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 Satyr and Pan-experientialism

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PostSubject: Satyr and Pan-experientialism Thu Aug 20, 2015 10:19 am

Satyr wrote:
Anyone who believes atoms, or (inter)activity on the subatomic level is sentience, is borderline insane - or Judeo-Christian.

Satyr seems to struggle to understand the opposing party's position.

The Value ontologists, or pan-experientialists in general, do not claim that inorganic matter is sentient, say, in the same way we humans are, or even in the way other animals are.


There is nothing borderline insane, nor Judeo-Christian about theorizing that inorganic matter possesses a primitive proto-sentience. I mean, Satyr himself acknowledged that plants have a primitive sentience, so why is it such a big leap to claim that not too much farther down the ladder, in the inorganic, that such matter has an even more primitive awareness?

My take is that eventually, you reach a point where energy is simply non-sentient; duality: opposites define each other - hot/cold;up/down; black/white; unconscious/conscious.

Satyr is obviously a materialist ( theory of mind ), but unfortunately, of the Daniel Dennet variety, which actually suits his denseness quite well.

A.N. Whitehead is well-known for pan-experientialism. Check out his work.
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PostSubject: Re: Satyr and Pan-experientialism Thu Aug 20, 2015 10:49 am

The secret, desperate for attention, boy, is iteration.

Inorganic patterns are force, organic patters are power.
A self-perpetuation, feeding back into itself, emergent unity which excludes all patterns not part of this combination.

Matter is energy (inter)acting at a different rate - slower in relation to the observer.
We can imagine an organism with faster metabolic systolic/diastolic cellular rates to those we are used to on earth, where even what we consider solid, such as wood, would appear to it as liquid.

Matter is different to what we call energy in rate of (inter)activity.
Calling me a "materialist" is like calling me a christian....
I, deny matter a static thingness, an absolute state, a oneness, a wholeness.
Matter/energy different words expressing the concept of different degrees of dynamism, in relation to the observer.
The question, imbecile, "what is changing?" is a nonsensical one, as it presupposes what it then demands, as answer to.
There is dynamism, exhibiting patterns, interpreted via a medium as simplified/generalized noumena, abstractions.
A superstring vibrating is nothing without the vibration. IT IS the vibration.
It is not a thing which just happens to vibrate.
Man IS his appearance.
Man IS his behavior, hi choices, his past.

There is no static "thing".
Thing is how the brain simplifies/generalizes, abstracts the dynamic the fluid to a noumenon, a static.

A plant is a primitive, rudimentary form of sentience, as is a cell in the plant.
An atom in a stone, in water, in metal, is not sentient.
What energies are released, and absorbed, with every (inter)action either fall to a lower state of (inter)activity, lose all pattern, contributing to chaos, and the temporal tendency towards absolute chaos, which we also call linear time, or become absorbed into the patterns already existing.
This is not intentional, you moron, it is part of the process of (inter)activity.
How patterns (inter)act is not motivated by a plan, an intent.

Intent emerges in sentience, as self-sustenance.
Only life has motive, can project an object/objective, can make its own continuance its primary motive.

If you are going to use ILP methods of getting em to notice you, do try to be more original.
I know your need overpowers you, and you react emotionally, but this is not the way of the warrior...this is the way of the concubine.

Do not expect me to pay more attention to you than you warrant.
So many morons, so little time. I have more important things to do than occupy my time with adolescent minds.

Read a book.
Get a job. do something other than are no good at it.

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PostSubject: Re: Satyr and Pan-experientialism Thu Aug 20, 2015 11:15 am

Once again, the old-man struggles to understand the other.

Being a materialist does not necessarily make one an atomist.

Never claimed you were an atomist, a believer in static thing-ness.


Satyr wrote:
No need for apologies.
And attention is not an insult.
To want attention is a requirement if what you want from another does not entail the choice of taking it by force. Then attention is detrimental to the objective.
Don't let the simpletons using infantile, pop-psychology, convince you that wanting attention is a vice.

I work surrounded by cancer patients.
I've seen young people die in their twenties.
It's not easy.

I wish you all the best.

Coming back around to the primary reason of the OP, Satyr either intentionally straw-manned the VO/Pan-experientialist position, or simply failed to comprehend it.

For those interested, this is a nice introduction to Whitehead's PE:
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PostSubject: Re: Satyr and Pan-experientialism Thu Aug 20, 2015 11:24 am

I humored you boy.

Desperation for attention is what females despise in males.
It's a dependence, a weakness.
You and LaughingStock are now using the exact same methods.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Quote :
D. Bidney wrote:

"Briefly put, the reasons for the inadequacy of Whitehead's system are two. First, he attempts to derive the actual from the potential.
This I regard as intrinsically impossible and unintelligible.
Secondly, he is trying to combine a monistic metaphysics with a pluralistic theory of physics and biology-a fallacy similar to that of Spinoza.
Instead of offering us any solution of the perennial problem of the one and the many, he merely restates the difficulties in a more ambiguous and aggravated form. He wishes to retain a monistic substrate and also to keep the independence of the individual events and their self-creativeness. At one time he gives the primacy to God and calls the individuals modes of His activity; at other times he gives the primacy to the nexus of events and conceives of God as an accident derived from the
It seems to me that he actually has a vicious bifurcation between his fundamental principles, though he tries vainly to reassure us that he does not mean to introduce any real dualism or bifurcation.

The positive theses to be derived from this paper are two.
First, an ultimately intelligible theory of metaphysics must begin with the primacy of the actual, as Aristotle, the Scholastics and Spinoza insisted.
Secondly, a metaphysics which is to do justice to the problems of the one and the many, permanence and change, eternity and time, must in the last analysis be some form of
dualism. There must be some eternal principle of being over against the world of events. This was the great insight of Plato and Aristotle and the failure to appreciate that insight accounts for the mutual difficulties of Spinoza and Whitehead.
Just precisely how these two metaphysical principles are to be harmonized is still the task of future philosophy."

Along with existence God is reborn out of the increasing possibilities which make the emergence of a new near-absolute inevitable.
Each return, beginning, rebirth, universe, use any metaphor, is never the same.
In most there is no emergent unity to become conscious of itself within the Flux, whereas in others the rules, the laws, the principles, are different to those we would consider logical, or natural, in our own.


D. Bidney wrote:

"At this point the problem which the Ionian philosophers and Spinoza faced recurs.
If we begin with infinite, indeterminate experience, how shall we account for the origin of change and differentiation into finite modes?
In Whitehead's system the problem is more acute than in Spinoza's because the latter at least started with an actual determinate substance with power of activity to modify itself into various finite modes.
But Whitehead's ultimate substrate is indeterminate potentiality or feeling, lacking any actual powers and characteristics. How is one to derive actuality from potentiality? Aristotle postulated a pure form or actuality, which he also designates as Prime Mover, because he was convinced that potentiality was intelligible only in relation to a prior actuality.

This too is the common assumption of Maimonides, St. Thomas, and Spinoza.
The reason why Spinoza takes such pains to prove the existence of an absolutely infinite, perfect substance is because he assumes that all becoming or process, all modes that become in time, can be rendered intelligible only by conceiving some infinitely perfect being of which they are the effects.
In brief, the less real or perfect is to be explained by the more real or perfect. Whitehead, however, in common with Bergson and S. Alexander, has to explain the origin of the actual from the potential.
I suggest here that he can do so only by endowing the potential with attributes which can consistently be attributed only to something actual. This is shown by the fact that Whitehead endows Process or Creativity with an urge or Eros to realize itself.
He thus introduces into the cosmic process the principle of appetition or endeavor which characterized Leibniz's monads."

The "urge" is an echo of the near-absolute, the Big Bang, the Yin/Yang of a dualism that never became a singularity, a One.
Organic relates to this as a feeling of need, and in man it takes on the form of a longing.


D. Bidney wrote:
"Throughout all his work Whitehead repeats and repeats the lesson that as a result of modern physics we must no longer
conceive of nature as constituted by inert, static substances. The electrical theory of matter is that matter is essentially an activity,
quanta of energy.
The notion of an inert substance qualified by attributes must be abandoned and in its place we must substitute process or series of occasions and events. Whitehead expresses this doctrine clearly and briefly in his pamphlet, Nature and Life, where he says:

"Matter has been identified with energy and energy is activity; the passive substratum composed of self-identical enduring bits of matter has been abandoned".

He is careful to point out that we must not commit the fallacy of 'simple location' by regarding any bit of energy in isolation from its environment.
To quote again:

"In the modern concept the group of agitations which we term matter is fused into its environment. There is no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence. The environment enters into the nature of each thing."

The main reasons for Whitehead's rejection of the category of substance are two :

First, there is the argument from Logic and Mathematics which he holds in common with Bertrand Russell. Throughout all his works Whitehead makes it very obvious that he is opposed to a substance-attribute metaphysics and to a subject-predicate logic.
Instead he urges that philosophy should be based on a logic which gives the primacy to relations or structure and not to the terms or subjects. Similarly in metaphysics the ultimate principle must be a relational activity and not some underlying static substance.
He believes that some such entity as process, change, or becoming, is the ultimate reality which serves as the bond of relation between the various events or occasions which emerge in time from the cosmic process. Just as in logic it is the relational form of the proposition which determines the truth-function of the variable term, so in metaphysics, process or creativity is the relational principle which constitutes reality as one continuum.

Secondly, there is the Bergsonian argument from Intuition and the Theory of Creative Evolution. Bergson in his Introduction to
Metaphysics and Creative Evolution reveals to us most clearly the fundamental presupposition of modern relationistic philosophy. Becoming, he argues, is more intelligible than being.
This, he claims, can be shown if we bear in mind the phenomenon of motion. Movement is not the series of static positions of things.
It is essentially a certain duration of flux. This duration can be analysed for the purposes of action into a series of stages or positions, but motion cannot be reconstructed through a series of static positions. When one attempts to do so he becomes involved in all the paradoxes of Zeno. Similarly from Becoming or Process we can by abstraction derive various static forms of being. But from the notion of being one cannot derive the notion of becoming.
In this respect, Bergson and Whitehead maintain, all philosophies of the past have been misled by the Aristotelian subject-predicate logic and by the consequent substance-attribute metaphysics."

The missing factor being subject, as it relates to object, or noumenon relating, connecting, referring/deferring to phenomenon.
The more it connects, bridging the gap between static, abstraction (noumenon - symbol, metaphor) and the apparent, the appearing, the present (phenomenon), the closer the idea comes to the real.
An approach to omniscience, or God's mind.
God being a human construct, like all absolutes, is missing - he is another word for the absent, and yet needed by the organism, absolute.
And what the organism lacks it constructs by appropriating, collecting energies, and combining them, processing them simplifying/generalizing them into ambiguities. Ambiguity is where the absolute resides as a literal rather as a figurative tool for orientation and the efficiency (focusing the aggregate energies upon object/objectives and then overcoming the lag between consciousness and reality (noumenon and phenomenon) by projecting, using imagination.

The need for a substrata, a thing, a substance, a fabric, is completely human.
To conceptualize the "whole" which is non-existent, the mind must imagine a containment field, some noetic box to simplify/generalize the fluid into a static form, a thing.
The concept of a whole is human, and it presupposes a duality, of outside, (non-existence) so as to then abstract existence as a one.
The antagonism between idea(l) and real, or noumenon distant (fragmenting, disordering,) from phenomenon, is evident and it explains the need for consistent re-evaluation, and reaffirmation which is the primary goal of what we call consciousness.
Whole is consciousness stripping away the object/objective from the background, the (inter)activity, so as to simplify/generalize it into a static form.
Form, like all sensual interpretations, are human evaluation of rate of (inter)activity.
Energy, Heraclitus calling it fire, is the metaphor used to conceptualize what remains contrary to human methods of conceptualizing - reality being counter-intuitive, and intuition being a method of coping with it.
Quantum Physics exposes man to this contradiction between his noetic Newtonian Physics and the incomprehensible Quantum sub-layer, which is "sub" not because it is hiding or in some underneath realm, but because it falls beneath human sensual acuity and the human mind's ability to process.
Human senses and neurological organization evolved to cope with survival on a Newtonian level of perception.


D. Bidney wrote:

"In his Process and Reality and Science and the Modern World Professor Whitehead explicitly acknowledges that his metaphysics
bears a close relation to that of Spinoza.
Thus he writes:

"The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate forms of thought, so far as concerns the presuppositions that this form is a direct embodiment of the most ultimate characterization of fact.
One result is that the substance-quality concept is avoided and that morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process." (P.R. 10.)

Similarly in Science and the Modern World (102-3) he says:

"In the analogy with Spinoza his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realization individualizing itself in the interlocked plurality of modes. Thus concrete fact is process. Its primary analysis is into underlying activity of prehension and into realized prehensive events."

The passages just quoted bear ample evidence of Whitehead's recognition of the similarity between his system of metaphysics and that of Spinoza. It shall be my purpose in what follows to make explicit just wherein the relation between their schemes of thought lies and what constitutes their fundamental differences. The main thesis I shall try to maintain is that there is a conflict of philosophical traditions at the basis of the metaphysics of Spinoza and Whitehead, and that all the problems of Spinoza's metaphysics recur in Whitehead's works in a more acute form.
With this object in mind I think it best to select for discussion those concepts of Spinoza's thought to which Whitehead has drawn attention.
The substance of Spinoza is also God or the most perfect being.

The infinite substance or God is allowed a final 'eminent' reality beyond that of the finite modes or accidents.
The principle upon which this reasoning is based is that of the inseparability of perfection and reality-a doctrine which identifies Spinoza with all the other philosophers of the Great Tradition.

I suggest that all of Spinoza's proofs of the existence of God can be expressed in two brief theses:
First, existence is an attribute of the essence of a most perfect being-which is his definition of 'causa sui' and a doctrine he held in common with St. Anselm. Second, perfection determines existence, or more elaborately, perfection is prior in reality to being and is that which determines the actual existence of being.
Hence if anything exists, the most perfect or infinitely perfect being exists.
The point I would make here is that both theses of Spinoza may be reduced to the single proposition that perfection (or value) and existence (reality) are inseparable
There is one very important implication of Spinoza's doctrine of perfection. If we say that quantity of perfection determines
existence, it follows at once that an infinitely perfect being is most real.
Another way of arriving at the same conclusion is by beginning with the notion that the attributes of a substance constitute
its essence. From this it follows that the more attributes a substance has, the greater is its reality, and that hence a substance
constituted by infinite attributes is most real.
The common thesis of both arguments is that only an infinite substance or being is most
real. The finite thing by the very fact of its finitude lacks being.
This thought, I take it, is at the basis of Spinoza's dictum Omnis detertninatio negatio est (1-8,schol. I)-a phrase which is usually
misinterpreted by commentators who begin the study of Spinoza with a Hegelian bias.
It is not that any form or category of being involves its negate as Hegel would urge, but that a determinate
form of being is by its very nature a limitation or negation of infinitely perfect being. In brief, the Spinozistic thesis is that the
infinite is prior in nature to the finite.
I have taken the space-time to elaborate this point because I regard it as constituting one of the fundamental differences be-
tween Spinoza and Whitehead, as indeed between all philosophia perennis and modern relationistic phi lo sop hie^.^ One direct implication of Whitehead's principle of the primacy of process is that value or perfection is not intrinsically bound up with the nature of reality.
Values, as exemplified in various temporal, finite forms of being, may emerge or evolve in time, but process as such, unlike Spinoza's substance, is not essentially constituted by value-attributes.
In his Adventures of Ideas Whitehead has some explicit statements to this effect.
He writes:

"All realization is finite and there is no perfection which is the realization of all perfections" (330).

And again (357):

"Every occasion is in its own nature finite. There is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections. Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience necessarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities. There are always others which might have been and are not. This finiteness is not the result of evil or of imperfection. It results from the fact that there are possibilities of harmony which either produce evil in point of realization or are incapable of such conjunction."

Here we see that Whitehead follows the Greek rather than the Hebrew-Christian tradition. For him, as for Plato and Aristotle,
an actual event is that which has some definite form. The infinite is the formless, that which lacks all determination and therefore all
actuality. Hence according to Whitehead there can be no infinitely perfect being who is the realization of all perfections. Perfection is something which can be attributed only to some finite form of being."

Where have we heard this before?
The old repackaged by hucksters, selling it as new, and as evidence of their "genius".

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PostSubject: Re: Satyr and Pan-experientialism Thu Aug 20, 2015 2:37 pm

Satyr wrote:
Desperation for attention is what females despise in males.
It's a dependence, a weakness.
You and LaughingStock are now using the exact same methods.

I didn't make this thread to troll you, to rile you up.

And cut the crap, you like to attention seek all the time, in your forums thread.

You are simply dishonest about it, claiming it's about 'sociological' purposes.

Fuck it.

Think what you want, old-man.

I want you to stay exactly as you are.

Never change.
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