Nieatzsche's Bitches

Who are these "free-spirits" Nietzsche kept talking about?
"Free"? Huh?

Did he mean "determined to know they are un-free spirits"?
Isn't this another way of saying "chosen"?
Chosen, determined, to know they are un-free from among all those who are "deluded" enough to believe they are free...
Agencies of universal determinism....god's will?
Some kind of selection process. or chance....just luck.
A hierarchy of divine providence?
Natural order determined some to know they are not free, and the rest to believe they are....absolutely so in both cases.
And we should accept this and love fate....or god, or the divine that determined it, willed it to be so?
Some know they are innocent, not responsible for anything, others do not - how unjust is that?
Why do the former still hold the latter accountable, though?
I mean if a police officer arrests you and a judge sends you to jail for a "crime" you "never committed" then why are they responsible?
What about those who deny abortions to Mary Land, why are they responsible for their denial?

I know....we are speaking with retards....nothing makes sense when you talk to retards....'cause, they are retarded.
It's what they are.
And they are retards because of past poor choices....which they inherited and then they failed to improve their inheritance, staying as they are...
So, they don't have absolute, total, complete, responsibility for being retarded, but they have some part in it, because they stayed retarded and did not improve.
They participated in their current retardation...not in their inherited retardation...
They could have improved and become mid-wits, but no they remained dim-wits and then claimed they had no choice.
Now they will have to relive their idiocy, for an eternity...

Never mind...the poet responds for you...

Nietzsche wrote:

225
Free spirit a relative concept. - He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of the age, would have been expected of him. He is the exception, the fettered spirits are the rule; the latter reproach him that his free principles either originate in a desire to shock and offend or eventuate in free actions, that is to say in actions
incompatible with sound morals. Occasionally it is also said that this or that free principle is to be attributed to perversity and mental overexcitation; but this is merely the voice of malice, which does not believe
what it says but desires only to wound: for the superior quality and sharpness of his intellct is usually written on the face of the free spirit in characters clear enough even for the fettered spirit to read. But the two other derivations of free spiritedness are honestly meant; and many free spirits do in fact come to be what they are in one or other of these ways. But the principles they arrive at along these paths could nonetheless be truer and more reliable than those favoured by the fettered spirits. In the case of the knowledge of truth the point is whether or not one possesses it, not from what motives one sought it or along what paths one found it. If the free spirits are right, the fettered spirits are wrong, regardless of whether the former have arrived at the truth by way of immorality or the latter have hitherto cleaved to untruth out of morality.
In any event, however, what characterizes the free spirit is not that his opinions are the more correct but that he has liberated himself from tradition, whether the outcome has been successful or a failure. As a rule, though, he will nonetheless have truth on his side, or at least the spirit of inquiry after truth: he demands reasons, the rest demand faith.

Relative....you can't be free from existence....but free within existence - relatively free - degrees, morons....not absolutes.

Nietzsche wrote:

185
Author's paradoxes. - The so-called paradoxes of an author to which a reader takes exception very often stand not at all in the author's book but in the reader's head.

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

38– Sting of conscience.
The sting of conscience is, like a snake stinging a stone, a piece of stupidity.

[Human, All too Human (vol.3)]

Obscurity and prose permit the conversion of statements into personally constructed profound insights. If the motive of the reader is to preserve the author’s reputation, and not discredit his entire body of work, a generous spirit can manage to interpret a text in a manner that allows him to not lost trust in what he has found to be useful.
As it stands a man not suffering the “stupidity of conscience” is a man with no innate self-regulatory impulse, finding only in externally provided ethics a reason to control himself.
My romantic brother is approaches fully armed and prepared for his ceaseless war on Christianity, denouncing all forms of shame and guilt, using biblical imagery used to control masses that experience few, if any, “stings of conscience,” and would regress to a state of pre-civilization if not given a threatening reason and a seductive promise to self-regulate. Such dismissive allegorical statements only serve to give reasons to manimals to return to their natural state.
Later on, in aphorism 52, we find the source of his resentment towards conscience, associating it with an external authority when an internal ideal will do…

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

52–Content of the conscience.
The content of our conscience is everything that was during the years of our childhood regularly demanded of us without reason by people we honoured or feared. It is thus the conscience that excites that feeling of compulsion ('I must do this, not do that') which does not ask: why must I?
In every case in which a thing is done with 'because' and 'why' man acts without conscience; but not yet for that reason against it.
The belief in authorities is the source of the conscience: it is therefore not the voice of God in the heart of man but the voice of some men in man.

[Human, All too Human (vol.3)]

Moral sentiments require external authorities to give them form, when they are innate, and can only express themselves through negative feelings, and “stings of conscience” – a product of an evolved sense of reciprocal dependence leading to the ‘golden rule,’ and man’s emerging self-consciousness exposing him to another need/suffering as if it were his own, i.e., sympathy.
Recovering Abrahamics sought to rescue salvation without the cost of guilt & shame priestly classes had imposed upon it as a necessary price, paid to them as the collectors, on behalf of divinity. They discovered that they had no need for such mediations, as those offered by Christianity – Abrahamism having been franchised, setting-up competing shops. With no need for this hypothetical divine sacrifice, using guilt & shame to exploit human vanity and anxiety.
Nietzsche’s animosity towards Christianity was founded on this rejection of authorized mediations, concealing the motives of those that presenting themselves as agencies of their franchises services on behalf of a shared Abrahamic divinity.
Man no longer needed to become ‘innocent,’ because his primordial guilt – and the shame associated with it – was all fabricated; no divinity had to sacrifice itself, because man was never free from its totalitarian will.
With no shame and guilt man could return to his primal state of minion – a mere agency of divinity that could not break its own rules/laws and so could not be guilty of anything, and ashamed of nothing.

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

9– Where the theory of freedom of will originated.
Over one man necessity stands in the shape of his passions, over another as the habit of hearing and obeying, over a third as a logical conscience, over a fourth as caprice and a mischievous pleasure in escapades. These four will, however, seek the freedom of their will precisely where each of them is most firmly fettered: it is as if the silkworm sought the freedom of its will in spinning. How does this happen? Evidently because each considers himself most free where his feeling of living is greatest; thus, as we have said, in passion, in duty, in knowledge, in mischievousness respectively. That through which the individual human being is strong, wherein he feels himself animated, he involuntarily thinks must also always be the element of his freedom: he accounts dependence and dullness, independence and the feeling of living as necessarily coupled.
Here an experience in the social-political domain has been falsely transferred to the farthest metaphysical domain: in the former the strong man is also the free man; the lively feeling of joy and sorrow, high hope, boldness in desire, powerfulness in hatred is the property of the rulers and the independent, while the subjected man, the slave, lives dull and oppressed.
The theory of freedom of will is an invention of ruling classes.

[Human, All too Human (vol.2)]

And, perhaps, another feels “most free” in enslavement, renouncing freedom, in the absolute, as an infantile hope they’ve outgrown, gaining all the benefits of irresponsibility.
Ruling class is the only place freedom could have been experienced. Caught between a twofold authoritarian totalitarianism, man finds himself between cosmic totalitarianism, and its natural laws chiseled by an unseen divine hand, and not by the hand of the prophet who brings it down from the mountain top, and collective authoritarianism imposing socioeconomic laws as addendums to divine laws.
Where, other than among the powerful could the experience of freedom become so pronounced as to be noticeable. Among the powerless their meager options – most of which remain inaccessible – evoke in them a sense of surrender to fate.
Trapped between absolute natural order and absolute social order they see no hope – escaping the feebler of the two only places them before cosmic incarceration, both looming as incomprehensibly perfect and infallible.
My romantic brother attempts to escape Christian shame and guilt by liberating it from its mediating human priestly classes, but does not challenge their core superstitions. We sought to liberate man – or was it only his fellow Germans he wanted to free? – from the shaming of primordial sin so as to gain eternal life unspoiled by any blemish, saying ‘yes’ to its eternally, as if this is not another incarceration.
But, from where would this liberation come, if man has no will and no freedom to direct it?
Was he presenting himself as a mediator to discredit all mediations, directly connecting the masses to their faceless divine ruler?
What of this ‘Will to Power,’ he announced? His own words imply that man has no power, and no will, so what will is seeking power, or preserving tis power wilfully? A protestant’s protest against earthly mediations. If only the divine would will such “liberties” to the powerless.

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

10– Feeling no new chains.
So long as we do not feel that we are dependent on anything we regard ourselves as independent: a false conclusion that demonstrates how proud and lusting for power man is. For he here assumes that as soon as he experiences dependence he must under all circumstances notice and recognize it, under the presupposition that he is accustomed to living in independence and if, exceptionally, he lost it, he would at once perceive a sensation antithetical to the one he is accustomed to.
But what if the opposite were true: that he is always living in manifold dependence but regards himself as free when, out of long habituation, he no longer perceives the weight of the chains? It is only from new chains that he now suffers: - 'freedom of will' really means nothing more than feeling no new chains.

[Human, All too Human (vol.2)]

But who denies dependence to the level my romantic brother assumes to be universal? Would not independence be a degree of dependence, just as power would be a degree of powerlessness? What perfect, complete states does he oppose and seek to free himself from, this denier of freedom? Freedom from Christianity – Abrahamism he could not name, being warned by Socrates – was the only freedom he could hope for? To what degree if not absolutely so, could he will himself to such a state of independence? Was he a massager from the divine, coming to announce the ‘death of god’; harbinger of a coming determined freedom? Had he been chosen to spread the word – Zarathustra that had come too early among those who had not, yet, been determined to be ready for enslavement to one other than earthly authorities?
One could say that one need not be omniscient to know something of the world, no more than one must be completely independent to have some freedom… otherwise would my romantic brother be insinuating omniscience, evidenced by his profound insights; does he claim omnipotence, through association, with his ‘will to power,’ humbly admitting that he has neither?

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

11– Freedom of will and isolation of facts.
Our usual imprecise mode of observation takes a group of phenomena as one and calls it a fact: between this fact and another fact it imagines in addition an empty space, it isolates every fact. In reality, however, all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts and empty spaces but a continuous flux. Now, belief in freedom of will is incompatible precisely with the idea of a continuous, homogeneous, undivided, indivisible flowing: it presupposes that every individual action is isolate and indivisible; it is an atomism in the domain of willing and knowing.
Just as we understand characters only imprecisely, so do we also facts: we speak of identical characters, identical facts: neither exists. Now, we praise and censure, however, only under this false presupposition that there are identical facts, that there exists a graduated order of classes of facts which corresponds to a graduated world-order: thus we isolate, not only the individual fact, but also again groups of supposedly identical facts (good, evil, sympathetic, envious actions, etc.) – in both cases erroneously.
The word and the concept are the most manifest ground for our belief in this isolation of groups of actions: we do not only designate things with them, we think originally that through them we grasp the true in things. Through words and concepts we are still continually misled into imagining things as being Simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself. A philosophical mythology lies concealed in language which breaks out again every moment, however careful one may be otherwise. Belief in freedom of will – that is to say in identical facts and in isolated facts - has in language its constant evangelist and advocate.

[Human, All too Human (vol.2)]

What my romantic brother describes is abstraction – noumenon – constructing segments of space/time, confusing mediocre minds with the idea of absolute subjective states, rather than fluid processes.
Rather, like a boat steersman guiding his boat by shifting the rudder right, then left, at other times allowing the boat to surrender to the river’s flow – a foolish steersman turning the boat around to fight the currents upstream – so too, does man’s will direct his fate by choosing to go this, or that way – recalling the consequences of his previous choices he learns to avoid and to engage the flow selectively.
Hindu’s mistakenly assumed memories were retained after death, to justify karma and the responsibility of individual choices in their quest to find final peace. The Greeks correctly judged death to be an end of memories, if they are not passed on to another through physical or linguistic intercourse.
Neither proposed forgetfulness as an easing of man’s responsibility and relative control of his fate.
How could we learn, and why would we need to, if all were inevitable, and eternally recurring?
My romantic brother sought to gain eternal life without an earthly cost, and what he came up with was a repeating existence that could not be altered by human agency – so primordial sin became impossible, as was regret, because all was declared to be inevitable and eternally repeating – temporal incarceration benefited by forgetfulness. Divine laws were chiselled in stone, but no prophet was required to write it down, adding his own twists to the sacred text.
This was my romantic bother’s solution to anything that would make man’s life eternally unlivable.
Memory is the issue. Memory is the source of regret, and shame and guilt.
Natural selection would be a ploy if memories are not passed-on, participating in the determinations of probabilities – not certainty – of success and/or failure.
A steersman learns from precedent – stored in his experiential memories, learned from his mentor in boat steering – what the consequences are of going along a river’s flow, rather than against it, looking for a way into the calm waters beyond. He learns – “what does not kill me makes me stronger” – and chooses not to take this way, but that way, and in through this choice he increases his chances, the probabilities, contributing to the adjustment of his fate. If choice were not an expression of his will’s power, its relative freedom, then why would he even need to be aware and to know and to learn? What use would be his learning if he could not choose other than what he had before?
All is flow, yes. Will is the subtle nudging of the body – boat, as manifestation of past made present – this way or that; learning with every mistake so that choice is guided by sharper judgments, and errors are reduced to a tolerable minimum.
Free-will is not “…incompatible precisely with the idea of a continuous, homogeneous, undivided, indivisible flowing...” if it is properly defined and understood as describing a degree of power with access to a finite number of accessible options, from which the will chooses to direct the individual, like a steersman directs his boat – learning with every successful trip which path to choose and which one to avoid.
No static states – will participates in the flux, to the degree of its power, and awareness of the options before it, determining it fate. Choice is part of this fluidity – an act, guided by accumulating knowledge and understanding.
‘Primordial sin,’ which my romantic bother’s father was burdened by, was not a display of man’s free-will – it was a ruse, an allegorical way of displaying man’s lack of options – a display of Adam’s un-freedom, for his choice was itself god’s creation; it was the beginning of a weaponising of shame and guilt that has now produced a shameless reaction, a guiltless degeneracy...
Was this what my romantic brother wanted to be eternally returned – no regrets, no reason to say ‘nay’ to an eternal life of the same?

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

28– Capriciousness in the apportionment of punishment.
Most criminals acquire punishment in the way women acquire children. They have done the same thing hundreds of times without noticing any ill consequences: suddenly there is a disclosure, and at its heels punishment. Habituation, however, ought to make the guiltiness of the deed on account of which. The criminal is punished seem less culpable: for it happened as the result of a tendency the criminal has acquired and which he would have found it hard to resist. Instead of that, a suspicion of habitual crime procures him severer punishment; habituation is seen as a ground for refusing any amelioration of his sentence. A previously exemplary life in contrast with which the crime stands out all the more fearsomely ought to make its guiltiness seem all the greater! But its customary effect is to ameliorate the punishment. Thus everything is meted out, not with an eye to the criminal, but with an eye to society and the harm and danger it has incurred: the previous serviceability of a man is weighed against his single harmful act, his previous harmfulness added to that at present disclosed and his punishment intensified accordingly. But if one in this way punishes or rewards a man's past as well (in the case of a serviceable past a lighter punishment is a reward), one ought to go back even further and reward or punish the causes of such or such a past, I mean parents, educators, society, etc.: in many cases the judges will then be found to be in some way involved in the guilt. It is capricious to halt at the criminal if what one is punishing is the past: if one is not willing to accede to the absolute guiltlessness of all guilt, one should at least halt at each individual case and look no further back: that is to say, isolate the guilt and refrain from connecting it in any way with the past - otherwise one will come to sin against logic. Draw the necessary conclusion from your doctrine of 'freedom of the will', you free-willers, and boldly decree: 'no deed possesses a past’

[Human, All too Human (vol.3)]

To which he offers a diagnosis that may also explain his own motive, in regards to Christianity and tis eternal punishments.

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

29– Envy and its nobler brother.
Where equality really has prevailed and been permanently established there arises that tendency which is on the whole accounted immoral and can hardly be conceived of in a state of nature: envy. The envious man is conscious of every respect in which the man he envies exceeds the common measure and desires to push him down to it or to raise himself up to the height of the other: out of which there arise two different modes of action which Hesiod designated as the evil and the good Eris. There likewise arises in a state of equality a sense of indignation that one man should fare badly beneath his dignity and equal rights, while another fares well above his equal rights: these affects are felt by nobler natures. They suffer from the absence of justice and equity in those things that are independent of the despotism of man: that is to say, they demand that that equality recognized by man shall now also be recognized by nature and chance; it angers them that the equal are not accorded an equal fate.

[Human, All too Human (vol.2)]

Here we may find the ‘good doctor’s’ reasons for falling out with Wagner, and why we sought to distance himself from Schopenhauer, his once beloved mentor, standing apart as a ‘lover of fate,’ that said ‘yes’ to whatever it had in store.
Perhaps, coincidentally, a few aphorisms later offering us another piece…

Nietzsche, Friedrich wrote:

31–Vanity as an offshoot of the antisocial.
For the sake of their security, men have founded the community on the basis of positing themselves as being equal to one another; but this conception is at bottom repugnant to the nature of the individual and something imposed upon him; and so it happens that, the more the general security is guaranteed, the more do new shoots of the ancient drive to domination assert themselves: in the division of classes, in the claim to special dignities and privileges, and in vanity in general (in mannerisms, costume, modes of speech, etc.). As soon as the communality comes to feel itself in danger again, the majority, who were unable to assert their domination when a state of general calm obtained, re-impose a condition of equality: the absurd special privileges and vanities disappear for a time. If, however, the communality collapses completely and everything dissolves into anarchy, then there at once breaks through that condition of unreflecting, ruthless inequality that constitutes the state of nature: as, according to the report of Thucydides, happened on Corcyra. There exists neither a natural right nor a natural wrong.

[Human, All too Human (vol.2)]

Yet nature gives her indifferent indisputable decrees over right & wrong choices, continuously leading, inexorably, to the moment of judgement, expressed through an act, a choice, which is never entirely conscious nor taking account of what preceded so as to excuse itself from what follows.
It may have escaped my romantic brother’s genius that the ‘free-willer’ judge and jury are motivated by a conscious objective, similar to that found in natural selected final and indisputable punishments for bad choices, with no motive, nor malice, selecting for the same awareness and acceptance of the cost of one’s own actions, otherwise how could such a gifted and sensitive mind, as my romantic brother, have ever arisen and survived long enough to grace me with his insights? – unless he implies that the cosmos, in its divine grace, intends for his overman to emerge by chance, or by divine intent – that it is inevitable that it should be so – and not naturally selected through a myriad of deserved or undeserved consequences imposed on good and bad choices.
It is precisely this recalled past which is being judged and punished in the present – “…sins of the father, and mother…” as it goes.
A judge acts as an agency of human objectives, selecting those who act consciously, intentionally, partially or totally aware of all the possible consequences of their actions.
My good romantic brother is offering excuses to cretins and charlatans who will hide behind ignorance – feigned or self-induced – to justify any action, and every choice that can ever be acted out.
It is certain that good/bad are not universal but ephemeral, transient judgements, necessitating a dynamic and flexible mind, to assess the changing circumstances and choose, this way, and then that way, as the case may be – what is a correct choice now may be wrong a minute later.
We must redefine our terms to take into account what ‘free’ and what ‘will’ means, otherwise we will be providing excuses for ourselves and degenerates until the end of time.
There is, nor can there ever be, complete independence, i.e., freedom, but only degrees of freedom; just as there cannot be omnipotence, but only degrees of power. ‘Will’ does not imply a static, separated from fluidity, singularity, but a dynamic, flexible, adaptable, focus of existential flow, that doesn’t entirely determine fate but participates – to the degree of its power – in the determination of probabilities – not certainties.
A criminal is punished not because of what he did but what he failed to do: take control of himself, adapting it to dynamic circumstances, taking into account his own past – of which only he can ever fully know and appreciate – so as to adjust himself to the circumstances – accepting all unforeseeable circumstances as part of existence itself (chaos & complexity). A good judge is punishing the criminal’s lack of control and/or interest in knowing and controlling himself.
Judges punish, as the Spartans did, those who get caught – not for the crime but because they got caught in the act; punishing bad performances or an inadequate awareness of circumstances, requiring different risks and approaches.
The ideal citizen would be one who is aware of his own impulses as they relate to collective rules restricting their free expression.
Just as in nature… all is permitted... but some actions carry a cost precisely because they challenge natural order, and the perpetuation of life. Therefore, there is good and bad in nature, it simply isn’t universal – static, absolute – but fluctuating, dynamic, requiring real-time evaluations and judgement calls – with chance always being a factor, incorporating in that one mysterious term, both the unknown and the unknowable.

What exactly did Nietzsche contribute to philosophy?

Most of it is a derivative from Schopenhauer's Will & Representation (sufficient reason), only he rejected his mentor's pessimism - psychological contribution.
His 'eternal return' is a derivative of Hinduism's reincarnation myth, only he eliminated Karmic memory, as the metaphysical baggage that follows man around from lifetime to lifetime - psychological contribution.
His 'overman' is a derivative of Buddhism's enlightened man, Buddha - himself a nihilistic expression that aims at ending Hinduism's eternal rebirth as the ultimate goal; of Hellenisms demi-god motif, Hercules, from which the Jews invented modern day Superman to ridicule and then circumcise the concept; of the natural progression of evolution, requiring no willing at all since it is inevitable that homo sapiens will be surpassed, upward or downward; or the vision of an upward overcoming, and a future man that has transcended his resentment of his own becoming in time (Heidegger) - psychological contribution.

What else?
His largest contribution - in my view - is his diagnosis of nihilism, and his pronouncement of the 'death of god' - the Abrahamic one.
But nihilism wasn't invented in his time - it was carried by Christianity - which he correctly analysed and denounced as 'slave morality.'
He prophesied the evolution of nihilism from spiritual to secular, attracting millions of men-children who then found the absent universal father-figure in his prose - usually attracting males with father issues, viz., suffering from the modern/postmodern disillusionment with a deteriorating family institution, and their own inferior or absent fathers.
But he did not trace his diagnosis to an ideological virus, emerging to offer semiotic shelter to all those who were experiencing the negative side of self-awareness.
He assaulted Christianity, in an effort to wake up Germany, and a slumbering Europe, from the comma this virus had produced, but he never assaulted Islam nor did he critique Judaism, as the source of the infection; nor did he attempt to trace it all back to Egypt and Persia.

We now live with the aftermath.
We tolerate all kinds of assaults on Christianity but dare not speak about Judaism, and only halfheartedly do we critique Islam.
His polemics have now become banners in the armies of zombie hoards that seek retribution against nature, in the face of European man, i.e., its highest agency, to date.
Without seeing the patterns how can we deal with the ailment and not simply report the symptoms and diagnose a vague psychological disease, using poems and prose?
Were his psychological contributions a form of interventional therapy, when preventative therapy would be more effective?
Waiting for the patient to die, taking the disease with it, is one method - hoping that the corpse will give birth to a new species resistant to it, is romantic idealism. The mind needed a semiotic vaccine, to help it fight-off the infection, helping it create its own immunity to this psychic disease, by returning it to nature.
Did he discover the means of transmission? We had to wait for Wittgenstein to find a hint - ironic, if you think about it.  
We had to wait for Spengler to reshape our contexts.

Nietzsche's bitches, want to become a means towards his perceived ends; replacements of the absent one.
The powerless find empowerment in imitating those they perceive as powerful.

The ones surrendering to Abraham's god, surrendered to Nietzsche's will, and when they could not find empowerment that way they returned to the one-god that could never disappoint.
How could the non-existent ever disappoint the existent?
Nietzsche's flaw?
He existed.