons.

Comparisons between more immediate and more deeper knowledge of the past...between self, as one knows it and understands it, and an average, or an individual otherness...comparison between ideal and perceived real...and so on.
Depending on the depth and quality of the comparison, the value judgments can be manufactured, based on a human constructs, a memetic standard, or inherited as a genetic predisposition, evolved before the emergence of cultural standards.

For example...the value of a car can be an artificially produced judgment based on socioeconomic cultural factors.
The value of salt, fats, the evaluation of sexual desire (sexual appeal), based on the others genetic fitness, is not  a product of human culture.

All values judgments are assessed within a standard of "usefulness,"  or "means towards an end", because no end is ever attained.
The end, the projected absolute object/objective, is moved towards.
The value is measured against this approach towards an underlying, presumed, if not always stated or known, projected absolute.

Since the assessment is based on the knowledge and understanding of the past, any projection of usefulness in the future is avoidably determined by this.
The judgment is not subjectively determined as being correct or not, because reality cares not for personal judgments and how humans think.
The precision, and quality of the value judgments will be determined by how precise, honest, lucid they are, as this relates to any future human, manmade, environment, and to an ever-changing natural world, tending towards the random, but not altering at the same rate as human artificial constructs.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 2:05 pm

Mo wrote:

Lyssa wrote:Am I concerned with my subjective opinion of how I "would like" things to be or am I talking about an objective reality of the world "as it is"... i.e. to say, anyone and everyone DO affirm themselves no matter who they were - from saints to monsters...

That anyone and everyone does affirm themselves always... is not what I see when I look at the world. I also don't think it is something that Nietzsche said, as a descriptive claim about the world. Though I could be wrong about that. But if he thought that that was actually what people already do, and can't help but do, then there'd be no reason to normatively prescribe it for some people---which I think he did.

It is my understanding that he did so, esp. when he remarks in the WTP that the worst nihilist, the destroyers and the self-destroyers, would still rather affirm something [their weak will] than nothing. Anti-natalists belong here. Its also the case when he remarks the strong characters of antiquity in awe of their feats and incapable of attributing their achievements to self-agency, have them transferred to God - self-affirmation takes many moods and expressions.
The need today is *because* instincts have failed, "highest values have devalued themselves", norms have to be re-set instead of letting them slide to a default - this project is the revaluation of new values to not just "restore" what has declined, but trans-form and raise it higher, new norms for a new kind of being, new kind of a race of men.

Mo wrote:

Quote :Whatever the case, strong/weak, that one wants to grow more, that everything wills its own self-preservation to become more is an objective feature of our reality,, and my having/not having a problem has nothing to do with it.

Self-preservation is not the same thing as self-enhancement, and they often conflict, as in the case of almost every risk you take. Nietzsche's WTP is not the same thing as Schopenhauer’s 'will-to-live'.

Yes, I know that; I was saying whether I have a problem of x-type of man and y-type of man and z-type of man expressing their WTP is irrelavnt to the observation that WTP is the underlying feature of all x, y, z types of beings...
I do have a problem with a slave rising to power and setting up some "ought-to"s and commandments,,, but my having a problem with him is irrelavant to the observation this slave's commandment is an expression of his WTP, his growth, his will to self-preservation & flourishing,,, as would the case with any other type of life.

Mo wrote:
Leaving aside Nietzsche for the moment, my question is whether you think that 'power' is actually a goal for creatures such as us. Or, is someone who accumulates power their whole life without any other direction like someone who accumulates hammers and tools, but never uses them to build something, or like someone who accumulates money for its own sake, and never to spend it on anything else.

I am trying to point out Your very asking this question - "if power suffices for a sufficiently worthy telos?" is ITSELF an expression of Your WTP.

Power underlies every value-judgement. To Exist is to Interpret. Interpretation is a power-derivative.
Hence Sloterdijk [Nietzsche: Thinker on Stage] presents N.'s own worldview of WTP as the bedrock of life - as only still just 'a' WTP.
"Progress toward "naturalness": questions of power are at stake - "what one can do," and only after that what one ought to do.'" [WTP, 124]

The questions we ask about values and how we are living and how we ought to live and how those values can/ought/if justified, etc. are all mirror expressions of life's own feature of self-recurring self-assertions from the lowest to the highest;

Quote :
Play requires us to let go of law’s role as the curtailer of arbitrariness. The second model is that of resis- tance, framed by Nietzsche’s analysis of power and Deleuze’s distinction between active and reactive forces. The insight here is that power requires resistance, and it is law’s primary function to empower the other in order to invest value in meeting and confronting him; thus the monism of the will to power not only does not do away with normativity in the public sphere but actually requires it — but for goals opposite to those of liberal- ism. Resistance is linked to the third model, fashioned after Nietzsche’s model of education: here, law performs not as a socializing agent but rather as a liberator of authenticity. Its function is analogous to that of a mentor whose role is ultimately to encourage the pupil into coming into her own will, shedding ressentiment and bad conscience in an active, non-conscious way; in its relation to consciousness it moves in an opposite direction to that of psychoanalysis. A fourth consideration is then offered, the role of normativity in self-overcoming, or self-legislating; namely, how does normativity figure in the will to power’s most significant challenge?
While these models work from an interpretation of the will to power as becoming, the last two are especially dependent on the active-reactive distinction. The cornerstone is not to confuse power with representations of power. It is not the will that desires power (as an object of desire that would necessarily involve a representation of power), but power that wills becoming.
At the outset stands Deleuze’s comment in pointing out a common mistake among philosophers prior to Nietzsche, namely equating the will to power with some scheme of representation. Grammatically, in the sentence “the will desires power” the use of the word “power” entails a representation of something that the will desires. This indeed is a mistaken reading generated by a linguistic blunder. It is not the will that wants power, but power that desires: “pouvoir est ce qui veut dans le vouloir [power is that which wants in the wanting.]” Indeed it is exactly the decadent will, ridden by ressentiment, that desires power. The will to power is the drive to become more, a mode of being that is constantly becoming."
[Peter Goodrich, Nietzsche and Legal Theory]

Power wants itself. And the worthy part of having it as an immanent 'telos' is from the perspective, one wants to be more and more Master of Oneself... power over oneself... this is a noble asceticism and the opposite of wanting money for money's sake. God-ness is a state of efficiency - 'Giving' more by 'Spending' less and less.

"To "humanize" the world, i.e., to feel ourselves more and more masters within it-" [WTP, 614]

So the N. framework of power 'need' not paint the pic. of an animal Acquisition, turning on the same miserable wheel of samsara again and again, but a Giving more and more...

This has deep resonance in the sacrificial world-view of the I.E. pagans.
Power ex-Tends man. Sacrifice [gift-giving] ex-Tends man.

Mo wrote:
This is a problem that I think Nietzsche confronted, when he realized that without more to say he was still teetering on nihilism. Anyways, whatever the reason you pursue power, it does not have to be some reason outside yourself---but I tend to think you need to say something more than just "power for power's sake".

He acknowledged this in a better remark than the one you presented;

"What is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He, however, creates man’s goal and gives the earth its meaning and its future. That anything at all is good and evil—that is his creation." [TSZ, III, 12]

This freeing-up-for-activity kind of nihilism, he called Active, not something he saw as "problematic".

N.'s WTP does not say power is For acquiring more power, but power itself IS an acquiring of more power to not acquire more power. To attain that state of Indifference - Ataraxia.

That is the meaning of everything striving to be God.


Mo wrote:

Quote :HA. Asking for a reason, a rational justification for my self-worth is the germ of nihilism growing; would I pause to ask if its worth breathing?

No, asking for a reason why you value what you value is basic. ---That was Nietzsche's entire life-project, in a nutshell---i.e., questioning the value of our values.

Normative-thinking is not the same as thinking About Normativity.
N. does not question Why the healthy being prefers life and the slave decadence,,, he as you say, questions, the value of a healthy being thinking that way...

Mo wrote:

Quote :Why is it always about medical health and vitamins to you when it comes to metaphors? Just curious.

It fits with the general Nietzsche-speak of 'strong' and 'weak', physiology, non-transcendence, etc. Physical health is also a good example of a domain of things that are opinion-independent, but also subject-dependent.

Ok.

Mo wrote:
Quote :Let me add; N. thought the ER would be a terror for some people precisely because it would be the ground that would force everything to acknowledge WTP as its basic feature of life, and therefore from the slave to the master, everything would be brought on the Same EVEN ground, same plane of "having to" confront each other - levelled by this equality - this equality of facing the slave is an expression of WTP just as much as the master too is an expression of his WTP.
ER becomes a levelling device forcing everything to affirm themselves.

WTP and ER are separate, and separable. One isn’t any kind of support for the other.

I am saying N. presented the ER as a Mode of thinking, living, feeling, assessing, in which the WTP as the "equivalent" feature, the "levelling" feature of all life forms becomes obvious. Master and Slave are thrown together in the same Even playground, the same Even default where they both will "have to" recognize each other as the same naturalism, without one of them hiding himself and taking refufe in the comfort of Xt. morality - that he "deserves to live" because "God" "loves" him... the world then appears for what it is - naturalism restored - the slave as slave and the master as master.

The ER "sifts" distinctions by bringing every kind of WTP in the Same sieve.

Its a selection mechanism... and how its tied to the WTP in the larger understanding - life as rank expressions of value-distinctions.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 2:07 pm

A Norm is set up with a particular goal in life.

Goals are not given, not pre-set, we create them, we posit them.

What kind of society do we want in lieu of what kind of Individual do we want to see bred by it, and vice-versa?
That which raises us.

What form of life is the Highest? - That which can justify the worst in life... [N.'s remark here that the best thing the worst thing that the french revolution was and made possible was 'a' Napoleon...]

What can justify the worst in life? - That which affirms every moment since life began as the lace or web leading back to itself - the whole section, the whole disgust... leading back to making its life a possibility, a reality...

Why is this kind of justification noble?
Because it in turn inspires US to live, to affirm ourselves as every moment since the past...  affirming our past is limiting, but limiting in the way a dam empowers a river current, given there's enough current, enough spirit - it uplifts us past our gravity and opens a newer vista from a higher height.
"To attain a height and bird's eye view, so one grasps how everything actually happens as it ought to happen; how every kind of "imperfection" and the suffering to which it gives rise are part of the highest desirability." [WTP, 1004]

This vista allows it to recognize different norms for sculpting different types of people for different needs and functions to live efficiently [Manu's law, Plato's law, - the tripartition norm based on the three 'gunas' - sattva, rajas, tamas,,,, or reason, will, passion]...

I think this is a fine passage to describe his normative-thoughts About the normative:

"Not to make men "better," not to preach morality to them in any form, as if "morality in itself," or any ideal kind of man, were given; but to  create conditions that  require stronger men who for their part need, and consequently will have, a morality (more clearly: a physical-spiritual discipline) that makes them strong!" [N.'s emphasis; WTP, 981]


Are you an Elitist who believes in Hierarchy - as in the free expressions of natural rank differences?

What kind of individual do you want to breed? What kind of society? What kind of man is your goal? What kind of life is most excellent and what kind of man is likely to fulfill it best?

...will decide how you draft and from where you draw your normative.


And now to ask you,

Are you an Elitist Mo, who believes in Hierarchy - as in the free expressions of natural rank differences?

What kind of individual do you want to breed? What kind of society? What kind of man is your goal? What kind of life is most excellent you think, and what kind of man is likely to fulfill it best?

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 2:17 pm

(I thought Schacht summarized N.'s position on the topic accurately. )


Schacht: Nietzsche's Naturalism and Normativity.


Quote :
"It is commonly supposed—as it is by Korsgaard—that the basic idea of ‘normativity’ is that of ‘oughtness’ (pro or con) with respect to actions of one sort or another, and that real normativity is a matter of ‘oughtness’ with respect to those things that one (‘we’, anyone, everyone) really ought or ought not do.
Morality—that is, true morality—is then supposed to consist of whatever makes the list.For Nietzsche, this whole way of thinking—about normativity, and also about morality—must change. Most fundamentally, he parts company with Korsgaard’s way of framing ‘the normative question’—as ‘what makes morality normative?’ or ‘what justifies the claims that morality makes on us?’—because for him there is no such thing as ‘morality’, simpliciter. Rather, for him there long have been and are and can be and in all likelihood will continue to be many moralities, none of which has been or is or will be the thing itself, the single true or real one, among the many pretenders. The ‘morality’ to which he refers in the title of Zur Genealogie der Moral—which latter term may be translated as either ‘morals’ or ‘morality’—lays claim to be ‘morality itself ’, as he observes, and may have come to be taken for granted and assumed to be such. However, he rejects that claim:

"Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality—in other words . . . merely one type of human morality [Eine Art von menschlicher Moral ], beside which, before which, and after which many other
types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible." (BGE 202).

It is not only of ‘higher moralities’ that he is thinking:

"Wherever we encounter a morality [Moral], we also encounter an evaluation and rankordering of human drives and actions. These valuations and rank-orderings are always expressions of the needs of a community and herd . . . Since the conditions for the preservation of one community have been very different from those of another, there have been very different moralities [Moralen]. In view of [the likelihood of] future fundamental transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, we can prophesy that there will be further very divergent moralities." (GS 116)

It by no means follows from this for Nietzsche, however, that there is no such thing as normativity in or with respect to morality. On the contrary: there is a great deal of it, precisely because moralities of one sort or another have long been and continue to be ubiquitous in human life, and because normativity is one of their fundamental features. The mistake is to suppose that there is some one ‘true’ morality—call it ‘Morality (with a capital M)’—that has a kind of unconditionality setting it apart, and that has a monopoly on ‘true’ normativity.

The task of philosophy with respect to normativity is not to seek this moral holy grail. Rather, it is to try to understand the phenomenon of normativity as it relates to the various forms of life that involve norms, and to consider what it is possible to say with respect to their assessment.

So he begins his ‘On the natural history of morals’ by asserting that ‘One should own up in all strictness to what is still necessary here’: namely, ‘to collect material . . . to prepare a typology of morals’; for, he suggests, ‘the real problems of morality . . . emerge only when we compare many moralities’ (BGE 186). He thus attempts to restore what Korsgaard calls ‘the normativity of morality’ to the human context that was its original home (the religious or metaphysical garb with which it has been supplied notwithstanding) and that continues to be its appropriate place and primary context, and to reinterpret and reassess it accordingly. He thinks that there is nothing more to
either morality or normativity than what he can get a grip on, and that what he can get a grip on should not be lightly dismissed. We thus need to begin, for Nietzsche, by taking morality and normativity down from the pedestal on which they have long been placed. Like knowledge and art, and norms themselves, they are fundamentally, first and foremost human phenomena. For him the ideas of morality and normativity are mere empty abstractions except in association with forms of human life of one sort or another, through which (as was observed above, in my discussion of his naturalism)

individual human sensibilities are shaped, and in which these ideas acquire specificity and content. ‘Forms of life’ can be either comprehensive in their compass, framing all aspects of life in a community or society (as they would seem commonly to have been in earlier times, and to be in some places still), or partial, pertaining only to portions of life along with others that do so as well, not only in a society but in the lives of individuals, whose identities thus reflect and are woven of a multiplicity of such strands. In the latter case they may be thought of as something like ‘worlds’ people sequentially or even overlappingly inhabit, in the ‘life’ of each of which (and, in the modern world, they are often many) they participate.

As was earlier observed, forms of life shape sensibilities among those who internalize them. Their endurance depends upon continuing human commitment to and involvement in them (as in the case of a living language or tradition); and this means that normativity is their life-blood, since it requires adherence to the norms associated with them. That involvement also makes possible the realization of normativity, and thereby the attainment of a partially ‘dis-animalized’ human reality transformed by means of it. And that, for Nietzsche, is of great importance, owing to the kind of difference it signifies.
Norms that are embraced affect human experience, thought, feelings, and conduct. They impinge, collide, and conflict; they affect and transform each other and other human phenomena.
They do not transcend human reality, however, but rather are part and parcel of human forms of life.
As Korsgaard rightly observes with respect to ‘ethical standards’, norms quite generally (and of which such ‘standards’ are a subset) ‘do not merely describe’ patterns of activity; ‘they command, oblige, recommend, or guide’. They exist in order to guide and direct what goes on, in some form of life or other. Their naturalistically conceived basic function, for Nietzsche (which they by no means always perform effectively), is to express and promote the ‘conditions of preservation and growth’ of the forms of life with which they are associated. In some instances they perform a kind of advisory function, while in other cases their task is to bind, aided by a combination of sanctions and acceptance-promoting practices.

In our case, for Nietzsche, this has meant to assist in our transformation away from our proto-human animality, in the service of the emergence of that broadscale ‘form of life’ that is ‘the type Mensch ’ as the emergent sort of living creature we have come to be: ‘Many chains have been laid upon man so that he should no longer behave like an animal’ (HH II, II, 350). Moral and ethical (as well as legal) norms and normativities, as Nietzsche naturalistically conceives of them, belong in this mix rather than standing altogether apart from it. They may be special cases; but the ‘claims they make upon us’ (in Korsgaard’s language) have no basis or authority beyond that of the forms of human life and related specific valuations with which they are associated.

Normativity thus involves the guidance or direction of conduct where there is a real possibility of its proceeding otherwise, as is the case in most of human life for Nietzsche (now that instincts no longer do the job). Like forms of human life themselves, the norms that are part of their fabric typically and paradigmatically have a social and cultural character—and therefore also a linguistic and historical character—even though they may come to have a status transcending the parameters of their origins. Life in all forms and at all levels is dynamically structured. In human life much of what goes on is structured, guided, and regulated by a vast profusion of norms, among which—along with a great many others—are those associated with various types and instances of legality, ethicality, and morality. (Others, for example, are associated with languages, professions, and games.) There is hardly an aspect of human life that is not norm-structured. Indeed, Nietzsche considers the interconnected development of both the capacity and the need to be normguided to be one of the keys to our ‘dis-animalization’.

A normative situation may be broadly characterized as a situation in which conduct is structured by action-guiding norms (rules, regulations, laws, customs, expectations, standards, and the like). Forms of life are the contexts that make the establishment, development, and continuation of such situations possible.
Norms and normativity can be conceived in abstraction from such contexts, but do not (because, practically speaking, they cannot) for the most part amount to anything humanly real apart from them; or at any rate they can come to do so, for Nietzsche, only under quite exceptional human circumstances (HH II, II, 350; GS 335; GM II, 2). Even then they build upon (but also go beyond) the already substantial transformation of the character of human life and human reality that the emergence and establishment of shared forms of life represent.

This is a very brief sketch of the larger human context in which, for Nietzsche, any sort of normativity—and any sort of real-world morality—is to be viewed and naturalistically reinterpreted. In summary: for Nietzsche, forms of life (FOL) and of human life in particular (of which there is a profusion), differ in their structures and contours, and in the values they at once embody and engender.

Values are FOL-relational, norms are FOL-contextual, and normativity is FOLstructural. Normativity is internal to FOL norm-systems. When norms or normsystems are themselves normatively assessed as candidates for adoption, rejection, or modification, that assessment can only be carried out by drawing upon other such resources that make possible the identification of ‘reasons’ that may figure in such assessments. This suggests an answer to the question of whether, for Nietzsche, or in what respect, it makes sense for someone to ask whether they ought to adopt or continue to adhere to or override or reject some norm. On the present account, that question can make sense if, within one’s larger form of life of which that norm is or would be a part, there are values or other norms that might at least seem to be aligned or at odds with the norm in question, or to warrant limiting or overriding it in certain circumstances. It can also make a kind of sense if there is some other form of life to which one is also committed, and within which there are other norms or values with which the norm in question would be in harmony or conflict. In the latter case, the conflict would actually be between the two norm/value-systems and the forms of life in which they figure. In that event the
‘ought’ would not be a normative one, unless one were further committed to some higher-order form of life and value scheme in which there are principles for the resolution of such issues (perhaps by way of prioritizing).

That is a possibility that Nietzsche envisions in his setting of ‘the problem of value and of a rank-ordering of values’ as the most important task of his ‘philosophy of the future’. But as he makes quite clear (for example, in BGE: P and TI II, 2), he holds that there is no such thing as ‘value’ independent of ‘life’, and considers all value to be form-of-life-related, with the possible exception of the idea of ‘the enhancement of life’, which, while life-related, is not (virtually by definition) internal to any particular form of life. Norms, however, are for Nietzsche instrumental to values. There are normative constraints aplenty for him, for constraining is the function of norms. But the only normative constraints he recognizes are constraints set by norms. In the absence of all norms, or beyond them or in abstraction from them, there can be no such constraints. The constraints upon the embrace of norms that he is prepared to recognize, beyond those of norm-system priority, are constraints of a practical nature​...

The prototypes of such situations, he suggests, are twofold: cases in which one identifies with a group whose customs or standards are to be observed and rules followed, and cases in which one identifies (in the form of allegiance) with an authoritative human or divine power and thereby with its commands. Latterday ethical and moral developments are variations and elaborations building upon and refining these basic patterns. More exceptionally—but, for Nietzsche, very importantly—a more individuated sort of identity-formation may become humanly possible, of the sort that he has in mind in such places as the section of The Gay Science in which he celebrates the idea of wanting to become ‘human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves’ (GS 335).

Identification and internalization, for Nietzsche, are the pathways to the endowment of ethical and moral norms with normative efficacy. Valuations in turn play a crucial role, and remain the key to identification; Nietzsche’s conception of normativity need not and does not reduce simply to an account of the psychology and phenomenology of normative experience. Forms of human linguistic, social, cultural, and institutional life are normatively structured. When one identifies with them, buys into them, and internalizes them, those structures and the undergirding and surrounding values are parts of what gets internalized. Thus the ‘oughtness’ that is recognized by one who has bought into them is not merely subjective. It has a kind of objectivity to it that, while by no means categorical or universal for all human agents, is nonetheless humanly real enough that Nietzsche could speak of the ‘discovery’ of a ‘new circle of duties’ associated with ‘the fundamental idea of culture’ in one of his first forays into this territory (UM III, 5).

The Nietzschean truth of human maturity that we have to learn to live with, however, is that however precious to us the fabrics of our forms of life may be, they are not absolute, but instead are—both modestly and importantly—ours, to make of what we can, while we can. Or, as Nietzsche has Zarathustra say:
"In a note from 1887–88 Nietzsche wrote: ‘I understand by Moral a system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life’ (WP 256). And in Twilight he writes: ‘Every naturalism in morality [Jeder Naturalismus in der Moral ]—that is, every healthy morality—is dominated by an instinct of life: some commandment of life is fulfilled by a determinate canon of “shalt” and “shalt not” [“Soll” und “Soll nicht” ]’ (TI V, 4).

But values are at work in ‘slave morality’ and in ‘ascetic ideals’ too; and Nietzsche would seem to think that, on the whole, the values with which most moralities are associated are symptomatic either of ‘life’ in various sorts of distress or of needs and circumstances that no longer exist.
As for what Nietzsche means by ‘higher moralities’—for example moralities that ‘train men for the heights’ (WP 957)—and the normative thinking he does engage in that, like Zarathustra (in the words of its subtitle) is intended not for everyone but ‘for all and none’, those will have to be topics for other
occasions."

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 3:52 pm

Quote :
We saw that Nietzsche’s theory incorporates four central claims, which I will repeat here:

1. The demand for autonomy produces determinate constraints on what is to be valued.
2. However, we do not justify values by showing that they are derived from or entailed by the demand for autonomy.
3. Rather, we use autonomy to assess our current values.
4. Yet autonomy somehow permits, and indeed requires, a radical critique of these current values.

The interpretation that I have proposed does, in fact, reconcile these claims.

First, notice that the demand for autonomy entails that we must revalue our values in light of will to power. So the demand for autonomy does generate a determinate constraint on permissible values: we are to adopt those values that minimize or eliminate conflict with will to power. Thus, condition (1) is fulfilled.

Second, on Nietzsche’s view, we do not justify the authority of a value by showing that it derives from or is entailed by autonomy. Nietzsche does argue that one normative principle can be derived from the features of autonomous willing: the claim that we have reason to will power. But it should be clear that we are not going to be able to derive much additional content from this claim.  For example, there is no way of moving from the idea that we aim to encounter and overcome resistance to the idea that we should not lie, or that we should not murder. On the contrary, lying and murdering are ways—possibly quite good ways—of willing power. Fortunately, Nietzsche’s will to power doctrine is not meant to function as a foundational principle from which we derive all other normative claims. Rather, as the prior sections explained, will to power is intended to serve as a “principle of revaluation.” That is, the will to power generates a standard in terms of which we are to assess all other values. So Nietzsche grounds one normative principle in facts about our agential nature, and uses this principle not to derive, but to assess, the other values that we embrace. In this respect, Nietzsche’s theory looks more Hegelian than Kantian: rather than attempting to derive our values from a formal principle, we use a formal principle to assess our current, historically contingent set of values. The resultant theory does not have a foundationalist structure, of the sort that Nietzsche clearly denounces; but it does give one value a privileged status, and it uses that value as a criterion or principle of revaluation. Thus, Conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled.

Finally, the fact that power has a privileged status enables us to mount a radical critique of our current set of values and social institutions—a critique that may reveal them not merely to fall short of their own ideals, but to be deeply misguided in the goals they strive to realize. Power’s privileged status gives us, as Nietzsche puts it, “a position outside morality,” in terms of which we can reassess even our most basic values (GS 380). Thus, condition (4) is fulfilled

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 6:21 pm

Lyssa wrote:
It is my understanding that he did so, esp. when he remarks in the WTP that the worst nihilist, the destroyers and the self-destroyers, would still rather affirm something [their weak will] than nothing.

Nietzsche says that people "would rather will nothing than not will" (paraphrase).

My point was not about the omni-presence of the folk-psychology label 'will' as the fundamental character of the world. I was only saying that I would not equate 'willing nothing' with 'affirming yourself' (even for a weak willed person), and don't think that Nietzsche does either. Of all the faults with ordinary language, I do not think that the oddity of that equation is one of them.

If Nietzsche thinks that everybody is always affirming themselves, no matter what, and cannot do otherwise, then he would face the problem of what it means to 'affirm yourself'. That's because something that applies to everything, universally, consequently applies to nothing, meaningfully. E.g., If self-affirmation is a saying "yes" to life, then even the most egregious life-denier is actually saying "yes" to life, according to Nietzsche---and that would render what Nietzsche was saying meaningless, and worse. Do you have a different view?

EDIT: On second thought, if someone really does hate life, dis-values life, then I can perhaps see how they are affirming themselves---their values---by trashing life, and being a life-denier. But if someone hates themself, then it's just awkward to think that they are affirming themself by trashing themself. Anyways, I'll have to think more about this.

Quote :
I am trying to point out Your very asking this question - "if power suffices for a sufficiently worthy telos?" is ITSELF an expression of Your WTP.

Power underlies every value-judgement. To Exist is to Interpret. Interpretation is a power-derivative.
Hence Sloterdijk [Nietzsche: Thinker on Stage] presents N.'s own worldview of WTP as the bedrock of life - as only still just 'a' WTP. The questions we ask about values and how we are living and how we ought to live and how those values can/ought/if justified, etc. are all mirror expressions of life's own feature of self-recurring self-assertions from the lowest to the highest;

I do not have a problem with this as an explanation of Nietzsche. I have a problem with the idea itself.

To think that power underlies every varied judgment renders 'power' or WTP meaningless. If clipping my nails is an expression of WTP, and so is driving my car, and so is creating ideals, and so is hating the world, and so is building a friendship, and so is tearing down a building, and so is raising a family... if everything is an expression of WTP, then the criteria for applying the label "WTP" are so empty and devoid of content that they are essentially meaningless.

A label that applies to everything consequently applies to nothing, meaningfully. There’s no way of distinguishing it from what it is not---and hence it’s worse than wrong, it’s not even intelligible.

Speaking for myself: What underlies every value-judgment is a conception of value---that’s what you’re judging. Value underlies every judgement, period. To think that power alone is valuable---independently of what it is a power-to-do---is a category mistake, since power is only valuable in relation to what it gets you, and in relation to what is around you.

Quote :
Are you an Elitist Mo, who believes in Hierarchy - as in the free expressions of natural rank differences?
I think you asked me this before, and the answer is the same. --Which hierarchy? That hierarchies exist is a brute and descriptive fact about the world. But no, I don't value any particular given hierarchy simply because it is a hierarchy.  For people that seem to take a negative view of 'absolutes', you still ask about things in general, or else have other grand generalizations to tell me about... like about how this ever-present 'will to power' will be responsible for what I choose for dinner, rather than the possibly more aptly named 'will to thai food' that might also work.[/quote]
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Tue Mar 04, 2014 6:49 pm

One is thrust into the world, and he bears the remnants of that near-absolute he represents, as a distant past he recalls, as he goes along. He is attracted to the slightest indication of it - in beauty, intelligence, symmetry of all kinds...music.

The "will" is nothing more than the control, as much as it is possible, directing the organizing aggregate energies as they move toward entropy, and only wish, in the start, to resist it.
The will can be halted, by death, but the aggregate energies it attempted to focus upon an object/objective, continue on.
The awakening to this reality, is what creates resentment...manifesting in the creative escapes of mankind.

Like a surfer on a wave.

A surfer values the wave, the board, his balance.
The wave will never end, but he will fall off his board, and it will become part of the wave.
He is the board, his balance is him riding the wave, which he is also a part of, and separate from.

Wave = Flux
Board = Becoming/Body/Ordering
Surfer = the Will, Consciousness trying to keep upright, to maneuver the board upon the wave.

A surfer values order, symmetry, anything that reminds him of what he is as a process, anything that promises a continuance of the experience.
He is ordering, but order is not subjective...neither is beauty, power...or any word used to describe this absent absolute, this near-point of order he feels in himself as a nostalgia for what almost was and yet would never have been...because if it were none of this would be occurring.

The dilemma, the conundrum...the love/hate contradiction. To appreciate what most insults and frightens you.
To be attracted to order and yet know that without disordering this experience, this living, would be impossible.

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Wed Mar 05, 2014 12:13 pm

Mo wrote:
Lyssa wrote:It is my understanding that he did so, esp. when he remarks in the WTP that the worst nihilist, the destroyers and the self-destroyers, would still rather affirm something [their weak will] than nothing.

Nietzsche says that people "would rather will nothing than not will" (paraphrase).

My point was not about the omni-presence of the folk-psychology label 'will' as the fundamental character of the world. I was only saying that I would not equate 'willing nothing' with 'affirming yourself' (even for a weak willed person), and don't think that Nietzsche does either. Of all the faults with ordinary language, I do not think that the oddity of that equation is one of them.

I take N.'s statement that everything in life wants to grow, flourish, expand, dominate, exploit, as the basic trait of every living kind, strong or weak. Strong and Weak wills simply denote stronger self-organizational capacity and a poor one. Although in the latter case, the Core is unable to come together as a unit - to dominate and assert itself, this doesn't take away the norm of every living kind. Life IS will-to-power;

"It was morality that protected life against despair and the leap into nothing, among men and classes who were violated and oppressed by men: for it is the experience of being powerless against men, not against nature, that generates the most desperate embitterment against existence. Morality treated the violent despots, the doers of violence, the "masters" in general as the enemies against whom the common man must be protected, which means first of all encouraged and strengthened. Morality consequently taught men to hate and despise most profoundly what is the basic character trait of those who rule: their will to power. To abolish, deny, and dissolve this morality-that would mean looking at the best-hated drive with an opposite feeling and valuation. If the suffering and oppressed lost the faith that they have the right to despise the will to power, they would enter the phase of hopeless despair. This would be the case if this trait were essential to life and it could be shown that even in this will to morality this very "will to power" were hidden, and even this hatred and contempt were still a will to power. The oppressed would come to see that they were on the same plain with the oppressors, without prerogative, without higher rank." [WTP, 55]

The will doesn't exist,,, its always a will-to-something... emptiness, nothingness...
Self-destruction either through suicide, or spreading destruction, decadence, corruption or letting oneself enslaved and dominated by a stronger will are all expressions of how even the worst choose to Adapt to life, given the circumstances and the quanta of power they are. Those that destroy to be destroyed, to be absorbed away, to be reduced to nothing, reveal the will-to-power of the the weak-will. The DEGREE it is capable of "affirming" itself is near-0, and this is no linguistic-ploy. Its what led N. to wonder why the Xts. never killed themselves? Why do they not? They know they are weak and powerless against the masters... and life becomes one big misery... yet why don't they just suicide? They don't. They invent morality to procrastinate, to prolong that death-instinct... and it was THIS move,,, that showed N. every kind of life hides degrees of affirmation.

Blowing yourself up and destroying others and spreading decadence and faith in the after-life and such nihilisms are Degrees of Deviation from the Norm, the Health..., and this self-hatred is still the expression of a strong/weak affirmative degree and when this degree creates a chasm, we get a difference in Kind, than one of mere degree... the splitting and emergence of a whole new species.
Not everyone who looks like a human is a Human,, some are "only" apes and "dwarves and fragments" of men. Etc.


Mo wrote:

Quote :I am trying to point out Your very asking this question - "if power suffices for a sufficiently worthy telos?" is ITSELF an expression of Your WTP.

Power underlies every value-judgement. To Exist is to Interpret. Interpretation is a power-derivative.
Hence Sloterdijk [Nietzsche: Thinker on Stage] presents N.'s own worldview of WTP as the bedrock of life - as only still just 'a' WTP. The questions we ask about values and how we are living and how we ought to live and how those values can/ought/if justified, etc. are all mirror expressions of life's own feature of self-recurring self-assertions from the lowest to the highest;

I do not have a problem with this as an explanation of Nietzsche. I have a problem with the idea itself.

To think that power underlies every varied judgment renders 'power' or WTP meaningless. If clipping my nails is an expression of WTP, and so is driving my car, and so is creating ideals, and so is hating the world, and so is building a friendship, and so is tearing down a building, and so is raising a family... if everything is an expression of WTP, then the criteria for applying the label "WTP" are so empty and devoid of content that they are essentially meaningless.

A label that applies to everything consequently applies to nothing, meaningfully. There’s no what of distinguishing it from what it is not---and hence it’s worse than wrong, it’s not even intelligible.

Speaking for myself: What underlies every value-judgment is a conception of value---that’s what you’re judging. Value underlies every judgement, period. To think that power alone is valuable---independently of what it is a power-to-do---is a category mistake, since power is only valuable in relation to what it gets you, and in relation to what is around you.

We are driven to value that which empowers us directly or indirectly.
Its because WTP applies to every single thing, it opens up distinctions.
It exposes the needs of that particular society and the kind-of-life that flourishes in it.
This perspectivism is "relational", not "relativistic";

Quote :
A naturalist like Nietzsche can readily make sense of aesthetic value understood in this relational but not relativistic way. On a relational view of value, values are constituted by certain invariant relations that are not observer-dependent.
Consider for example this relation: x is a feature of an object that, when attended to and engaged with by individuals of type F (e.g. possessing certain sensory, cognitive, imaginative, and affective capacities), tends to yield for such individuals intrinsically rewarding appreciative experiences. Whether a given object bears this appreciation-producing relationship to a class of individuals F does not depend upon whether the question is asked by individuals of type F or some other type—they should give the same answer. Nietzsche’s view of ‘giving style’ to one’s character seems clearly to fit this idea of a relational aesthetic value, since one can recognize what it is for others to have genuine style even if, given one’s own characteristics, this could not be one’s own style..." [N. and Normativism]



Mo wrote:

Quote :Are you an Elitist Mo, who believes in Hierarchy - as in the free expressions of natural rank differences?

I think you asked me this before, and the answer is the same. --Which hierarchy? That hierarchies exist is a brute and descriptive fact about the world. But no, I don't value any particular given hierarchy simply because it is a hierarchy.

I wouldn't either.
I wouldn't affirm a hierarchy simply because it is one. The modern hierarchializing of economics over everything else, for example, is not something I would affirm just because it is an hierarchy. But then again these are not "free expressions" of rank differences as my question qualified; the hierarchy that emerges from the cunning of the weak [its free expression of what it is] subverting the free "natural" expression of the strong and the noble is not the hierarchy therefore my question asked.

What kind of hierarchy/ies do you affirm, if any?

Or do you wish to remain reticent about your views? I ask so that my understanding of you, your world-view, where you are coming from is not mis-guided. On the one hand you seem to be clearly against relativism, yet on ILP and those discussions with Ecce, you 'seem' to favour the norm-alizing of racial differences - Blacks with education can be Trained to have IQs as good as Whites, and Whites with Training can rise to have athletic prowess as the Blacks...  it would seem you wish to bridge the brute hierarchies that occur in nature, naturally...

That sends a conflicting pic. of you to me; you can be against simplistic labelling - something I can understand, and still be able to say what your values are about...
If you don't wish to present a clear stand of what your views and values are about - what kind of society, future, individual, you value, something I would think relevant within the frame of discussing normativity, then no matter.

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Wed Mar 05, 2014 12:18 pm

Satyr wrote:
One is thrust into the world, and he bears the remnants of that near-absolute he represents, as a distant past he recalls, as he goes along. He is attracted to the slightest indication of it - in beauty, intelligence, symmetry of all kinds...music.

The "will" is nothing more than the control, as much as it is possible, directing the organizing aggregate energies as they move toward entropy, and only wish, in the start, to resist it.
The will can be halted, by death, but the aggregate energies it attempted to focus upon an object/objective, continue on.
The awakening to this reality, is what creates resentment...manifesting in the creative escapes of mankind.

Like a surfer on a wave.

Very nice...

To add, there is no "the will", always an interactive 'will-to'... just saying.
Every moment already involves an interpretation, a focus, a direction we abstract...

Both 'the' individual surfer and 'the' will are aggregate power complexes held together in a seeming unit.

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Wed Mar 05, 2014 12:32 pm

Lyssa wrote:
Blowing yourself up and destroying others and spreading decadence and faith in the after-life and such nihilisms are Degrees of Deviation from the Norm, the Health..., and this self-hatred is still the expression of a strong/weak affirmative degree and when this degree creates a chasm, we get a difference in Kind, than one of mere degree... the splitting and emergence of a whole new species. Not everyone who looks like a human is a Human,, some are "only" apes and "dwarves and fragments" of men. Etc.

Nietzsche wrote:
I no longer know whether you, my dear fellow man and neighbor, are at all capable of living in a way that would damage the species; in other words, "unreasonably" and "badly." What might have harmed the species may have become extinct many thousands of years ago and may by now be one of those things that are not possible even for God. Pursue your best or your worst desires, and above all perish! In both cases you are probably still in some way a promoter and benefactor of humanity and therefore entitled to your eulogists—but also to your detractors
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PostSubject: Re: Critique of Hume's is ought problem. Wed Mar 05, 2014 12:35 pm

That's one of my favourite and most cherished quotes - "pursue your best or worst and perish!"...
thank you Perpetual.

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

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