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Lyssa
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PostSubject: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:16 am

Some writings of Parodites from the BTL forum on his conception of the Daemonic worth contrasting. Since there are no comprehensive books on the subject, I thought his writings worth including here. While they are thoughtful and insightful, his attempt to 'ethicize' the Daemonic as an Experientialism is not my path.




Parodites wrote:
Excess.-- Nietzsche called it Will to Power, Kierkegaard called it despair. I perceive the same underlying concept beneath its names. It is the unresolvable relation between the empirical and transcendental spheres of consciousness, between freedom and necessity, the infinite and the finite, which constitute the self.



The daemonic.-- This is the self's capacity to reflect, that is, represent this excess in a series of conceptual oppositions, ie. relations as a kind of anti-dialectic. For example, the opposition of the infinite and the finite.

Subjectivity.-- This is the representation or reflection of the excess in conceptual oppositions. A kind of 'kenotic' differentiation of the excess. Different modes of life, different ruling passions, are produced as the self orients itself within the conceptual oppositions.

Speculative ethic.-- The experimental and intentional production of such modes of life. Exploration of them. Appraising them against one another.


... Each of the conceptual oppositions created daemonically constitute a different mode of life. The mode and its quality depends on the opposition, one example of a mode is the aesthetic mode of life. The number of these different modes of life that a particular individual can produce depends on the power of his daemonism. Not all individuals are capable of living the same modes of life or living the same number of modes.

A transcendental good is an ideal that roots the individual in that opposition wherein his daemon comes to a rest, is exhausted. Most men are not rooted in this way, and so we have the daemonic frenzy, the repetition of the same modes of life, a kind of psychological stunting. Their self is fragmented in this way throughout the modes and they must continually re-orient themselves within the conceptual oppositions which it has created.

Philosophy endows us with the concepts with which to exhaust our daemonic nature. A speculative ethics as a particular way of philosophizing would aid one in finding out the ideal by which to comprehend the final orientation of one's daemonism, namely by comparing and clearly differentiating the different modes one has lived through, becoming more conscious of them. Hence I call it the transcendental good rather than transcendental ideal: it is realized through a valuation, a speculative ethic. The Eternal Recurrence was Nietzsche's transcendental good."




Quote :
"Ultimately, a new morality, the defense of the category of the Absolute, a defense of the category of truth, a re-imagination of Plato, the overcoming of Nietzsche, a non-religious answer to Kierkegaard's problem of despair- these are among my central goals."




Quote :
"The phenomenon of nihilism is not what ails our time. I have discussed the division of empirical and transcendental reason. The consequence is that transcendental and empirical reason both destroy themselves when divided. The modern Christian blindly refuses truth and reduces his God to a mere father figure instead of the obscura dei and fulcrum of poetic and philosophic perspectives on his life, and the circle of reason, in the words of Hamann, spins itself into skepsis and mere self-destruction. Look at the recent bullshit debate between creationists and atheists like Dawkins. The materialism and "religion" in these debates are both trivial vapid shit, false shadows of empirical philosophy and transcendental philosophy alike. It is not merely that we lack values today, we lack the capacity to value.

The Greek self was an antagonism which was temporarily, that is, daemonically, stabilized by means of artistic and philosophical creation. Their Gods were expressions of their high degree of daemonism. The Judaeo-Christians re-interpreted the self as an irresolvable contradiction between the mortal and divine aspects of the body and soul, and the excess became an absolute lack or longing which could only be satisfied in the image of God. Their singular God was something entirely different, psychologically.


My work is about defending the category of the Excess, re-actualizing the concept of the absolute and truth, and re-integrating the two modes of reason."




Quote :
"My philosophy is essentially concerned with fusing and reconciling "immanent" and "transcendent" ethics.

What is an immanent ethics? Think Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche.

As Deleuze said about Spinoza, he believed neither in courage or faith but in joy and vision. He proposed a substance with infinite attributes, an inner plane, and defined- in accordance with that, the basis of moral valuation as determining the mode in which attributes are given to this internal, infinite substance. Bad is any mode of life that would lead to an "inadequate idea."

" “What is the mode of existence of the person who utters a given proposition?” asks Nietzsche, “What mode of existence is needed in order to be able to utter it?
Rather than “judging” actions and thoughts by appealing to transcendent or universal values, one “evaluates” them by determining the mode of existence that serves as their principle. A pluralistic method of explanation by immanent modes of existence is in this way made to replace the recourse to transcendent values: in Spinoza and Nietzsche, the transcendent moral opposition (between Good and Evil) is replaced an immanent ethical difference (between noble and base modes of existence, in Nietzsche; or between passive and active affections, in Spinoza)."


Transcendent ethics? Think Kierkegaard, Eriugena, etc. An ethics that appeals to the absolute, to something that exceeds the boundary of subjective, lived existence, and makes use of transcendent conceptual oppositions- good and evil, necessity and freedom, etc.

The immanent qualities in human nature, in man himself and in his human powers, and the transcendent objects (God, eternity, etc.) toward which these powers are directed and, in being so directed, take on true shape and articulation.... these two sets have never been united. This problem is the problem of the West, it is the Occident itself. The Asiatic philosophies are all immanent moralities, there is very little transcendence in them. In the west have both practices been cultivated and their pregnant disparity finally become enunciable. I am so enunciating it. Only with such a morality can a true philosophic conception of what exactly "man" is be arrived at.

The immanent ethic originated out of what I call empirical reason, with the pre-Platonic Greeks, and the transcendent morality was fully realized with the Abrahamic religions. Nietzsche finalized the immanent morality, Kierkegaard finalized the transcendent one, and Kierk. was foreshadowed by Schelling and Eriugena. Of course there are many rungs in that ladder, but I have isolated those three main ones. I am more or less reconstructing the history of philosophy with my conception of the self as a daemonic being as a heuristic principle, and formalizing all of it in accordance to the paradigm of immanence and transcendence."




Quote :
"The Dionysian of Nietzsche is a pure excess, in which tragedy is dissolved into comedy, and comedy absorbed in tragedy. The Daemonic is a psychological phenomenon whereby that excess is articulated through what I call "conceptual opposition," a non-dialectical process. Nietzsche only figured out the logic of the excess itself, he did not (to my mind) make it to the logic of the daemonic, and consequently misunderstood a great deal about the Greeks, the religion of Abraham, and the struggle between those two conceptions of world/man. He was only able to oppose to the Dionysian the idea of the Apollonian, the idea of the creative will imposed upon the excess in order to shape it, as a piece of clay. This stunted perspective locks Nietzsche into a continuous formation of identity, by way of the Apollonian, and consequent dissolution of that identity in the Dionysian excess. He later grasps this process under the catch-all term Will to Power, which necessitates his view that all values are expressions of a particular quanta of strength. We still do not have in any of this an excess that is neither after reflection as a contradiction or before reflection as an agon or Nietzschean struggle-- we need an excess that, rather, serves as a category of reflection. A category in the Aristotelian sense: just as Aristotle's categories inform the horizon of being, so the categories of reflection inform the possible horizons of thought. In my philosophy however values are re-realized as "ethical ideas," ideas in the Platonic sense, objectifications of the excess attained by daemonic philosophy, that is, conceptual oppositions."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

*Become clean, my friends.*


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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:16 am

Quote :
"What real domain can the human being claim for itself, when its most vital existence is found in the correspondence between the finite and transcendental spheres, when- to speak with Hippocrates, it finds in all men something divine, and in all divinity something of its humanity? This daemonic nature is the alien intelligence with which the will operates and is not itself a master; the symbols of myth and the host of philosophical ideas, as the most profound exertion of the human will, have not evolved by some merely inventive poet to represent an arbitrary reality of his own design, but have evolved rather out of this daemonic nature, in the pre-reflective state in which the poet recognizes something outside the border of his own experience and is in this way opened up to the deeper life. These symbols and ideas, like the eternity of Nietzsche, or the Prometheus of Aeschylus, are not linguistic in the same way that our common speech is linguistic, for they originate in the daemonic nature which is the precondition of human self-consciousness, and as such represent things not yet able to be fully articulated by the self-conscious human being; the myths and philosophical ideals are all true, for there is a human being to debate rather or not they are true. They are the precondition of human self-consciousness, the mere fact that we can debate them signifies their truth.

The contradictions and disputes among philosophers arise from a spirit philosophizing out of something other than the spirit of daemonism, something other than that middle-position and pre-reflective state which opens up the sphere of the mortal being to the immortal sphere.

The ancient philosophies were all spontaneously engendered through the daemonic, they served as a horizon through which the self-consciousness could take shape. They served as a limit to what could be expressed in human tongue.

And this is one of the greatest of mysteries. Language can only evolve when something has placed a limit to what can be expressed; there must be a limit placed upon language before language can evolve. Language only makes sense when it begins through a passive state, that of the daemonic being which has been opened up to "the deeper life." I can only speak the word "man" when the word "god" has served as a limit to the former conception. So on and so on, down to the first word, so to speak.

Philosophy, as that essential thing which a daemonic being does, as the fundamental nature of a daemonic being, (the only one we know of is the human) is the ground of this mystery."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

*Become clean, my friends.*
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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:18 am

Quote :
"My ethics is aimed at rooting philosophy in the element of genuine experience. To let my book speak for itself:

Happiness is a state like that of the sea after it has come to rest in the wake of some violent storm. One must conceal in one's depths some nameless longing as even it does. What most people refer to as their life is nothing more than one long, violent storm, one long raging into the abyss and the sea. It is precisely the most painful emotions that can, after all, be used as their own opiate. The strength of mankind is a deplorable and wretched thing. In the end, our desires never succeed in changing our life, much less this world; it is only our life and this world that have succeeded in altering our desires. All that we have to show for our strength and our struggle has not been achieved on account of that strength and that struggling, but simply on account of the whim of sea. One must turn to the vis contemplativa in order to permit these alterations that life makes to our desires to prove favorable, in order to cohere the law within himself with the law outside of himself. The only question is to what extent one can organize within the harmony of his own nature the harmony of events; the only question is to what extent one can become conscious of one's experience. Experience itself, of whatever romantic cast, and however wondrous, is in itself worthless. If a human being has anything of life in him, no experience will prove capable of coordinating the mass of forces within him, and neither will any act prove capable of organizing them; one is only to live, and concentrate in the narrowest bound of his consciousness the tribe of his loves and experiences, and to therein hold them in their sharpest intensity. One must become toward his heart like that gardener who allows nature to generally take its course upon his plants, but simply introduces a little bit of deliberation here and there, a small part of artifice, in order to beautify everything. That question posed by Hamlet is truly the highest abstraction the human intellect is capable of in the sphere of ethics, and "to be" man's highest good, though Faust would have doubtlessly mistranslated it. As Aurelius said, in this world one can either stand up straight or be straightened; the life we could not live, lives us. Insofar as one learns to truly take consciousness, ceaselessly, of this immutable sense of life, one learns also to take consolation in the realization that everything does, in fact, work itself out, at least within the enlivened consciousness. Perhaps, with regard to our life itself and the course it has taken, not for the best, as most people say, and usually for the worse: but at least it is worked out within us, at least we know that there is and must be an answer to the question we are able to formulate, for otherwise even the question would have eluded us. A question can be a consolation just as much as an answer can."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:20 am

Quote :
"Plato and Aristotle agree that philosophy begins in a passive state, as opposed to a creative state, of the soul. This state they call wonder, thaumazein. This word, however, does not simply imply sublime awe, but rather the capacity to intimate the unknown and strange, to recognize some obscure connection between one's self and the foreign. It is in this sense that the Greek poets use it to refer to the gods, for they could intimate something of their divinity, and still further, realize in the image of this divinity something of their own humanity. This obscure relationship between the self and the world, the ego and the cosmos, man and his gods, is the essential relationship which all philosophy has explicated over the centuries. The passivity, then, is not one of impotence, but of pregnancy.

Man can only sustain himself as man by delving into that obscure relationship, which must necessarily silence him, or set him aflame, as was the fate of the Gnostic angel upon re-entering the world of mortals. He is like a character designed by a poet and thrust into the scene of some play, and can hold his personality and identity in existence only by continuing to engage in the play, even though this grants him an incomplete personality and identity, powerless to shape its own fate. In a certain sense he, like the tragic actor, can only maintain his identity by continually denying it. This disturbing quality of the passivity in which genuine consciousness originates, Kierkegaard spoke of in his conception of despair.


Kierkegaard conceives of the self as a synthesis of the infinite and finite, though an incomplete synthesis: he essentially presents a form of Kantianism which lacks the idea of a final synthesis which would inform the unity of the self and moreover serve as something analogous to the categorical imperative by which an absolute basis of the self and of human action could be determined. This lack of an absolute basis for the self and human action is the source of Kierkegaard's despair: for him it is only in god, not within the self, that this basis can be found. He thus stands among all of those beautiful but innocent mystics, granted that his mysticism is articulated in a purely philosophical language and thus serves as a healthy curiosity for all philosophers. We have here, with Kierkegaard, rejected the hope of a completed synthesis, but we have also rejected the hope that in God there could be found any absolute basis for the self and an active power, since only in that obscure relationship between the Gods and man, self and world, can consciousness be maintained, and we cannot degenerate into mystical self-oblivion: the ego, the self's reflexive and empty self-image, the psychological expression of the principle of identity, lives and takes on shape, and becomes pregnant, through the reconciliation of the ego and non ego, through their co-extension along the fundamental spheres of though; the living consciousness in which the ego indwells is eternally bent toward the self's true being, which cannot be absorbed into any dialectical system and stands always outside of thought. The fact that consciousness thereby exists as an endless determination of this true being of the self, not suspended between two infinites as Pascal would lament, but embodying their eternal conflict, and out of joint with himself just as much as the world, is the source of that disturbing quality of the passive state in which man finds himself." - Hamartia

So the empirical ego thrusts itself into a process of reconciliation with regard to its fundamental principles, the ego and non-ego, the infinite moral will or potency and finite time and reality, freedom and necessity. The deeper it thrusts itself into this process, the more powerfully it is able to sustain itself, nonetheless as something incomplete, so that it most posit something not involved in this process of reconciliation: the transcendental ego, the self as such. The empirical self can only exist by the positing of something beyond it, that exceeds it. Men have called this something God, have represented it with different ideas and philosophical systems, but it is simply the absolute subjectivity. This part of my philosophy came to me when reading of a concept elaborated by Schleiermacher and Feuerbach called absolute subjectivity. The former said "Emotions are significant not simply because they are ‘felt’, but because they are inward witnesses and responses to realities other than the self." They used the concept to explain religion in the following way... Man objectified in his Gods these inward witnesses of his own sensations and qualities; they represented the omnipotence of feeling. They represented aspects of human nature freed from time, place, nature.

This "self as such," the transcendental ego, belongs to that transcendental order which values, philosophical and moral ideas, and Gods represent. These values and ideas are not positive objects of knowledge, but merely representative, representations of this order:

"Kant's philosophy is essentially an attempt to relate transcendental and empirical apperception; to unite the original consciousness of man as a particular subject, as a being in possession of a soul, as a self, to the consciousness of this self enduring throughout many changing experiences. He attempted to do what Aristotle had failed to do, namely extrapolate from the conception of the universality of experience the universality of knowledge. This concept of the universality of experience, which is the basic insight of Kantian philosophy; the concept of a totalizing power on the part of human reflection, which realizes its objects in synthetic union, is however antithetical to the form which philosophy must assume. These two consciousnesses cannot be united, but only inter-related, for the simple reason that the former cannot be positively designated as an object of knowledge. " - Hamartia

Philosophy, beginning with Plato, has understood itself as only a representative knowledge, while ethics and morality have in a sense degenerated, in the attempt to be positive objects of knowledge- facts, or sets of particular knowledge, particular virtues and vices. As the ideas of philosophy represent the transcendental order, so I want to establish a new morality wherein values represent the process of analogy by which the empirical and transcendental egos might be and are related to one another. Philosophy is the revelation of the transcendental order to which the self belongs and by virtue of which it has existence, while morality must be a system of relations which allows the empirical ego to grasp its own nature as analogous to the transcendental ego. Morality would thus exert a transformative power rather than a prescriptive one.

This analogizing or transformative power, I call the "daemonic." A Daemon in Greece was a half-god, between man and god, which carried humans from the mortal to divine sphere. Eros or love was, itself, referred to as a daemon. I take this term from Bruno. I offer some formulations of the daemonic, what I conceive to be the fundamental moral reality, here:

"The life of the self is a continual ascent and descent through these different modes of existence, [egoic and nonegoic, freedom and necessity, etc.] a continuous articulation between these two different spheres. Giordano Bruno regarded the self in this way, namely as a kind of expectant disquietude which must continuously articulate itself amidst opposing forces; between the ego and non-ego, freedom and necessity, spirit and flesh, in his concept of love. In love's attempt to spiritualize itself, to overcome finitude, the limitation of bodily existence, mortality, and necessity, it is deceived by the image of beauty and falls only into sensuousness, in which its spiritual ecstasy is annihilated. Thus love is committed to a cyclic process of ascent toward the spiritual and descent into sensuality, which Bruno calls the heroic frenzies. Through love, it is as though the seed of the eternal takes root in time, the seed of the spirit takes root in flesh; the attempt love makes to make itself spirit is not paired to a desire, for desire is already directed toward beauty, nor to a state of inebriation, but rather to the disunion within the lover himself, which expresses itself not through a synthesis of the contrary forces which war within him, but through a continual division of these forces into objective relations between freedom and necessity, truth and beauty, spirit and flesh.

One should recall the words of Aeschylus:

oneirophantoi de penthēmones
pareisi doxai pherou-
sai kharin mataian.
matan gar, eut' an esthla tis dokōn hora,
parallaxasa dia
kherōn bebaken opsis ou methusteron
pterois opadous' hupnou keleuthois.’

Why does Aeschylus use the word "keleuthois" to designate the path which the deceptive images of beauty take in leading man to the sleep of empty, hopeless longing? Both Hesiod and Parmenides used this word when making the point that day and night, sleep and wakefulness, are caught up in eternal alternation, and so pothos or longing, the sleep of love, continually awakens us to eros and the definite object of our longing, and this awakened love must in turn fall back into itself, must sleep."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:21 am

Quote :
"Ει ουν φιλοσοφητέον είτε μη φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον, [Man, by virtue of his daemonic nature, must be a philosopher, rather he wants to or not, rather he philosophizes or not.] to speak with Athanasius. We cannot, in the manner of one of the old Greeks, name the world a cosmos and beauty until we have named our own soul a cosmos and beauty; to behold and grasp all the world in an idea we must first have come to know ourselves as one particular being and no other and have had everything good and evil rent from the trembling heart and held, not in time, which diffuses our being like colors from a ray of light, but in eternity, which concentrates it. Every man of genius has believed in the eternal, that belief is the very condition of his vitality and flourishing. Perhaps this belief serves as nothing more than an obscuration of the spirit, which man requires if he is to ascend into the highest possible regions of his genius; perhaps he must find all the earth wanting if, like Cassandra of Ilion, he is to utter things not fit for the earth, but it is always the same, and we become like that angel whose wings were set aflame when he reentered this world, if one can entertain the old Gnostic myth. We suffer upon turning back into ourselves, we suffer from the failure to seize upon that inner motion of the heart's genius, which alone could move us to acknowledge the ideal as fate; the consequence of that strange lust which compels us to embrace obscurity, darkness, and uncertainty, but moreover to prefer this benighted world of the self over that law which strikes against the heart when love, fully matured, overcomes and inspires us to act with proud indifference against the hazards of our mortality. Dei virtutem dei sapientiam, [knowledge, for god, is a virtue] or if one may reverse the old theologian's paradox: yes, and man's sin; or, to reinterpret the account of Genesis, what flowered with the greatest sweetness in heaven is reaped with the most bitterness upon the earth.

Making use of Bruno's account of love, I call the resolution of the disquietude of the self the heroic, and it's return into itself, the daemonic. The daemonic leads to a polarization of the individual through a series of subjective transformations, as he is led to find his place anew in each of the oppositions which have been established between the principle of the ego and that of non-ego. This concept of the “daemonic” I venture as the perfect articulation of the incongruous position of the Pascalian man, as well as that disunion which lives from within man himself." - Hamartia.

Thus I have recovered the conditions and fundamental reality behind the valuing subject, the empirical ego, which Nietzsche failed to do, but without any reference to his philosophy, and outside of any Nietzschean framework. Though, to speak like him, my philosophy/morality is "beyond good and evil" in the sense that all the virtues and vices and systems of value are equally representations of the transcendental order.

"Philosophers have proved incapable of conceiving of good and evil, freedom and necessity, the finite will and infinite creative power invested to man at the same level of moral reality, although Spinoza should be commended for making a brilliant attempt at doing so; one is always the negative expression, or lack, of the other. The fact that the empirical, lived self-consciousness can only preserve itself as an incomplete process, with no final synthesis of its contents which would allow it to grasp its freedom, not as the disparate extension through various transformations in life, but as a singular will and imperative, a categorical determination of its character, in the language of Kant- that is the source of "evil," that is, what the Platonists formulated in the proto-moral conception "akrasia," acting against ones own ethical and rational principle. Insofar as man's fundamental experience as an ethical, moral, or meaning-seeking being is one of limitation and finitude, his fundamental experience as a free being in possession of a will must be one of "sin," of corruption. In the first case man takes freedom as a representative idea, as a representation of the transcendental self-consciousness and ideal ego, but in the second case he must realize this "ethical idea" in some objective specification of knowledge, in order to exercise his will and moral potency; he must realize it in a particular canon of virtues and vices. But as was shown in the previous essay, his moral potency does not truly belong to the will, to his free agency, but rather to his capacity, as an empirical or lived ego, as a daemonic being, to be stimulated by the transcendental ego, that is, to preserve himself as an empirical self-consciousness, as a living ego and in the spirit of daemonism, by positing an ideal representative of the transcendental, toward which he must direct himself, even though the preservation afforded to him in this process is a preservation, a being held in existence, as only an incomplete being, a sinful being, a corrupted and limited being. " - Hamartia

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

*Become clean, my friends.*
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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:22 am

Quote :
"Why was it bad for man to eat the fruit? Was the fruit itself bad? How could it be, if it came from God? Eriugena said that the form which the fruit assumed was good, but that only man's reaction to it was bad. Like a drug. The drug in itself, in what it promised, in its beauty, was good... But when man consumes it, it disorders him, puts him out of joint with his own essence... intoxicates him. What was one, in man, the soul, is disintegrated, made dual, and turned into parts, under the intoxicating influence of the tree of knowledge. This is the origin of his disunion within himself, which Pascal speaks of most eloquently, the abyss which is pregnant with good and evil. The knowledge of good and evil is not contained in the fruit, it is the consequence of the fruit. In God all is united, God's knowledge is not particular, God bears knowledge without losing sight of the totality. But when man takes the fruit, it breaks down his soul into particular passions and pieces of knowledge.

... This dis-organization of his original nature is the intoxication, the corruption, evil. Man comes to see the world no longer as a totality and unity, but as broken and fragmented, in time.

The fruit of knowledge can by eaten angels and Gods, for everything is united in them. But when man consumes it it decomposes his unified nature into a series of particular things, introduces the order of time into nature, and dis-integrates reality into the fleeting parade of individual moments and things we live in now. In this sense "evil" is not real, it is only an effect, in man. Thus Eriugena makes the strange claim that man's expulsion from paradise was an expulsion from human nature itself.

... Eriugena shared a conception of God with Spinoza, God as a primordial substance with infinite attributes. For Eriugena this implied that anything that could be said about God was true, considered from different modes in which these attributes might be said to be or not be. The very fact that an idea can be clearly articulated indicates its truth. Again, only the individuating and decomposing force of the human intellect is responsible for see things in a negative designation, as non-entity, non-existence. Here we have the first glimmering of a speculative ethics. He says that the amount of interpretations of the bible is like the innumerable colors in a peacock's tail, that knowledge is infinite, and he delights in this idea. This perspective also contains the richest conception of the the inner disunion within the self, the "inner wound" within it that divides it into an ego and non-ego, a particular individual personality and the world. Eriugena transfers this disuinion of individual existence to the divine substance itself, dividing that substance into natura, through the categories of being and non-being, analgous to the finite and infinite which express themselves through man's inherent disuinion, constituting the four divisions of nature. Body and mind are not united, nor opposed, for him.... bodily existence and passion is one mode of the infinte substance, thought is another, their relation expressing at first the metaxy within the individual between the finite and infinite, mortal and immortal soul, and then the one in which the substance is expressed as natura, as nobeing and being, perishable world and imperishable God.

... For Eriugena, a passion is the finite and mutable revelation of the eternal aspect of a thought, a thought is the infinite and immutable revelation of the finite aspect of a passion. That is his concept of theophany. Goodness consists in following through the series of theophanies to the final mode of being, in completely realizing the eternal thought in the passions and the finite passion in thought, in other words, it consists in philosophy.

He seems to think that... anything we could possibly say about "God" is true, given what mode we conceive of it in, ie. any piece of knowledge we venture about the divine nature is true either as the finite aspect of a passion in the infinite and eternal mirror of some thought, or it is the eternal and infinite aspect of some thought "shown in a glass darkly" in the seductive semblance of some human passion. .... Ethics becomes the soverign philosophy, the science of articulating ideas. The ontology [study of being] of ideas, moral and philosophical."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:24 am

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"We later civilizations . . . we too know that we are mortal.

We had long heard tell of whole worlds that had vanished, of empires sunk without a trace, gone down with all their men and all their machines into the unexplorable depths of the centuries, with their gods and their laws, their academies and their sciences pure and applied, their grammars and their dictionaries, their Classics, their Romantics, and their Symbolists, their critics and the critics of their critics. . . . We were aware that the visible earth is made of ashes, and that ashes signify something. Through the obscure depths of history we could make out the phantoms of great ships laden with riches and intellect; we could not count them. But the disasters that had sent them down were, after all, none of our affair.

Elam, Ninevah, Babylon were but beautiful vague names, and the total ruin of those worlds had as little significance for us as their very existence. But France, England, Russia...these too would be beautiful names. Lusitania too, is a beautiful name. And we see now that the abyss of history is deep enough to hold us all. We are aware that a civilization has the same fragility as a life. The circumstances that could send the works of Keats and Baudelaire to join the works of Menander are no longer inconceivable; they are in the newspapers. That is not all. The searing lesson is more complete still. It was not enough for our generation to learn from its own experience how the most beautiful things and the most ancient, the most formidable and the best ordered, can perish by accident; in the realm of thought, feeling, and common sense, we witnessed extraordinary phenomena: paradox suddenly become fact, and obvious fact brutally believed.

I shall cite but one example: the great virtues of the German peoples have begotten more evils, than idleness ever bred vices. With our own eyes, we have seen conscientious labor, the most solid learning, the most serious discipline and application adapted to appalling ends.

So many horrors could not have been possible without so many virtues. Doubtless, much science was needed to kill so many, to waste so much property, annihilate so many cities in so short a time; but moral qualities in like number were also needed. Are Knowledge and Duty, then, suspect?

So the Persepolis of the spirit is no less ravaged than the Susa of material fact. Everything has not been lost, but everything has sensed that it might perish.

An extraordinary shudder ran through the marrow of Europe. She felt in every nucleus of her mind that she was no longer the same, that she was no longer herself, that she was about to lose consciousness, a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable calamities, by thousands of men of the first rank, from innumerable geographical, ethnic, and historical coincidences.

So -- as though in desperate defense of her own physiological being and resources -- all her memory confusedly returned. Her great men and her great books came back pell-mell. Never has so much been read, nor with such passion, as during the war: ask the booksellers. . . . Never have people prayed so much and so deeply: ask the priests. All the saviors, founders, protectors, martyrs, heroes, all the fathers of their country, the sacred heroines, the national poets were invoked. . . .

And in the same disorder of mind, at the summons of the same anguish, all cultivated Europe underwent the rapid revival of her innumerable ways of thought: dogmas, philosophies, heterogeneous ideals; the three hundred ways of explaining the World, the thousand and one versions of Christianity, the two dozen kinds of positivism; the whole spectrum of intellectual light spread out its incompatible colors, illuminating with a strange and contradictory glow the death agony of the European soul. While inventors were feverishly searching their imaginations and the annals of former wars for the means of doing away with barbed wire, of outwitting submarines or paralyzing the flight of airplanes, her soul was intoning at the same time all the incantations it ever knew, and giving serious consideration to the most bizarre prophecies; she sought refuge, guidance, consolation throughout the whole register of her memories, past acts, and ancestral attitudes. Such are the known effects of anxiety, the disordered behavior of mind fleeing from reality to nightmare and from nightmare back to reality, terrified, like a rat caught in a trap. . . .

The military crisis may be over. The economic crisis is still with us in all its force. But the intellectual crisis, being more subtle and, by it nature, assuming the most deceptive appearances (since it takes place in the very realm of dissimulation)...this crisis will hardly allow us to grasp its true extent, its phase.

No one can say what will be dead or alive tomorrow, in literature, philosophy, aesthetics; no one yet knows what ideas and modes of expression will be inscribed on the casualty list, what novelties will be proclaimed.

Hope, of course, remains -- singing in an undertone:

Et cum vorandi vicerit libidinem
Late triumphet imperator spiritus.

But hope is only man's mistrust of the clear foresight of his mind. Hope suggests that any conclusion unfavorable to us must be an error of the mind. And yet the facts are clear and pitiless; thousands of young writers and artists have died; the illusion of a European culture has been lost, and knowledge has been proved impotent to save anything whatsoever; science is mortally wounded in its moral ambitions and, as it were, put to shame by the cruelty of its applications; idealism is barely surviving, deeply stricken, and called to account for its dreams; realism is hopeless, beaten, routed by its own crimes and errors; greed and abstinence are equally flouted; faiths are confused in their aim -- cross against cross, crescent against crescent; and even the skeptics, confounded by the sudden, violent, and moving events that play with our minds as a cat with a mouse . . . even the skeptics lose their doubts, recover, and lose them again, no longer master of the motions of their thought.

The swaying of the ship has been so violent that the best-hung lamps have finally overturned. . . .

What gives this critical condition of the mind its depth and gravity is the patient's condition when she was overcome.

I have neither the time nor the ability to define the intellectual situation in Europe in 1914. And who could pretend to picture that situation? The subject is immense, requiring every order of knowledge and endless information. Besides, when such a complex whole is in question, the difficulty of reconstructing the past, even the recent past, is altogether comparable to that of constructing the future, even the near future; or rather, they are the same difficulty. The prophet is in the same boat as the historian. Let us leave them there.

For all I need is a vague general recollection of what was being thought just before the war, the kinds of intellectual pursuit then in progress, the works being published.

So if I disregard all detail and confine myself to a quick impression, to that natural whole given by a moment's perception, I see . . . nothing! Nothing . . . and yet an infinitely potential nothing.

The physicists tell us that if the eye could survive in an oven fired to the point of incandescence, it would see . . . nothing. There would be no unequal intensities of light left to mark off points in space. That formidable contained energy would produce invisibility, indistinct equality. Now, equality of that kind is nothing else than a perfect state of disorder.

And what made that disorder in the mid of Europe? The free coexistence, in all her cultivated minds, of the most dissimilar ideas, the most contradictory principles of life and learning. That is characteristic of a modern epoch.

I am not averse to generalizing the notion of "modern" to designate certain ways of life, rather than making it purely a synonym of contemporary. There are moments and places in history to which we moderns could return without greatly disturbing the harmony of those times, without seeming objects infinitely curious and conspicuous . . . creatures shocking, dissonant, and unassimilable. Wherever our entrance would create the least possible sensation, that is where we should feel almost at home. It is clear that Rome in the time of Trajan, or Alexandria under the Ptolemies, would take us in more easily than many places less remote in time but more specialized in a single race, a single culture, and a single system of life.

Well then! Europe in 1914 had perhaps reached the limit of modernism in this sense. Every mind of any scope was a crossroads for all shades of opinion; every thinker was an international exposition of thought. There were the works of the mind in which the wealth of contrasts and contradictory tendencies was like the insane displays of light in the capitals of those days: eyes were fatigued, scorched.... How much material wealth, how much labor and planning it took, how many centuries were ransacked, how many heterogeneous lives were combined, to make possible such a carnival, and to set it up as the supreme wisdom and the triumph of humanity?

In a book of that era -- and not one of the most mediocre -- we should have no trouble in finding: the influence of the Russian ballet, a touch of Pascal's gloom, numerous impressions of the Goncourt type, something of Nietzsche, something of Rimbaud, certain effects due to a familiarity with painters, and sometimes the tone of a scientific publication...the whole flavored with an indefinably British quality difficult to assess! Let us notice, by the way, that within each of the components of this mixture other bodies could well be found. It would be useless to point them out: it would be merely to repeat what I have just said about modernism, and to give the whole history of the European mind.

Standing, now, on an immense sort of terrace of Elsinore that stretches from Basel to Cologne, bordered by the sands of Nieuport, the marshes of the Somme, the limestone of Champagne, the granites of Alsace . . . our Hamlet of Europe is watching millions of ghosts.

But he is an intellectual Hamlet, meditating on the life and death of truths; for ghosts, he has all the subjects of our controversies; for remorse, all the titles of our fame. He is bowed under the weight of all the discoveries and varieties of knowledge, incapable of resuming the endless activity; he broods on the tedium of rehearsing the past and the folly of always trying to innovate. He staggers between two abysses -- for two dangers never cease threatening the world: order and disorder.

Every skull he picks up is an illustrious skull. This one was Leonardo. He invented the flying man, but the flying man has not exactly served his inventor's purposes. We know that, mounted on his great swan (il grande uccello sopra del dosso del suo magnio cecero) he has other tasks in our day than fetching snow from the mountain peaks during the hot season to scatter it on the streets of towns. And that other skull was Leibnitz, who dreamed of universal peace. And this one was Kant...and Kant begat Hegel, and Hegel begat Marx, and Marx begat. . . .

Hamlet hardly knows what to make of so many skulls. But suppose he forgets them! Will he still be himself? His terribly lucid mind contemplates the passage from war to peace: darker, more dangerous than the passage from peace to war; all peoples are troubled by it. . . . "What about Me," he says, "what is to become of Me, the European intellect? ...And what is peace? Peace is perhaps that state of things in which the natural hostility between men is manifested in creation, rather than destruction as in war. Peace is a time of creative rivalry and the battle of production; but I am not tired of producing? Have I not exhausted my desire for radical experiment, indulged too much in cunning compounds? ...Should I not perhaps lay aside my hard duties and transcendent ambitions? Perhaps follow the trend and do like Polonius who is now director of a great newspaper; like Laertes, who is something in aviation; like Rosencrantz, who is doing God knows what under a Russian name?

"Farewell, ghosts! The world no longer needs you -- or me. By giving the names of progress to its own tendency to a fatal precision, the world is seeking to add to the benefits of life the advantages of death. A certain confusion still reigns; but in a little while all will be made clear, and we shall witness at last the miracle of an animal society, the perfect and ultimate anthill."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:25 am

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[ Second Letter ]


I was saying the other day the peace is the kind of war that allows acts of love and creation in its course; it is, then, a more complex and obscure process than war properly so-called, as life is more obscure and more profound than death.

But the origin and early stages of peace are more obscure than peace itself, as the fecundation and beginnings of life are more mysterious than the functioning of a body once it is made and adapted.

Everyone today feels the presence of this mystery as an actual sensation; a few men must doubtless feel that their own inner being is positively a part of the mystery; and perhaps there is someone with a sensibility so clear, subtle, and rich that he senses in himself certain aspects of our destiny more advanced than our destiny itself.

I have not that ambition. The things of the world interest me only as they relate to the intellect; for me, everything relates to the intellect. Bacon would say that this notion of the intellect is an idol. I agree, but I have not found a better idol.

I am thinking then of the establishment of peace insofar as it involves the intellect and things of the intellect. This point of view is false, since it separates the mind from all other activities; but such abstract operations and falsifications are inevitable: every point of view is false.

A first thought dawns. The idea of culture, of intelligence, of great works, has for us a very ancient connection with the idea of Europe -- so ancient that we rarely go back so far.

Other parts of the world have had admirable civilizations, poets of the first order, builders, and even scientists. But no part of the world has possessed this singular physical property: the most intense power of radiation combined with an equally intense power of assimilation.

Everything came to Europe, and everything came from it. Or almost everything.

Now, the present day brings with it this important question: can Europe hold its pre-eminence in all fields?

Will Europe become what it is in reality -- that is, a little promontory on the continent of Asia?

Or will it remain what it seems -- that is, the elect portion of the terrestrial globe, the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a vast body?

In order to make clear the strict necessity of this alternative, let me develop here a kind of basic theorem.

Consider a map of the world. On this planisphere are all the habitable lands. The whole is divided into regions, and in each of these regions there is a certain density of population, a certain quality of men. In each of these regions, also, there are corresponding natural resources -- a more or less fertile soil, a more or less rich substratum, a more or less watered terrain, which may be more or less easily developed for transport, etc.

All these characteristics make it possible, at any period, to classify the regions we are speaking of, so that at any given time the situation on the earth may be defined by a formula showing the inequalities between the inhabited regions of its surface.

At each moment, the history of the next moment will depend on this given inequality.

Let us now examine, not our theoretical classification, but the one that actually prevailed in the world until recently. We notice a striking fact, which we take too much for granted:

Small though it be, Europe has for centuries figured at the head of the list. In spite of her limited extent -- and although the richness of her soil is not out of the ordinary -- she dominates the picture. By what miracle? Certainly the miracle must lie in the high quality of her population. That quality must compensate for the smaller number of men, of square miles, of tons or ore, found in Europe. In one scale put the empire of India and in the other the United Kingdom: the scale with the smaller weight tilts down!

That is an extraordinary upset in equilibrium. But its consequences are still more so: they will shortly allow us to foresee a gradual change in the opposite direction.

We suggested just now that the quality of her men must be the determining factor in Europe's superiority. I cannot analyze this quality in detail; but from a summary examination I would say that a driving thirst, an ardent and disinterested curiosity, a happy mixture of imagination and rigorous logic, a certain unpessimistic skepticism, an unresigned mysticism...are the most specifically active characteristics of the European psyche.

A single example of that spirit, an example of the highest order and of the very first importance, is Greece -- since the whole Mediterranean littoral must be counted in Europe. Smyrna and Alexandria are as much a part of Europe as Athens and Marseilles. Greece founded geometry. It was a mad undertaking: we are still arguing about the possibility of such a folly.

What did it take to bring about that fantastic creation? Consider that neither the Egyptians nor the Chinese nor the Chaldeans nor the Hindus managed it. Consider what a fascinating adventure it was, a conquest a thousand times richer and actually far more poetic than that of the Golden Fleece. No sheepskin is worth the golden thigh of Pythagoras.

This was an enterprise requiring gifts that, when found together, are usually the most incompatible. It required argonauts of the mind, tough pilots who refused to be either lost in their thoughts or distracted by their impressions. Neither the frailty of the premises that supported them, nor the infinite number and subtlety of the inferences they explored could dismay them. They were as though equidistant from the inconsistent Negro and the indefinite fakir. They accomplished the extremely delicate and improbable feat of adapting common speech to precise reasoning; they analyzed the most complex combinations of motor and visual functions, and found that these corresponded to certain linguistic and grammatical properties; they trusted in words to lead them through space like far-seeing blind men. And space itself became, from century to century, a richer and more surprising creation, as thought gained possession of itself and had more confidence in the marvelous system of reason and in the original intuition which had endowed it with such incompatible instruments as definitions, axioms, lemmas, theorems, problems, porisms, etc.

I should need a whole book to treat the subject properly. I wanted merely to indicate in a few words one of the characteristic inventions of the European genius. This example brings me straight back to my thesis.

I have claimed that the imbalance maintained for so long in Europe's favor was, by its own reaction, bound to change by degrees into an imbalance in the opposite direction. That is what I called by the ambitious name of basic theorem.

How is this proposition to be proved? I take the same example, that of the geometry of the Greeks; and I ask the reader to consider the consequences of this discipline through the ages. We see it gradually, very slowly but very surely, assuming such authority that all research, all the ways of acquiring knowledge tend inevitably to borrow its rigorous procedure, its scrupulous economy of "matter," its automatic generalizations, its subtle methods, and that infinite discretion which authorizes the wildest audacity. Modern science was born of this education in the grand style.

But once born, once tested and proved by its practical applications, our science became a means of power, a means of physical domination, a creator of material wealth, an apparatus for exploiting the resources of the whole planet -- ceasing to be an "end in itself" and an artistic activity. Knowledge, which was a consumer value, became an exchange value. The utility of knowledge made knowledge a commodity, no longer desired by a few distinguished amateurs but by Everybody.

This commodity, then, was to be turned out in more and more manageable or consumable forms; it was to be distributed to a more and more numerous clientele; it was to become an article of commerce, an article, in short, that can be imitated and produced almost anywhere.

Result: the inequality that once existed between the regions of the world as regards the mechanical arts, the applied sciences, the scientific instruments of war or peace -- an inequality on which Europe's predominance was based -- is tending gradually to disappear.

So, the classification of the habitable regions of the world is becoming one in which gross material size, mere statistics and figures (e.g., population, area, raw materials) finally and alone determine the rating of the various sections of the globe.

And so the scales that used to tip in our favor, although we appeared the lighter, are beginning to lift us gently, as though we had stupidly shifted to the other side the mysterious excess that was ours. We have foolishly made force proportional to mass!

This coming phenomenon, moreover, may be connected with another to be found in every nation: I mean the diffusion of culture, and its acquisition by ever larger categories of individuals.

An attempt to predict the consequences of such diffusion, or to find whether it will or not inevitably bring on decadence, would be a delightfully complicated problem in intellectual physics.

The charm of the problem for the speculative mind proceeds, first, from its resemblance to the physical fact of diffusion and, next, from a sudden transformation into a profound difference when the thinker remembers that his primary object is men not molecules.

A drop of wine falling into water barely colors it, and tends to disappear after showing as a pink cloud. That is the physical fact. But suppose now that some time after it has vanished, gone back to limpidity, we should see, here and there in our glass -- which seemed once more to hold pure water -- drops of wine forming, dark and pure -- what a surprise!...

This phenomenon of Cana is not impossible in intellectual and social physics. We then speak of genius, and contrast it with diffusion.

Just now we are considering a curious balance that worked in inverse ratio to weight. Then we saw a liquid system pass as though spontaneously from homogeneous to heterogeneous, from intimate mingling to clear separation.... These paradoxical images give the simplest and most practical notion of the role played in the World by what -- for five or ten thousand years -- has been called Mind.

But can the European Mind -- or at least its most precious content -- be totally diffused? Must such phenomena as democracy, the exploitation of the globe, and the general spread of technology, all of which presage a deminutio capitis for Europe...must these be taken as absolute decisions of fate? Or have we some freedom against this threatening conspiracy of things?

Perhaps in seeking that freedom we may create it. But in order to seek it, we must for a time give up considering groups, and study the thinking individual in his struggle for a personal life against his life in society."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:25 am

Quote :
"Of great import are these last lines:

"This coming phenomenon, moreover, may be connected with another to be found in every nation: I mean the diffusion of culture, and its acquisition by ever larger categories of individuals.

An attempt to predict the consequences of such diffusion, or to find whether it will or not inevitably bring on decadence, would be a delightfully complicated problem in intellectual physics.

The charm of the problem for the speculative mind proceeds, first, from its resemblance to the physical fact of diffusion and, next, from a sudden transformation into a profound difference when the thinker remembers that his primary object is men not molecules.

A drop of wine falling into water barely colors it, and tends to disappear after showing as a pink cloud. That is the physical fact. But suppose now that some time after it has vanished, gone back to limpidity, we should see, here and there in our glass -- which seemed once more to hold pure water -- drops of wine forming, dark and pure -- what a surprise!...

This phenomenon of Cana is not impossible in intellectual and social physics. We then speak of genius, and contrast it with diffusion.

Just now we are considering a curious balance that worked in inverse ratio to weight. Then we saw a liquid system pass as though spontaneously from homogeneous to heterogeneous, from intimate mingling to clear separation.... These paradoxical images give the simplest and most practical notion of the role played in the World by what -- for five or ten thousand years -- has been called Mind.

But can the European Mind -- or at least its most precious content -- be totally diffused? Must such phenomena as democracy, the exploitation of the globe, and the general spread of technology, all of which presage a deminutio capitis for Europe...must these be taken as absolute decisions of fate? Or have we some freedom against this threatening conspiracy of things?

Perhaps in seeking that freedom we may create it. But in order to seek it, we must for a time give up considering groups, and study the thinking individual in his struggle for a personal life against his life in society."

How to endure the final diffusion of culture without becoming decadents- that is a great task that is set before us."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:25 am

Quote :
"But everything about our modern world and the direction that science and philosophy have taken seems bent on “closing the circle” of mortal life, on annihilating any possibility of mediating the transcendental and empirical spheres of the ego."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:26 am

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"These symbols and ideas, like the eternity of Nietzsche, or the Prometheus of Aeschylus, are not linguistic in the same way that our common speech is linguistic, for they originate in the daemonic nature which is the precondition of human self-consciousness, and as such represent things not yet able to be fully articulated by the self-conscious human being;
The ancient philosophies were all spontaneously engendered through the daemonic, they served as a horizon through which the self-consciousness could take shape. They served as a limit to what could be expressed in human tongue.

And this is one of the greatest of mysteries. Language can only evolve when something has placed a limit to what can be expressed; there must be a limit placed upon language before language can evolve. Language only makes sense when it begins through a passive state, that of the daemonic being which has been opened up to "the deeper life." I can only speak the word "man" when the word "god" has served as a limit to the former conception. So on and so on, down to the first word, so to speak.

Philosophy, as that essential thing which a daemonic being does, as the fundamental nature of a daemonic being, (the only one we know of is the human) is the ground of this mystery."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:26 am

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"The musical animal.-- The development of human language only becomes comprehensible when one proposes some purely representative language out of which it evolved and eventually adopted the power of communication. It is probable that the first man Adam did not comprehend things in name, but in song. Music is just such a kind of purely representative language, when one regards it in its most essential sense, as an art whose own medium or manner of depiction serves as the depiction itself; music is the primeval nature out of which man first began to take cognisance of the world through his intellectual, abstracting power, rather than his brute sensibility, in which all things first suggested to him their “meaning,” in which every being stood frozen in a moment of revelation and betrayed its form to him, rent open by the entry of his voice. The dream of all poets has been to realize this purely representative language in words rather than in tones, but unfortunately the instinct or need for communication, which grew up within man much later, only after the utility of form was realized, and has thereby been insolubly bound up with words, always makes itself known, and renders this goal unachievable. In music itself this instinct has been exerting a retroactive influence, imbuing mere tone and sound with communicable significance, so that rarely even in this domain does man attain to that state of complete suggestibility which is called "inspiration." We cannot discover this primeval consciousness by realizing it through the analysis of our own music, but in the terms already ventured here one could imagine it as that point at which the consciousness, in its reflexive organization of the affects, first achieved that degree of reflexivity necessary to produce self-consciousness in our human sense of the word, when the enduring forms out of which our experience is constituted began to appear as such, as enduring, as form. That power which has transformed and has been transforming consciousness, that power for actively constituting the mental effects rather than reflexively, in accordance to our language and reason, in accordance to our more refined self-consciousness and the real utility that we find in the apprehension of form, namely logic and communication, will one day be controverted, as the last remnants of the older consciousness are annihilated through the new means of organizing the affects, so that the new state in which man might one day find himself, a purely active consciousness, will be quite analogous to that “musical consciousnesses,” to that absolute suggestibility before the world, in which all things intimated to man their being, which we cannot now imagine. But this new consciousness shall not represent, it will not represent at all, but only create, only declare; this consciousness of absolute communication, of absolute expression and engendering, will be more similar to the older consciousness of absolute representation than it is to our present one, to our now chimaeric nature."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:27 am

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"Toward the good conscience.-- It is probable that the greatest human beings were in actuality the most child-like, but also the most courageous; who, by virtue of their courage, found the greatest beauty in emblazoning all their lives with hope's plaintive colors, their greatest happiness in the bountiful enthusiasm of desire. The misfortune is, that in time one of their hopes must be realized, one of their desires attained, in which case their good conscience about things becomes poisoned by reality, which forms only the lowly dregs of a wine that has long since run dry and, in relation to their ardent dreams about life, must always corrupt them. Hence, the great commandment of Epicurean morality to throw off all the dregs of reality, which of course means to throw off reality itself, to dwell silently in one's little garden all life long. A Stoic, possessed by an opposite nature, and perhaps also by an opposite courage; incapable of hoping and desiring with a good conscience, without the birth and death pangs of expectation and dissappointment, aims to so wholly indwell in reality that he forgets how to desire and to hope completely, but with the same final aim as an Epicurean: to maintain a good conscience, only with respect to bearing the truth. These are both quite violent methods toward securing a peaceful breast; have we developed no subtler means of reconciling the ideality and actuality of man, of taming the heart than- Epicureanism and Stoicism?"

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:27 am

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"A great sentence from the hand of an ancient Greek philosopher says that only he who possesses a glint of heaven in his eye can endure looking at the sun. But we cannot know that this glint is truly born of the heavens and a moral fecundity by looking at meager fires, but we must see if we can endure the sun, the idea, itself. Our love must not be meager, but noble."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:28 am

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"Man imbues his most powerful desires and passions with intellectual and artistic meanings, to the point that exercising these things (like the sexual drive) no longer fully empties them of their vital force, and an inarticulate melancholy is left over as it were: the melancholy of the artist and the philosopher, or what we sometimes refer to as genius."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:28 am

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"The destruction of the past would not have been inevitable if human beings were not so fucking stupid. Not the destruction of the old values, but their transvaluation, that is what Nietzsche wanted. He would have used (if he hadn't gone insane) the will to power as a principle to organize all human values into a system, a hierarchy starting with all the life-denying values and leading up to those which most affirmed life and promoted the will to power. Doubtlessly Nietzsche would have put the eternal return at the very top.
Once this system was developed, it would serve as a kind of science. The philosophers of the future would have used it to construct new values. There need not be any destruction of either abstract values or human beings through this process, the process Nietzsche always spoke about.

This is why Hitler failed as a creator of value. His art was not informed by techne, by a science, by the kind of system Nietzsche was trying to develop and which I just described. You can't just assert values out of thin air, they have to be based on something. And the only thing, to Nietzsche's mind, they could be based on was that system I am talking about. Hitler didn't fucking have it, and Nietzsche never was able to complete his construction of it."
A drop of wine falling into water barely colors it, and tends to disappear after showing as a pink cloud. That is the physical fact. But suppose now that some time after it has vanished, gone back to limpidity, we should see, here and there in our glass -- which seemed once more to hold pure water -- drops of wine forming, dark and pure -- what a surprise!...

This phenomenon of Cana is not impossible in intellectual and social physics. We then speak of genius, and contrast it with diffusion.

Just now we are considering a curious balance that worked in inverse ratio to weight. Then we saw a liquid system pass as though spontaneously from homogeneous to heterogeneous, from intimate mingling to clear separation.... These paradoxical images give the simplest and most practical notion of the role played in the World by what -- for five or ten thousand years -- has been called Mind.

But can the European Mind -- or at least its most precious content -- be totally diffused? Must such phenomena as democracy, the exploitation of the globe, and the general spread of technology, all of which presage a deminutio capitis for Europe...must these be taken as absolute decisions of fate? Or have we some freedom against this threatening conspiracy of things?

Perhaps in seeking that freedom we may create it. But in order to seek it, we must for a time give up considering groups, and study the thinking individual in his struggle for a personal life against his life in society." - Paul Valery.

"Nietzsche's systematic presentation of all human values, the basis of a world-culture and moreover a culture of value creators (geniuses, to use Valery's language) whose creation is informed by this science, this techne or technical knowledge, was Nietzsche's answer to Valery's crisis, the diffusion of culture.""

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:28 am

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"How can one have a concept of freedom when freedom itself, by its very nature, defies all conceptualization? That was one of Schelling's big concerns, and we could ask a similar question: How can we value our selves when the self defies all value-conceptualization? That no idea is adequate to its ideatum, contra Spinoza; that no concept is adequate to its signified, is the major lesson in Schelling's great essay on freedom, and in a similar way we might say that no value is adequate to the self. Schelling thus said that all things find their ground in "that within God which is not God himself," and we can say that all values find their ground and origin in that "within the self which is not the self itself." I have articulated this unreflected part of the self which is none the less constituent of it in my writing about man's daemonic existence.

Nietzsche, too, recognized that no value was adequate and equal to the self which posited it, and that the Will to Power, this positing itself, then was the primary constituent of the self's moral-philosophical reality. He refused to look for a new ground for values, allowed them to remain groundless, and did not recognize any more subtle logic at work in the self, namely the daemonic- the existence of an unreflected, unegoic principle which, in its dynamic interaction with the reflected principle, constituted the moral-philosophical reality of the individual.

This dynamic interaction is nothing less than what has here been called self-valuing, or what one could speak of as self-love. We can see the shallowest example of it when a woman loves her own beauty and body, the corporeal, unegoic, non-reflective part of her self, and thereby appropriates it to the higher order of the reflective self-consciousness, herself thereby rising into a higher order of daemonic reality.

But what are the deeper and the deepest unreflected aspects of the self, how can they be appropriated by the reflective self-consciousness: to what extent can we recognize in the unreflected aspect of the self the ground of our values, our self-love, our self-value? Such unreflected aspects are things like necessity against our apparent freedom, mortality against our eternal aspirations. As I formulate the questions in my own philosophical language: to what extent can the continuity between the empirical and transcendental egos be realized?

These questions are the theoretical objects of the new philosophy I see posed here and by myself, the only philosophy capable of re-grounding morality and human values.
Goethe shows an equal point in his metamorphosis of plants: a plant grows through a series of expansive and contractive movements in distinction to animals for, while it must strive up for the sun, the plant must grope blindly in the dirt for moisture. The plant can grow indefinitely, but it only takes shape, becomes formulated, becomes an organism, because of the limit imposed on its progress through its need for water and light.

Without something to limit the development of the self it can never become structured. We should re-read the works of literature and philosophy through the lens of this metaphor, as if they were developing plants reaching up infinitely toward the sun and the horizon of meaning, but which nonetheless need the ground and its water; which expand and contract randomly, as the night changes to day, as it rains and as it dries up.

In other words, we should look for the unreflected aspect in every self-conscious moral and philosophical idea, and then play the reflected idea or principle upon the newly uncovered unreflected one.

The daemonic being becomes structured, individuated, through the interplay of these two principles within itself, the one limiting it, the other compelling it to expand. Holderlin described a similar situation with his concepts of the aorgic and organic, the spirit and the body, inconceivable nature and nature structured by human thought.

But this structure, in distinction to Holderlin's concept of the self, is self-effacing. The frenzied existence of the daemonic, the interaction of the egoic and nonegoic principles, is continually effacing its own productions. This is why I borrowed the term "daemonic" from Bruno's book "eroici frenzies" to describe my concept of the self: it is a self-effacing, frenzied existence. The final destruction of the self, the final renunciation of the self which Holderlin imagined was the apotheosis of tragedy cannot be accomplished through my philosophy: the height of daemonic existence leads to a dramatic reversal through the attaining of "eroici" or heroism, to use Bruno's terms: what has been called here the act of self-valuing, self-loving, and what I have called the re-instantiation of the unreflected aspect of the self in reflected self-consciousness.

This philosophy then, I think, would attain the greatest power in not offering itself as something for cohering the self in the manner of old morality and philosophy, through prescriptive ideation, not as a tool for shaping one's self and asserting particular values, but as an instrument for grounding the act of self-valuing, as an instrument for grounding the "daemon." It would do this by fully articulating the middle-ground the daemon occupies, by realizing the continuous discourse between the empirical and transcendental within which man, as a daemonic being, continuously takes form and is continuously effaced."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:29 am

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"The ancients, especially in the case of the Greeks, found in nature a relief from their humanity, from the impulse toward knowledge, beauty, the true, and the good, which continually burdened them. These drives have grown cold for us, and it is in nature that we aim to reawaken them, as though by a kind of intoxicant. To be relieved of one's humanity- what a noble pleasure! Perhaps man once went before his gods with the same longing in his heart."

Out of that cold silence with which we return the silence of the divinity, philosophy learns to speak."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:29 am

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"Just as Aristotle threw himself into the tides because he could not understand them, just as Empedocles threw himself into the flames of mount Etna because he could not understand it, so the poet throws himself into time because he cannot understand the eternal, which is to say, he loves."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:30 am

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"What consoled us in hope can never be loved, while what we have loved can never console us in hope, for it is only when one of our desires denies the particular joy for which it had suffered to all the other innumerable desires which play upon our heart that one of life's graces manages to wholly confide itself to us, and will thereafter never betray itself again."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:30 am

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"In the fulfillment of one longing, another usually finds its birth. In those beautiful waters Narcissus found his own image which, rather than the waters, he then loved, while from the most beautiful vantage upon the sea creeps into our heart those melancholy suggestions of some distant mountain that seems to lie brooding overhead. Our greatest joys tend to renounce themselves."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:31 am

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"In nature, the animal man’s instincts were coordinated in such a way that the expression of one instinct was not merely the expression of its own force, but that of the entire organism, that of the consciousness. Consciousness is only this unified force, this reflexivity. To call forth the greatest store of consciousness with the slightest amount of sensory excitation, that was the “goal” of nature. Man’s reason eventually separated the instincts from one another, it introduced discontiguous states of mental affect into a consciousness born out of the need to grasp through continguous impressions relations of temporal and spatial nature. Such discontiguous states of affect we now recognize as “ideas,” words, abstractions. To reason, to arrange aesthetically the same kinds of relationships arranged metonymically by the early consciousness, relationships between events, things, and feelings, that is to say, to arrange them in accordance with these abstractions and the relationships suggested by an appeal to their standard (such as causality) man would have been provided with an advantage over the other beasts, the advantage of anticipation, imagination, and strategy.


His reason, in short, had the psychological consequence of a disruption in the metonymic structure of consciousness so that man began to experience the force of the instincts individually. The sensation of distance and gulf within himself inspired him with the thought of the soul, the thought of a self. The self represents a kind of abeyance of consciousness, the repose of a continuously discharging instinctual organism, a fragmentation of this activity in accordance with which the instincts could be re-coordinated, through “thought.” But this “thinking” could not realize a harmonious order of the instincts like that which nature took thousands of years to produce. The first thoughts to lend their coloring to the humans soul were accordingly very painful, and constituted a kind of negative expression of the organism, the force not of an organization but of a disorganization, from which man still suffers, for this disorganizing power of thought was doubtlessly very seductive, the force it was capable of generating far surpassed that of the organized instincts and the individuated instincts, and was in its power very compelling to early man, offering to him an impetus toward action and life that could not be denied, even if the life and the acts it led him to were dangerous, painful, tragic. It took root in the deepest parts of his consciousness. It is his conscience. The conscience juxtaposes instincts and passions of contrary dispositions, as the sexual drive and the metaphysical need are counter-poised to produce the inspiration of the Christian saint, and grasps this disorganizing power, this inspiration, in an abstraction, in a discontiguous state of consciousness. The disorganizing power of thought is the most seductive and powerful impetus to life that has been produced by nature, and for this reason it persists in man. This is only because thought has still been unable to realize a harmony of the instincts equal in power to that of his original nature.


The conscience, then, is the perishing and diseased nature which still lives within a consciousness attempting to actively realize an organization of its constituent drives, attempting to attain through discontiguous abstractions a new organization of the forces engendered by these drives as well as by the senses which disturb and incite it to life. In short, it is the voice of a disintegrated nature, a compendium of all bestial life, it is the voice of a being trying to become human.

You could picture the consciousness of man as a number of pendulums swinging... In most men the pendulums are separated by a great distance, they swing not together but at different speeds, by different paces, etc. A lot of them do not swing at all, they have run down over time, a particular drive has atrophied, ie. human domestication prevails. But in the man of genius all the pendulums- the drives, instincts, thoughts, and emotions which constitute consciousness.... are close to one another. If one pendulum swings, it hits up against the one next to it, and it to the one that follows, and so on, until all the pendulums are operating equally. Genius is measured by how little stimuli is needed to induce the entire consciousness to activity, the greatest geniuses need only a little stimulation to become very, very conscious. The fact that the drives operate as one leads to the strange behavior that allows the association between genius and insanity to be possible. Sexuality, intellect, all the emotions, etc.. all operate as one. Of course this is all archetypal, no genius, no man, has every united in his consciousness absolutely all the constituent drives available to human nature. They have achieved greater and lesser degrees of such a union, which always operates against a much stronger, much larger background of the unconscious which, again, is not repressed memories and drives, but those drives, thoughts, etc. which resist integration and still operate as separate forces."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:32 am

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"There is a world outside of us, to which we have no access save through our senses, then there are these senses themselves, and finally there is our post-reflective apprehension of this sensory world, wherein we find ourselves capable of speech. My mouth waters when I think of the food because the reflexive chain coordinating these three stages has been broken. I fail to bridge the connection between the second stage, my senses, and the first and third stages, things on the outside world and post-reflective cognition. Sanity is this reflexivity, the continuous relationship drawn between these three "realities." To fail at any stage of this process would lead to the inability to distinguish the imagined from the real and from the experienced.

Every mental illness would share one common feature: they arise from such "broken chains" between the spheres of experience, sensation, and post-reflective, linguistic cognition."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:32 am

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"... It is a wonder that, for such a delicate and ingeniously constructed melody as composes our inner life and idea of the world, the truly somber and the deeper notes such as love or suffering do not disconcert it, but that all the subtler notes of which it is comprised should almost immediately order themselves after them, incorporating them into the self-same theme of our personality; life recovers itself, not by opposing, but by encompassing, that which would disturb it. Truly vital character remains immutable, not from resolve or from obstinacy, but from a more complete understanding, and loftier sympathy.

... A Roman would slay himself, not out of despair, but out of happiness, when he was at the height of his physical and intellectual powers, so as not to be cut down inch by inch, as is the way of nature. A Greek would, at the height of passion, slay the object of his love, rather it be a lie, a god, or even a man, in order that it may not betray him. These are the two heights of spiritual independence which are, however, no longer possibilities for us: might there not be a third? The great soul suffers silently, as Schiller says: the great soul may, perhaps, also love silently."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:33 am

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"From my understanding, what we call value-ontology here is a reversal of the classical philosophical paradigm. Philosophy has first studied the nature of being, ontology, then built a morality on top of that. What we think is that ontology, that being, can only be discovered after valuations have been made, after a value system has been established. The primary ontological factor then, for a morality of this kind, must be that entity which empowers and makes the valuation possible in the first place: the valuing and creating self. The study of ontology then becomes the study of what is theoretically possible, conceivable, for the valuing subject in terms of experience, it becomes the attempt Adorno pointed towards in this quote, "Perspectives must be produced which set the world beside itself, alienated from itself, revealing its cracks and fissures, as needy and distorted as it will one day lay there in the messianic light."

Morality (value) as primary, ontology as secondary, that is the basic premise. Following it through would eradicate the distinction between essence and appearance, noumenon and phenomenon, that Nietzsche often criticized and which had stifled philosophy by the 19th century.

This value before ontology notion I would sum up with this quote by Athanasius: Ει ουν φιλοσοφητέον είτε μη φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον. [Man, by virtue of his daemonic nature, must be a philosopher, rather he wants to or not, rather he philosophizes or not.]

The corruption of philosophy, morality's loss of its primary quality, goes as far back as Plato.

Traditional ethical philosophy and morality have phrased the Good in a language quite distinct from the language that traditional philosophy uses to phrase the True. The true has always been purely representative. The truth, in the old Platonic sense, as the Ideas, are not positive specifications of knowledge. They are conditions of possibility of knowledge. Like the law of identity, a thing is what it is and no other thing. That is not itself a positive piece of knowledge, but is rather a representative kind of knowledge: it merely represents the transcendental object by which the empirical consciousness holds itself in existence and sustains the process of thought. I want to begin a new ethical philosophy that treats the Good in just this way, as purely representative, as a condition of possibility for the empirical, lived, finite, meaning-seeking consciousness. Our morals do not accomplish such a representative act, they do not represent to us a transcendental object. Our moral and ethical philosophies have tried to be merely positive designations of knowledge. Do this or do not do this. This is a virtue, that is a vice, etc. This owes itself to the primal error by Plato, who spoke of the good in a different language than he used to speak of the true. The true was spoken of as a representative idea, whereas the good was discovered within Eros' loving gaze, was born of this gaze, and because it was related only to Eros, only to the lover and not the beloved object itself, not the transcendental order to which truth belonged, which truth represented, this "good" served for Eros as a merely positive objectification of knowledge rather than as a representative of the transcendental. The foremost goal of a new ethical philosophy must be to re-imagine "ethical ideas," that is, purely representative goods. In the way in which the idea sustains the process of thought and holds the empirical consciousness in existence, "ethical ideas" must sustain a process that I call the "erotic-daemonic," and that new ethical philosophy which engenders them must hold the transcendental objects and those truths which represent these objects in existence, must hold the "ontological" philosophy in existence, by continually recovering those conditions of limitation within the empirical consciousness from which such truths were born."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:34 am

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"The primary ontological factor then, for a morality of this kind, must be that entity which empowers and makes the valuation possible in the first place: the valuing and creating self. The study of ontology then becomes the study of what is theoretically possible, conceivable, for the valuing subject in terms of experience...

Value ontology would be a method for refining a self-consistent, internal vision of life which, objectively specified, would provide such a "philosophical concept of experience." The philosophy that emerges out of it would deal, even in the extremity of its ontology, with things rooted in perception and experience, (and therefor the truth) since everything must first pass through the refining, self-consistent, internal conception of the world and the self, established through a cultivated valuation(s).

A quote by Nietzsche seems fitting:

This ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness has the very useful consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of consciousness. Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not exerted themselves very much to acquire it; and things haven't changed much in this respect. To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors.""

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:34 am

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"Value ontology is a way of philosophizing that grants ontological primacy to the human agent (the valuing subject, named many things by many people- for Nietzsche, will, for Heidegger, Dasein, for me, the daemonic, for Kierkegaard simply the self or that which despairs) rather than ousia or being. It gets beyond, in this way, the distinction between truth and appearance and deals with questions of being in a language derived from a philosophically accurate and rich concept of experience rather than an abstract, Aristotelian table of categories, something which Kantian philosophy has always lacked."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:34 am

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"The truth, that one is a mere instance in the world soul, and the appearance... that one truly exists, that one is a self. ..."the far more useful idea that value (more precisely the act of valuing) gives rise to both appearance and truth.""

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:35 am

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"To realize the will to power, which is the world, nullifies your existence as a human subject. You no longer exist as anything more than an incarnation of the world soul, an instance of will to power. The concept itself of will-to-power is a single line long ontology intended to describe all of existence. "Water is wet" is an ontology, but it only describes one small facet of the world. "Will to power," as an ontology of similar length but much wider scope, essentially means there is a potential that is continuously recycled without ever becoming actual. This potential force is what reality is, and there is no way to "actualize" or "unpack" this energy, as if the world itself were a continually climbing orgasm that cannot be consummated in any release of the built up force. "Will to power" as a philosophical concept literally means an unrealizable force, a potential that is infinite not in extremity, dimension, or intensity, but by virtue of the fact that it cannot be made actual, it cannot be actualized. Thus this ontology implies a world of pure appearance, with no underlying noumenon. There is nowhere for the will to go, so it wills unto power, which is to say, it continues to be precisely that, will, and "eternally proceeds within its own being," to use Spinoza's phrase."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:35 am

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"
This criticism of the will to power on ontological and psychological grounds demonstrates that the subject, the human subject, requires something beyond itself in order to establish the language necessary to realize a structure it can embody. Alone, the Nietzschean self cannot be actualized- it is not properly a self, rather a "selves." To be actualized the self requires a limit, without it, it cannot be articulated. Kierkegaard says as much in declaring "despair" to be the fundamental nature of the human being, it is not a psychiatric ill that can be cured, it is human nature itself, the basic incompleteness of that nature, and can be relieved only by God, the limit. Systems of religion, philosophy, and metaphysics- systems which have provided limits of this kind, have concealed the real truth which is that it is the subject which is onto-logically primary, not what is limiting it, meaning that the act of value and creation by which the self is realized becomes disfigured, is seen as a moment of subordination, of being encapsulated by the limit. If this was not the case, then the creative act would continue indefinitely, the self would be perpetually "realized," that is, created.

This "onto-logical primacy" of the subject which would allow that creative moment to persist, I have articulated with the concept of the daemonic."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:35 am

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""......... doubt and suffering can only serve as the presentiment of a replete and living self, of some vital power within us that longs to be exhausted, and certainly can never extinguish such a vitality; for who and what a person is depends in the final case, not on the truth he has acquired or the morality for which he lives, but rather on the number of passions, joys, sufferings, and thoughts that he can unite within the circle of his comprehension, it depends upon the breadth of that image, of that idea, which he is capable of drawing from out of their opposition and turmoil, for anything not held within the confines of this image will certainly be lost amidst the passage of years, and everything not informed by its singularity destroyed. It is what Shelley called the hope which has created from its own wreck the thing it contemplates; it is Eros, that love which ennobles philosophy, which searches into the depths of mortal passion, which chastens the springs of joy and suffering, which raises our passions and experiences into the higher language of ideas; it is love, which engenders within that suffering which is the bitter fruit of all practical morality the seed of heroicism, that unites the disparate elements through which our individuality comes into being. When the sky darkens and the storm sets in, the bird does not cease flying because it is afraid, but because it can no longer see the horizon in its infinite distance, and it longs to brave immensity and impossibility, and cannot live under anything but that boundless horizon; so too does a man live and take shape only in the horizon of his love, his hope, and his ideas." -- Hamartia"

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:36 am

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"Nietzsche often makes the point that we cannot understand the origin of a thing based on what it does or what it is used for now. In the present time we understand the conscience to be the internal voice of a moral system. It has, or produces, this inner sense of right and wrong because the moral system has been so thoroughly ingrained in a person that he no longer has to think about it, it is intuited.

When man first learned to look beyond the veil of time, when he began to think... He very quickly learned how to differentiate internal states of emotion and drive in accordance to the now easily divisible world outside of him. Man could now only act in accord with a particular emotional state that was paired with a change he wanted to see in the world outside of him. He could no longer behave as animals do, he had to think, he now possessed a will. The problem is that individual drives do not possess enough power to compel man to act, save for those drives directly involved in his survival, and that is only because they overcome his reason. Starvation would compel him to eat. But there was no way to evolve social bonds, a culture, anything beyond hunter-gather societies. There was no way to value. The fact that the individual drives were not powerful enough to seduce man to action is exampled by the fact that they do not grant him the capacity to value, and it is only value that will satisfy that hunger which no other animal possesses, the hunger of his newly developed intellect.

He could only pair one drive with an intended result, he could not appraise many results and value them against each other. He was just a clever animal at that point. He needed a lot of stimuli and got only a little consciousness out of it... He needed a way to weigh many different decisions and drives against each other, but for that he needed a developed sense of self-hood.

So now a "self" had to be developed, the thing that values... Something that can apprehend the variances in drive and emotion, between internal states, that can comprehend them and itself as something enduring throughout them. The disorganization of his integrated sensuality, the separation of his animal nature into constituent drives through his reason, took on a life of its own. Two inner states were reified in an abstraction in which their discontiguity, their variance, their difference, could be comprehended. This is the beginning of the spiritualization of man and world, and the development of the "self," of the psychological sense of selfhood, in such abstractions. Those abstractions in which man grasped the changes, the transformations and difference between his emotional states, granted him more and more consciousness of his selfhood. So the first stage of the development of the conscience, the capacity to value, was the intuited sense of self-permanence, self-hood.

Contrast is then the basis of our consciousness. There is no consciousness without the separation of inner and outer phenomenon into opposition, oppositions which must be reified in some abstraction that makes us conscious of the variance between two things or inner states. It would have been psychologically painful at first because all the drives responsible for the survival of man had to be placed in opposition to one another. Death rituals that celebrated life, things of this sort, took place. Mass suicides, cannibalism, death orgies, pain festivals. All of this was necessary. It formed the first social connections beyond hunter-gather, ie. religious connections, as well as helped develop self-consciousness. The failed abstractions, the values that proved suicidal or ended up leading toward death, obviously we don't know of. The failed cultures to which they belonged never lived long enough to write their own history books. But there is an extensive history which we have no knowledge of which details such failed cultures, the forgotten madness of our species, and much self-imposed torture. Only the "sanest" values and value-creators survived, all the history and culture we know is of them. The values and moral philosophies of this survivor culture are no more credible though, they just didn't end up killing us. Well, they didn't end up killing all of us.

In our time, in recent history.... this process of reifying the variance of the inner life, of extending the sphere of consciousness over the collapsed foundation of animal instincts, is only carried out by "geniuses," through moral philosophy, art, etc. But in our early history all men were doing this, in order to deal with their destroyed psyches and broken drives. Values are created only in response to the fact that there is no impetus to live. All men once needed that impetus, few men do now."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:36 am

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"As yet man lacks a fatum, a limit. He is only ethos daimon, the ascending and descending, wavering spirit, half beast half god.

"Ει ουν φιλοσοφητέον είτε μη φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον, (Man, by nature of his daemonic existence, must philosophize, philosopher or not.) to speak with Athanasius. We cannot, in the manner of one of the old Greeks, name the world a cosmos and beauty until we have named our own soul a cosmos and beauty; to behold and grasp all the world in an idea we must first have come to know ourselves as one particular being and no other and have had everything good and evil rent from the trembling heart and held, not in time, which diffuses our being like colors from a ray of light, but in eternity, which concentrates it. Every man of genius has believed in the eternal, that belief is the very condition of his vitality and flourishing. Perhaps this belief serves as nothing more than an obscuration of the spirit, which man requires if he is to ascend into the highest possible regions of his genius; perhaps he must find all the earth wanting if, like Cassandra of Ilion, he is to utter things not fit for the earth, but it is always the same, and we become like that angel whose wings were set aflame when he reentered this world, if one can entertain the old Gnostic myth. We suffer upon turning back into ourselves, we suffer from the failure to seize upon that inner motion of the heart's genius, which alone could move us to acknowledge the ideal as fate; the consequence of that strange lust which compels us to embrace obscurity, darkness, and uncertainty, but moreover to prefer this benighted world of the self over that law which strikes against the heart when love, fully matured, overcomes and inspires us to act with proud indifference against the hazards of our mortality. Dei virtutem dei sapientiam, [knowledge, for god, is a virtue] or if one may reverse the old theologian's paradox: yes, and man's sin; or, to reinterpret the account of Genesis, what flowered with the greatest sweetness in heaven is reaped with the most bitterness upon the earth." - Hamartia"

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:37 am

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"One must distinguish the act of recollection from that of mere memory. The poetry of recollection, the genuine pleasure in it, lies in embracing ones own works and deeds, in taking responsibility for them and in recognizing the past as truly constitutive of one's personality. How is such a thing accomplished? That would be a great piece of knowledge with which to bless our youthfulness, for in this lies the passion and the beauty of old age. The man who recollects absolutely is infinitely creative; absolute recollection opens unto a future in which an endless host of eventualities, be they comic or tragic, mingle inseparably. For the man who possesses an absolute power of recollection possesses also the absolute power of synthesis, since in fact recollection is a synthesis, and is capable of bringing to light only memories that have been integrated into a totality as self-consciousness: it is itself the production of self-consciousness. Yet, the more one recollects, the more this synthesis is allowed to bring forth, the more transformations this self-consciousness undergoes, and thus the more difficult it becomes to recollect, since the self must re-orient itself within the totality. In fact, however, each of us constitutes such an impossible power, insofar as we love: hence the wisdom of the ancients, that philosophy begins in love, in Eros, and that all knowledge is recollection. Love, rather it is inspired by truth or by a woman, grants us the opportunity to bathe once again in that primevous spring, that from which the self first emerged in its paucity and which, now fully enlarged, it must return into, which is to say it invigorates the daemonic, the inner disproportion of man, to resolve itself. The man in love wants to call up from within himself his whole life, in order to relate it to the loved one, he wants to translate all of his self-consciousness into consciousness of the beloved, just as the philosopher wishes to relate all knowledge to truth, and this absolute synthesis engenders the thought of some future at once absolutely vague and absolutely distinct, in which this love is somehow consummated, or in the case of the philosopher, the thought of some truth at once absolutely distinct and absolutely indistinct, in which all ideas are conjoined in their preternatural unity, in a totality, be it in the vein of Spinoza or Hegel. But the synthesis being carried out within us, which has now become an excess, an infinitely productive power, at last rises up against to meet this future, and cannot embrace it, so that the totalizing procedure of thought becomes an operation which introduces ceaseless differentiation into the inner life. It can here do one of two things: either it rejects this future as alien and hostile to it, becomes mere vagary, uncommitted to anything but itself, and realizes itself in its sensuality and temporal aspect, or it equates itself to it, it equates itself to this vague and yet distinct hope for the eternal and the true, it becomes that hope and matures into philosophy. Sensual love is merely the negative expression of the excess, an excess that can only communicate itself destructively, because it desires to communicate the infinite root of the self and the procreative synthesis; ideal love is the positive expression of the excess, which is capable of concretizing its language because it has restricted itself to the expression of the finite dimension which it occupies in relation to the excess outside of it, the eternal. The pathos of the former is the genius of artists, sometimes called melancholy, while the pathos of the later is that of "philosophy.""

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:37 am

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"So the Greeks thought of the self as an antagonism, a contradiction, between empirical reality, time, and desire, and on the other hand form, the eternal, etc. This contradiction is Eros, love. Eros can fall into matter, sensuality, and physical beauty, but it can also ascend the ladder of being and attain to philosophy. It thus constitutes an excess, which by its very nature cannot be absorbed in a dialectical synthesis. The Greeks made the self livable by exploding it into a series of conceptual oppositions, time and eternity, form and matter, etc. Each of these oppositions provided a vantage in which the self could orient itself within its own excess, each provided a ruling passion, a new pathos, a new mode of life, a particular kind of "subjectivity." Of course no ancient Greek says any of this, this is my interpretation of them.

The Judaeo-Christians had a whole new conception of the self. To them the contradiction which constituted the self signified not an excess, but a fundamental lack, an abyss. Why is man such a grotesque synthesis of conflicting powers, of the finite and the infinite? How is he even possible? It is because, all the way down, man is missing something. It is not the things of the earth he misses, for he is equally a temporal and earthly thing, nor the things of heaven, for he can indeed philosophize, practice justice, and achieve virtue.... No, no, he is missing God. Thus they psychologically figured out a way to cohere the self. Kierkegaard is all about this, for him this "God" provides the self a leap of faith by which to cohere and bring into unity its despairing relation of the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite. He himself could not figure out how exactly the religious life, how God, cohered the two parts, but I have, and I just explained why it works psychologically. The reinterpretation of the excess as a lack allows the two parts to be cohered when they are brought into a unified longing and desire for this missing thing, "God."

The problem is, the Christian answer to the self leads to the fragmentation I talked about, and the Greeks never realized the full extent of the logic of the daemonic, ie. transcendental goods, so they tended to just annihilate themselves in mystical union with the cosmos or in abstract exaltation above the universe, like Plato, exhausted demonically but without an idea in which to repose and take cognizance of that fact. Nietzsche himself ended in annihilation like a good Greek, a will to power annihilated in the Will to Power. With access to my philosophy he would have been able to understand his eternal recurrence as his "transcendental good" and avoided that.

My philosophy, then, is ultimately an answer to the self, and to the pain of being a Self. It is the only other answer besides the Greek and Christian one. It is also the only answer that truly works. I am the first human being to ever live that didn't hate himself."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:39 am

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"Self-valuing cannot be stimulated directly. The instinct for it can however be indirectly trained, the ancients did just this.

One of Holderlin’s most beautiful pieces of poetry may be found in the sentence, “If once the divine succeeds through the poem so near to my heart, then I welcome the grave’s eternal silence.” The recognition of something beyond the sphere of the poet’s individuality and experience is the necessary precondition for his flourishing, and the Greek pantheon served in just this way for Holderlin himself as well as for the ancients. Through such a recognition the mortal act is prevented from being closed, and the possibility of the divine announcing itself through it can be entertained indefinitely; through the great symbols of their mythology the ancient Greeks succeeding in transforming the mortal sphere, the domain of “eternal silence,” into a genuine depth, into which one might venture in the hope of discovering some new datum of experience yet to be formulated. Mortality and finite, lived experience for the ancients became a womb, the “secret birth of things,” to cite Schiller, into which they willingly entered when the light of their ideas no longer bore enough of itself to kindle the heart of the poet. It is with this piece of poetic wisdom that Holderlin wrote his tragedy about Empedocles. What I have called the “daemonic,” then, finds its most poignant expression in the birth of poetic inspiration. The light of our ideas has faded as well, and yet we do not know how to conceive of our mortal life in this way, as a depth- only through the recognition of something beyond our individuality and experience, only through the refusal of hypostasizing experience as an absolute, can the circle of mortal life remain opened.

It is not only in a religious sense that one should understand this for indeed all of our truly philosophical ideas, comprehended not as positive objects of knowledge and hypostases of experience, but as representatives of this transcendental order- that order of things exceeding the sphere of individuality and experience, have equally allowed the finite and transitory ego to exist as an open rather than closed circle. The Gods as representatives of this order were imagined when the continuity between the language of ideas and experience had not been precisely delineated through a philosophical vocabulary. We must, now armed with such a language, realize the “transcendental unity of ideas,” through a new morality that aims, not to hypostasize experience and grasp in positive knowledge a series of particular virtues and vices, but rather to fully explicate this continuity; where philosophy exists to represent this transcendental order, morality most exist to mediate the two spheres, the spheres of experience and ideality.

Self-valuing is the correspondence between these two spheres. Holderlin enacted this correspondence when writing about the death of Empedocles (Empedocles wanted to prove he was an immortal God by jumping into mount Aetna, and as he did so, he perished.) One can only accomplish this by recognizing something that exceeds one's own personal existence, (for Nietzsche, eternity) an excess which represents an order to which the self that is bearing recognition actually belongs. Nietzsche had to recognize an eternity beyond the sphere of his own empirical, lived existence in order to finally recognize himself as an eternal being, in order for the empirical and transcendental aspects of his ego to finally correspond.

But everything about our modern world and the direction that science and philosophy have taken seems bent on “closing the circle” of mortal life, on annihilating any possibility of mediating the transcendental and empirical spheres of the ego."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:40 am

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"There can be no recompense for that mighty liberty which, bounded only by birth and death, is called Life. Not with pain, love, malice, or joy can it be rewarded, for these belong unto it, but only by the man himself. Earth claims earth, life has no end other than itself, and the heavens regard only their own: this law is what the Greeks named fate which, in great opposition to our conception of it, offers itself as a limit to man, world, and god, rather than an indifferent litany of their impending tragedies, failures, and victories. This truth cannot be realized in the visions of the saint and does not lie within the grasp of contemplation, but must be resolved in the movements of life- ethos anthropos daimon. Like all real truths, destiny confers to us no maxim of conduct, but rather that light in which the image of human life, once diffused and disunited in time, is concentrated and beheld sub species aeternitas, which is to say in its unity. All great symbols, as all great ideas which stand as representative of some portion of human existence, suggest one another in their finite number as naturally as the musical notes induce their own infinite combination and recombination in the soul of the artist, and because life offers up to us essentially the same incorruptible, indivisible experience the genius of their unity is realized only to the extent that one has indwelled in life. The beauty of a supreme work of art or philosophy is a refrain of the indivisible sum of experience that is called human life which, however much of a variation upon the eternal theme it may offer, is nonetheless equivalent to it, and recognizes its birth and death, its fate, in it. The world is a poem for the poet, a cross for the saint, a sphinx for the philosopher. There is a universal justice, but it is that which we render upon ourselves in following upon the course of thought like a dying star in slow extinction before the pale bound of the firmament. In this slow death do we finally recover something of life; that sweet dialogue which is attended to in secret between ourselves and our own soul, to speak with Plato, which is incapable of communicating itself to all but the most superficial periphery of our existence in words and deeds and is resolved silently in the drama of the ideal. The suffering of Empedoclean man, of the longing for personal immortality, and the suffering of Faustian man, that all-embracing hunger which clamors in its own pain but to taste existence, are reconciled in the heroic annihilation of being in becoming; the forgery of human happiness, the idol of virtue, all the mortal and immortal powers of the earth and heavens strike us as a remarkable fatuity when beheld against this secret and this silence, against that unfathomed peace to use the expression of Leopardi, the unknowable basis of that dialogue which is after all only the rarest species of the knowable, be it called sin by the saint, desire by the Buddhist, or death, for it must lead us into heaven, nirvana, and life, for it must lead us to that point where the transient play of appearances ceases to offer up to us vacant forms and we, at last peering into the remote fulcrum of our life for we are at last peering into the remote fulcrum of our own self, declare with Tasso, ich weib es, sie sind eqig, denn sie sind. [Only what truly is endures.] Our character is but the extremity of the ideal; our personality, only the degree of some predominant conception raised to the highest power. Every mind has its own nycht or hemera in that general nychthemeron of the soul; every personality, as the high point and the moment of greatest vitality of some conception, as necessarily only a moment of tension in the idea, can find a repulsive note and answering strain in the progress of the intellect and thereby awaken to that desire to reconcile knowledge and being, to the daemonic, and to recognize what is called fate. Philosophy is nothing less than the aspiration to complete humanity."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:40 am

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"To equate the epistemic and ontic spheres and the ideal and real ego would essentially mean to grasp the living and experienced self, the self as an identity, as merely a differentiation of the excess, an excess which would thereby be grasped as equally the self, albeit ideally. There is a final conceptual opposition between the real ego, the experienced self, and some other thing, in which the excess must be differentiated. It must be differentiated as either the self or this other thing. To differentiate it as the self would lead to what I just described, the equating of real and ideal ego, the exhaustion of one's daemonism, the release of the self from time, etc. To differentiate the excess in this final opposition as that other thing, as not the self, would lead to the mystic experience and annihilation within the godhead- it would lead to the failure to completely develop the epistemic subject."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:42 am

Quote :
"1.

Greece- early, pre-Platonic Greece found its reason in the structure of the cosmos and of nature themselves, this structure was the logos, which was reflected in human consciousness, and drawn inward through the activity of an unreflected egoic principle to form the first great philosophical ideas. Thus philosophy always begins in a passive state of reflection or wonder for the Greeks. This process constitutes "empirical reason." Later there was proposed a transcendent, unknowable, divine order in distinction to the order of nature. The venture of this divine order corresponds with a structural incapacity in self-consciousness itself, to that unreflected, egoic principle, for in time it leads to an inseparable division in the subjective and empirical philosophical systems. Reason thereafter became the aim of resolving this problem, of extinguishing this unreflected principle by bringing it into reflected self-consciousness; its appointed task was in hypostasizing human experience and the content of subjectivity as absolute. To do this reason had to decompose the relations of the cosmic and natural orders, recomposing its object within the structure of subjectivity to realize its “idea.” This "idealism" finds its beginning in Plato, and constitutes the beginning stage of "transcendental reason." The project of denaturalizing nature and man there also began. The drawing inward of nature is the principle of the former empirical reason, the projection of the human being, in the manner of Feuerbach, of the later.

Transcendental reason is marked by three major philosophical developments: in Eriugena human nature and the nature of the divinity are equated, in Schelling the inner lack or structural incapacity of self-consciousness is itself expressed to the divinity, and the unfathomable ground of the divine is discerned as non-entity and nothingness, God himself carrying this lack in potentia and man expressing it in actuality as evil, and in Kierkegaard the structure of the divine is itself collapsed, necessitating the leap of faith in order to sustain transcendental consciousness and religious experience. Nietzsche expresses the final development in empirical reason, the idea of the world itself is, in him, finally reflected in human consciousness as the will to power- man is at last “naturalized.” The full field of discourse between these two modes of reason must be discerned, so that the valuing subject beneath and behind all philosophy and morality can itself be discerned, for it seems to me that philosophy itself, constituted by a secret canon, forms a kind of plane in which the thinking subject takes form; a plane constituted by the relation between the empirical and transcendental spheres of self-consciousness.

As it stands, these two spheres of thought have been finally separated. Empirical reason has abandoned speculative philosophy and become impotent, materialist, and empty, while transcendental reason, by way of Kierkegaard, has been annihilated in the image of the hidden God and has hypostatized mystical experience as the ultimate philosophical category: the Gods of Greece became the God of Abraham, the antagonism constitutive of the self was grasped as an abyss and inner longing for something other, for something higher than the world. This dissolution of philosophy has had the consequence of completely dissolving man's consciousness of the excess, of the unreflected principle beneath and within all thought.


From this knowledge the path to a revitalized philosophy can be discovered. Instead of beginning with identity, with ousia, with being and the question of being, as the first philosophers had done in Greece, a mistake which gave rise to the dissolution of philosophy into what I called empirical and transcendental reason, we should begin with the "excess," that which cannot be absorbed dialectically. This leads to a reversal of the ontic and epistemic spheres. The excess does not signify noumenal reality, does not signify the ontic reality, the ousia or being which cannot be comprehended by thought, but rather does the excess signify the inexhaustible mental component of the human intellect which is constitutive of that intellect and of our consciousness. This component is given precedence, rather than the ontic. In other words, the epistemic subject comes before the ontic subject. Hiedigger's project must then be abandoned, which relied on the primordiality and precedence of the ontic subject, dasein.



2.

The capacity to differentiate and articulate the excess through conceptual oppositions I have named the daemonic. These conceptual oppositions are not exclusive, and are potentially infinite. Kierkegaard's project must here be abandoned, which relied on the exhaustablity of the epistemic subject and the construction of several definite stages or conceptual oppositons and an either/or choice between them. That element of volition, of having to make a choice, a leap of faith, made the ontic subject once again the first order or primordial subject, as the will is a being and not an epistemic entity.



3.

Identities, "beings," are merely "remainders" of the excess. Contra Spinoza's determinatio est negatio. All identification here becomes differentiation, of the excess. Thought cannot therefor be "totalized," ie. constructed into an image of the world as a whole, ie. a system in the manner of Hegel or Spinoza himself. Schelling had a similar conception:


"There is an unfathomable basis of reality in things, the remaineder that cannot be contained, cannot be resolved into reason by the greatest exertion but remains in the depths. Out of that which lacks understand, true understanding is born."


The dialectic which rests at the heart of Eriugena's magnum opus, which he uses to construct a division of nature or periphyseon, recapitulates Dionysisus's Christian version of the Proclean scheme of procession, return, and remaining (prohodos, epistrophe, mone.) According to that dialectic the super-essential cause of all things (God) moves through all things as immanent to them and stands beyond them as trascendent of them. As cause, the divine is all in all- and so addressed, metaphorically, by kataphatic theology; but as super-essential, the divine is nothing in the midst of everything (a Pascalian meditation, though here applied not only to man but to the divinity itself) and so is more properly addressed by negative or apophatic theology. This dialectic of immanence and trascendence is intended to express the basic foundation of incomprehesibility which underlies the divine and all forms of mystic knowledge.

In the book of Job, God attempted to vindicate himself by listing all of his creations and the breadth of the universe; mountains, seas, stars, animals, etc. For Eriugena God is always the God of Job who reveals himself in the whirlwind of created things and realizes himself both as many and as no one in and through this. The polyonymous anonymity and nothingness of the human reflects perfectly (because it reflects abyssally) the polyonymous anonymity of the divine insofar as both the human and god would realize themselves in and through the creation.
The basic idea here is that man approaches so closely the divine, that the two become indistinguishable; the polynomous nothingness of the human reflects, abyssally, that of God himself.

We see that this unabsorbable excess does not lie in the ontic dimension, as a question of being, but rather lies immanently within the thinking subject itself, constitutive of its very subjectivity. Schelling names this excess "Will," in opposition to ousia or entity, being, nature.


"Will is primordial being, and all predicates apply to it alone- groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation, self creation. The old proposition is here once again in place: the original being is will, and will is not merely the beginning but also the content of the first emergent being."

You see in this passage he is articulating a very similar logic of immanence-transcendence... "not merely the beginning but content of the first emergent being."


Schelling continues: "Any philosophy which does not remain grounded in the negative but tries instead to reach what is positive immediately and without that negative foundation will inevitably die of spiritual impovershment. " This is also hinted at by Luther when he speaks of the power of God being even in the hand of a murderer. "The freedom with which the sinner operates and by which evil is perpetrated is still a divine power. Man has perverted the position of the potencies, and so god operates perversely in the perverse, he no longer acts as will but unwill." This perverting quality at the basis of man's freedom, this indwelling of the evil principle as the principle of negation, even in the profoundest desire to do right, I express in one of my own theological speculations: "By desiring something we have not fist completely emptied from out of our own heart, and repudiated from the dark and selfish principle within ourselves, which by its nature assimilates all things to itself, we destroy it. " This all points again and again to the knowledge that this evil principle indwells totally in human freedom, and engulfs even the most selfless desire to do good: it produces in those who have born its revelation what Hamann calls a "Holy Hypochondria." In short, this evil principle, the principle of negation, of the unfreedom of the will, of material, etc. is rather a positive affirmation of human freedom, not a refutation of it.

Schelling goes on to construct his own division of nature on this scheme: from the primal will or groundlessness issues first, darkness, suffering, irrationality, evil; the whole material and created world of forces and chaos. He speaks of it in this passage "For it was the teaching of all peoples who counted time by nights that the night is the most primordial of things. But what is the essence of night, if not lack, need, and longing? For this night is the nature looking forward to the light, the night longing for it, eagre to receive it. Another image of that first nature, whose whole essence is desire and passion, appears in the consuming fire which so to speak is itself nothing, is in essence only a hunger drawing everything into itself."

He goes on next to assert that the second "potency" as he calls it, or thing issued from out of the primordial ground, is light; that is, rationality, goodness, the other side of human freedom. His third potency he calls love, it is the realization of human freedom as including both this dark and light principle, evil and goodness; freedom as this double movement itself which is accomplished as love.

But compare Eriugena's dialectic with this three-fold potency. I interpret these potencies with this dialectic; the darkness and evil of the suffering, material universe, as the principle of all negation, issues from the primordial ground (the super-essential cause) but the light, goodness, rationality of human subjectivity, and freedom- that element of positivity, returns to this primordial ground through the process of thought and philosophy, submerging itself within it, and finally we have mone or the remaining, what remains unincorporated into this dialectical process and cannot be annihilated in the primordial ground.


Schelling's Naturphilosophie stood as a great testament to the depth of the transcendental mode of reason, but was never completely developed, owing to its insurmountable philosophical inadequacies. Yet the philosophical concept of the excess can find great material for its articulation in Schelling, as it can in Eriugena and Kierkegaard.




4.

Identities can be rigidly defined without solidifying a single conceptual opposition, insofar as the logic of the daemonic is upheld, that is to say, insofar as precedence is granted to the epistemic rather than ontic subject, in line with the first thesis. This gives us the possibility of ontology without metaphysic, that is, a philosophy in which the epistemic subject is wholly developed through continuous differentiation of the excess, resulting in the production of identities (ontologies) which do not require any antithesis for their definition. They stand in and of themselves as identities and are pure affirmations rather than negations. In all philosophy to define, as Spinoza said, was to negate: to say that something was an angel meant it was not a man. But in my philosophy, identities are what is left over after the excess is differentiated within a conceptual opposition: they are ontic realities produced by the philosophical elaboration of the epistemic subject. In other words, and to use the simple example again, in my philosophy "angel" and "man" would both be self-sufficient realities and parts of a conceptual opposition within which the excess is differentiated. Once that excess is differentiated as one or the other, say a man, this leads to the breaking through to simply a new series of conceptual oppositions, perhaps man and beast, within which the excess is differentiated again. Because identities do not require negation in order to be defined, the ontology constructed with my method cannot devolve into metaphysics. The formula would here be antithesis-thesis-thesis, ie. conceptual opposition- differentiation- excess. This is obviously very different than a dialectic and the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula. Here I am revising and appropriating things I gathered from Eriugena and Proclus:


" ... Presentiments of a philosophical category which could represent these relations between real and ideal ego, along with this moral potency; which could represent a kind of relationship which stands beyond all dialectic, can be found for example in the Proclean scheme of procession, return, and remaining, of prohodos, epistrophe, and mone. This dialectic demonstrates that God, conceived of as the super-essential cause of all things, moves through all things as immanent to them and stands beyond them as transcendent of them. This dialectic of immanence and transcendence is intended to express the basic foundation of knowledge which cannot be grasped, that unincorporated concept which underlies the divine and all forms of mystic knowledge, of negative and apophatic theology. Moreover, this principle of the unincorporated object of thought reveals a structural relationship between the aspects of divine immanence and transcendence which it is the goal of the theologian to discover, (Eriguena made this the subject of his Periphyseon) insofar as God does not only reveal himself as something that acts upon the world, but also as something that acts within and through the world. "


Nietzsche's project must here be abandoned, which used the ontic subject (the will) to break completely past the epistemic sphere.




5.

Of even greater import than this ontology without metaphysic is the possibility of a morality without either ontology or metaphysic: ie. the philosophical and complete development/elaboration of the epistemic subject by fully following through the concept of the daemonic with reference to a concept I elaborate elsewhere, namely the transcendental good.

Phenomenology is and has always been essentially the elaboration of the relationship between the epistemic and ontic spheres, and psychology arose from it as basically the same thing but with greater emphasis on the ontic sphere, ie. greater emphasis on experience and volition. This is why Kierkegaard in my mind was the first great psychologist, not Nietzsche, since he wrote the first proper psychology by constructing the either/or which allowed the ontic subject, by way of the idea of choice, to take precedence over the epistemic subject. But my new morality would obviously be totally different from either of the two things."

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"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon Wed Sep 03, 2014 3:43 am

Quote :
"Take Sartre's (A writer for whom I find in myself very little affinity or respect. The love of freedom for the sake of freedom is something that instinctually reviles me, no matter how spiritualized it may have become.) summary of modern philosophy, that existence precedes essence. Most of philosophy held the opposite, that essence comes before existence, ie. that the soul predates bodily incarnation. My philosophy has endeavored to posit them both at the same level of philosophical categorization and therefor to affirm them as equally positive expressions; existence and essence are two terms in which that excess which underlies their very conceptualization and which cannot be truly contained by either idea is articulated. Thus: existence and essence are both coterminous, and yet do not contain one another, for as philosophical categories they do not contain the excess out of which they were produced and which is reflected in their differentiation. I would give a final formulation of the principle as: "Essence is not adequate to existence; existence is not adequate to essence." With this principle one can defend the freedom of the will despite also accepting the existence of a determined universe, because essence (the will's freedom) and existence (the material universe) are equatable and non-containing of one another, by virtue of their constitutive excess.

Heidegger rejected Sartre on the basis that a reversal of a metaphysical claim (which is what his philosophy amounts to) is nonetheless metaphysical, and this point is very true. Heidegger however locates the excess in the ontic sphere, as I have said before, and like Nietzsche he uses the strength of the ontic subject (Will for Nietzsche, Dasein for Heidegger) to break completely through the epistemic, that is, the metaphysical. That rendered Heidegger basically philosophically impotent in the remotest extreme of his thought, and all he can do there is silently point to the truth of being. Perhaps, as he says, it can be found in music or poetry. At any rate he abandons philosophy at the extremity of philosophy. I have rather located the excess within the epistemic sphere, elaborating it phenomenologically, that is, in the way in which it structures human consciousness, as well as philosophically, with the concept of the daemonic. I have retained all the strengths of dualistic thought, ontology, and metaphysics, as well as all the strengths of ontic, monistic thought while having inherited none of their weaknesses. In my philosophy there is a monism of the human subject as an excess underlying all consciousness, as well as a philosophical dualism because it is through conceptual oppositions that the excess is reflected in consciousness, and at every step of the way the dualism can be dissolved or the monism expanded dualistically: that is the strength of it. These conceptual oppositions represent not synthesized polarities on the part of a Hegelian self-consciousness as they do in Kierkegaard, as between the eternal and temporal, but rather an immanent division of the human consciousness in an effort to reflect itself daemonically in the mirror of philosophical ideas as that excess which cannot be resolved into any conceivable polarity expressed by them. Philosophy, then, is essentially the stimulation of the real ego, the synthesizing and creative self, the self that lives, desires, and dies, which is worn away in the struggle of eternity and time, love and desire, by the ideal ego; that self which disunites, polarizes, and reflects, and the difficulty of philosophy is the seeming inability to relate the two, it is the fact that no eternity is able to express the beauty and the languishing of time, nor is time, in its last bitter extremity, able to express the absolution of the eternal, for the human self intuits within both terms some substance after its own nature, and which belongs to a still higher order of things in which the meaning of time stands of itself, and the meaning of the eternal is untouched by the walks of time. The real ego experiences the fullness of its life and will only in fleeting moments throughout the course of its existence, and it is this ideal ego which is the heart into which it lays this fullness. Nietzsche comes beautifully close to my conception in the thought of the eternal recurrence, yet he fails to draw out the excess inherent in the conceptions of time and the eternal and, thereby unable to transfer it to a higher field of discourse, he only succeeds in equating the two concepts. His thought perhaps succeeds in inducing a stimulation of the real by the ideal ego, but does not satisfy the real demand of genuine morality."

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"ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν." [Heraclitus]

"All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both." [Aeschylus, Prometheus]

"The history of everyday is constituted by our habits. ... How have you lived today?" [N.]

*Become clean, my friends.*
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PostSubject: Re: Parodites' Daemon

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