Spengler: Riding the Tiger of Modernity

But because without the help of Western technology, pharmacy,  surgery all this exaggerated  build-up of muscles and sexual characteristics would not be seen at all or hardly at all, we now always have to look at these "rebuilt" people. If it were not so exaggerated, as it is meanwhile, one could find pleasure in it, but ..., I must honestly say: I don't like to see it.  And as if that were not already bad enough: The greed for power functioning over the money will drive this decadent development further.

Interesting. Thank you for the film.

Especially the young Heidegger fought very strongly against psychologism and historicism. Already his dissertation was directed against psychologism. And also in his main work psychologism together with historicism is the object of Heidegger's criticism. This attitude towards psychologism and historicism is typical for the time. Already Nietzsche had turned against historicism in his book "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben" in 1874. Spengler, however, did not do so, although the hostility against historicism was even stronger at the very time when Spengler wrote the first volume of his major work (1911-1918) than it had been in 1874. Heidegger, however, kept his reservations about psychologism and historicism until the end of his life. If one comes across the noun "Historie" or the adjective "historisch" in his books, one can be prepared for a negative judgment; but if one reads the noun "Geschichte" or the adjective "geschichtlich," the judgment is positive. Heidegger was himself very much historically (thus: geschichtlich) oriented. So his critique was directed at historicism; and historicism "produces" history (Historie), but not history (Geschichte).
There is again a translation problem here. The German nouns "Geschichte" and "Historie" always have only one equivalent in English: "History". The same applies to the German adjectives "geschichtlich" and "historisch": "historical". There is no equivalent in English for the noun "Geschichte" nor for the adjective "geschichtlich".

Heidegger, at any rate, wanted to make clear by the use of the different words that he was, on the one hand, a very historically (geschichtlich) thinking person, but on the other hand, not a historistically (historisch), namely not a historistically (historistisch) thinking person. From his point of view, the latter was the case with Spengler.

(I did not understand everything the man said in the film, since he speaks heavily with an accent and does not pronounce the German names in German. In the flow of speech something gets lost. Well, I should have listened to it another time.)

But it seems that in Heidegger's critique of Spengler, historicism plays a big role. Right? And that Spengler did not think like Heidegger is clear anyway. Besides, Spengler didn't take philosophy very seriously. Heidegger could have learned from him, too. Because Heidegger had to separate himself with increasing age more and more from philosophy, because he noticed that his "thinking" ("Denken") can not be covered by philosophy. Therefore, from a certain point on, he spoke only of the "Denken" ("thinking"), no longer of "Philosophie" ("Philosophy").

Spengler was primarily oriented to Goethe; and Goethe may have been a philosopher too; but he would not have attached much importance to being called a "philosopher"; and so was Spengler.

Everything is "Geschichte".

(••) "Geschichte" comes from "Geschehnis" ("happening"), from what "geschehen ist" ("has happened") and "geschieht" ("happens") - including what „geschah“ („happened“) and „geschieht “(„happens“) to you and others. Another word for "Geschehnis" ("happening") is "Ereignis" ("event"). So "Geschichte" also means "event", especially "sequence(s) of event(s)". (••) Moreover, "Geschichte" means "Wissen" ("knowledge"), "Tun" ("doing") and "Erzählung" ("telling") of what "happened" and "happens".

When did the "Historie" begin? According to Heidegger, with the Church Fathers (they began in the 1st century), and that means for him: with the end of the Ancient Greekity. Others say that the "Historie" began with the early, the high or the late Middle Ages. With a clear conscience one can say that the "Historie" began in the 15th century. In any case, either still in the Middle Ages, but at the latest in the 15th century, the following meeting took place: (••) "Geschichte" as "Geschehnis" ("happening"), "Begegnung" ("encountering") and "Tun" ("doing") came together with (••) "Geschichte" as "Wissen" ("knowledge"), "Erzählung" ("telling") of "Geschehnis" ("happening"), "Begegnung" ("encountering") and "Tun" ("doing"). So "Geschichtswissenschaft" ("science of history" (••)) and "Historie" (••) emerged from "Geschichte". But "Geschichte" remained "Geschichte", did not change its meaning. It was only added. – So much for the history of how "Historie" emerged from "Geschichte".

According to the "Historie", "Geschichte" is the object of the "Historie", but the "Historie" is only a part of "Geschichte". "Geschichte" is not a part of anything, because everything is "geschichtlich", thus: part of "Geschichte"."Geschichte" means the story without any analyzing and qualifying, classifying and objectifying or any other determination. It is something between "story" and "history" (in the case of being no "Historie"), but never like "Historie". "Geschichte" is as such free from historiography, so besides the oral tradition an independent phenomenon, not determined by anything, thus also not by science and technology. When it becomes "written history", it is already almost "Historie", but the systematization, the analysis, the qualification, the objectification, etc. - in short: the scientification and technization - are still missing then, and when they are not missing anymore, then this "written history" has already become historiography, thus "Historie". Because when something is put in writing, it is only a matter of time until it is systematically misused for power purposes. – For example: Despite his use of writing, Thucydides was not a historian of "Historie", but a historian of "Geschichte". This is what Heidegger also said.

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"Historismus" ("historicism"), as part of "Historie", which is part of "Geschichte", is merely a "mental superstructure" or a "subset" of "Historie"; and "Historie", as part of "Geschichte", is merely a "mental superstructure" or a "subset" of "Geschichte". "Geschichte" is the base. Only it is something of its own. "Historismus" is nothing without "Historie" and nothing without "Geschichte", "Historie" is nothing without "Geschichte".

"Historie" is always already analyzed and qualified, classified, determined, established on the basis of "facts" ("historical facts") in a scientific and technical manner (ready for the mass media). This means for the critics of historicism: determined by historicism. For the critics of historicism, the historicists were the ones who thought that they could determine everything by means of "Historie" and therefore relativize everything (as the psychologists do by means of "Psyche").

Like Heidegger - or even more than him - I criticize psychologism. And just like him - or a little less than him - I criticize historicism.

The following comparison: If the history (Geschichte) were the time and the history (Historie) were the physics, then the history (Historie) could not explain with historical means what the history (Geschichte) is, although it uses the history (Geschichte) constantly as means or category. Also physics is not able to say or to show with physical means or methods what the time is.

Historicism (Historismus), as part of history (Historie), which is part of history (Geschichte), is merely a "mental superstructure" of history (Historie); and history (Historie), as part of history (Geschichte), is merely a "mental superstructure" of history (Geschichte). History (Geschichte) is the base. Only it is something of its own. Historicism (Historismus) is nothing without history (Historie) and nothing without history (Geschichte), history (Historie) is nothing without history (Geschichte).

History (Geschichte) exists even without historiography; history (Historie) is almost synonymous with historiography.

History (Geschichte) can always be without history (Historie). History (Historie) can never be without history (Geschichte). History (Historie) is part of history (Geschichte), but history (Geschichte) is not part of history (Historie).

Therefore, Heidegger can say: "Alles Historische ist auf das Geschichtliche angewiesen. Dagegen bedarf die Geschichte nicht der Historie. Der Historiker ist stets nur ein Techniker der Publizistik. Vom Historiker unterschieden bleibt der Geschichtsdenker." Usual English translation (here of a machine translator): "Everything historical is dependent on the historical. History, on the other hand, does not need history. The historian is always only a technician of journalism. The historical thinker remains distinguished from the historian." My tranbslation: "Everything of Historisches is dependent on Geschichtliches. Geschichte, on the other hand, does not need Historisches. The Historiker is always only a technician of journalism. The thinker of Geschichte remains distinguished from the Historiker."

According to Heidegger, "Geschichte" is the change of the essence of truth. It fundamentally transcends the realm of the historical. Therefore, "Geschichte" is the "specific happening of the existing human being (Dasein), in such a way that the happening that is 'past' in the togetherness and at the same time 'handed down' and continuing to have an effect is considered as history in the accentuated sense" (translated by me). In Heidegger's case, therefore, "Geschichte" is more distinguished from "Historie" than in the case of word scientists, lexicologists, philologists and other linguists, even more than in the case of historians, historicists). Particularly memorable is Heidegger's statement in "Sein und Zeit" ("Being and Time") that history is to be understood as "die Wiederkehr des Möglichen" ("the return of the possible"). Therefore, it also indicates how Dasein must be open and ready for such a return. Thereby, "Geschichte" or "Geschichtlichkeit" (often translated as "historicity", but "Historizität is exactly what it is noti) is closely connected with the interweaving of the time ecstasies: (1.) "Auf-sich-zu" ("towards-itself"): "Zukunft" ("future"); (2.) "Zurück-auf" ("back-to"): "Gewesenheit" (mostly, but not exactly like "present perfect" and in any case no real past, because past is over, but the human as Dasein is not over); (3.) "Begegnenlassen" ("letting-meet"): "Gegenwart" ("present"). It presupposes a truth event and the clearing of Sein (being).

So Heidegger’s understanding of "Geschichte" is a fundamental ontological one. Against this background, the concept of "Geschichte" as "Seinsgeschichte" ("Geschichte of being") merely requires a deepening of this fundamental ontological understanding of "Geschichte".

Not only "Geschichte" and "Historie", but also and even more "Geschichtlichkeit" and "Historizität" are clearly distinguished.

If a translator knew little of the German language and little of Heidegger's philosophy and translated into English, for example, he would always translate both "Geschichte" and "Historie" as "history" and both "Geschichtlichkeit" and "Historizität" as "historicity". And as I already said: each time each of these German words would be translated wrongly here.


Martin Heidegger (translated by me): "The apologetic business of cultural Christianity, practiced for a long time (since Irenaeus) in the Occident, is the preform of modern (neuzeitliche) history (Historie). This may never get together with Thucydides, but with Augustine and the civitas dei, from which then finally the very most Christian modern (neuzeitliche) empire of the highest cultural values has become, which once again confirms what it only wants to 'revalue'. Therefore - because history (Historie) comes from it - the cultural Christianity can also make use of history (Historie) with a special virtuosity; this Christian way of 'rewriting' history (Geschichte) necessarily makes school within the modern (neuzeitlich) age, the more modern (neuzeitlicher) it becomes."

Martin Heidegger (translated by me): "In the hidden rest of this change rests and swings, hangs and sways, freezes and staggers that which one establishes from the 'history' ('Historie'), i.e. from the spying out and investigation of the objectified 'history' ('Geschichte'), as the events and achievements, i.e. the things and deeds, in short as the facts. These determinations then appear with the gigantic effort of the technical apparatus of modern research and give the appearance that the technique of history is history (Geschichte) itself. One therefore equates 'the historical' with the historical ('Geschichtlichen'). From this 'historical' one then draws the 'balances', one gives the 'valuations' and calculates the 'quotas' of the 'costs' which 'man' has to spend in history (Geschichte). It is probably no coincidence that also a historical (geschichtlicher) thinker of the rank of Jacob Burckhardt, and especially he, moves in the field of view of 'balances', 'taxations', 'quotas' and 'costs' and calculates history (Geschichte) according to the scheme 'culture and barbarism'. Nietzsche, too, makes the 'estimating in values', i.e. the calculating, the final form of the occidental metaphysical thinking."

Martin Heidegger (translated by me): "The history (Geschichte) becomes never accessible to the historical (historischen) research, because this would like to confirm every time already the opinion about the history (Geschichte), namely an unthought, a so-called self-evident, with unthought and by the research and so only consolidates the unthought self-evident."

Martin Heidegger (translated by me): "Because history (Historie) as a 'science' arises from a certain form of Occidental history (Geschichte) - its modern (neuzeitlichen) essence - history (Historie) is not only an indifferent superstructure of a knowledge of history (Geschichte) above history (Geschichte), but one of the essential ways in which history is 'made'. This historical role of history has not yet been recognized, let alone its significance for the decisive period of modern times (Neuzeit) has not yet been assessed."

Sources:
Martin Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit", 1927, S. 379.
Martin Heidegger, "Überlegungen", VII-XI, 1938/’39, in: Gesamtausgabe, Band 95, S. 47.
Martin Heidegger, "Parmenides", 1942/’43, in: Gesamtausgabe, Band 54, S. 1, 4-5, 80, 81-82, 94-95, 142.

Note:
I myself divide all development roughly into "cosmogenesis", "evolution" and "Geschichte". The physical-chemical ("cosmogenetic") includes the biological ("evolutionary") as well as the cultural ("geschichtlich") development, but nevertheless all development stages are "geschichtlich", because the human spirit, which has conceived and just spiritually developed all these development stages, is a part of the "Geschichte", and this means that "cosmogenesis" and "evolution" are parts of the "Geschichte" too. "Being" (Heidegger: "Sein") becomes recognizable only through man (Heidegger: "Dasein", "Da-Sein") resp. his "Geschichte". Without man there would be nothing that could know or experience the menanig of being – Everything is "Geschichte".Man’s thoughts, that is needed for the recognition, is part of the Geschichte. – Everything is "Geschichte".