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Satyr
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyMon Nov 18, 2019 3:29 pm


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Nov 23, 2019 7:43 pm



How do you convince the mind that what it perceives as different is really the same?
Millions of years of natural selection erased with a few social engineering seminars?
Would it take indoctrination from birth to convince the mind to disregard what it can see, or to properly interpret it as superficial or meaningless?
What would be the collateral effects?
Identity crisis.
If what appears to be different is the same, then what appears to be male may be female....or neither sex.
Push this to its own 'logical limits'.
Nihilism.
A loss of trust in one's own sensual awareness and innate judgement calls.
The insane primate....self-induced schizophrenia, and psychosis.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Nov 23, 2019 7:48 pm

Modern facades of civility, are only detatchments of control over thier physical drives, allowing them to grow stronger. Nature always has the last word.
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyTue Nov 26, 2019 10:14 am


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Dec 14, 2019 8:43 am


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyTue Dec 17, 2019 8:52 am


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri Dec 27, 2019 6:48 pm


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri Jan 17, 2020 7:26 pm


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri Feb 07, 2020 6:00 pm



Yo...we be kings yo.

Well, there goes the delusion that the ancient-Egypt was a Negro civilization.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyWed Feb 12, 2020 9:46 am

Genius correlates to a level of cognitive abilities that are complex and versatile and that surpass mere IQ or knowledge, which is why it takes on a "bedazzling" effect for the simple-minded. For moderns, a "genius" is only about IQ points, test scores, academic achievements, or the more popular platform, "social activism". For them, whoever has the ability to amass attention to themselves has some 'genius' quality, after all, genius must be something that they envy and wish to be. Therefore, any source of influence or prowess is subject to "genius"if it inspires feelings of inferiroity in them.
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyTue Apr 07, 2020 5:34 pm

Levin, Michael wrote:
2.1. BASIC BIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
Race The concept of race is often said to lack scientific merit (see, e.g., Montagu 1972, Yee et al. 1993, Hoffman 1994).
Ironically, denial of the reality of race often prefaces a denunciation of race bias, with little explanation given of how people can respond to a trait that no one possesses and no one understands. It should be obvious as well that repudiating race forbids advocacy of racial preferences, although few critics of the race concept have faulted affirmative action on this account. Whatever they may say, the parties to such disputes assume that the notion of race is reasonably clear.
It is true that human races no longer exist if “race” is taken to mean, as it sometimes does in biology, a large, isolated breeding population. Yet, in addition to universal understanding of what foes of race prejudice oppose and friends of racial preference advocate, there is wide agreement on ascriptions of race. One hundred randomly chosen individuals sorting passers-by on an urban street would, without hesitation or collusion, almost always agree on who is black, white, or Asian. Moreover, the race others would noncollusively ascribe to an individual is almost always the race he unhesitatingly ascribes to himself. Such systematic agreement must rest on some objective basis—possibly misconstrued, but present and detectable.
The definition of race that captures ordinary usage, its usage in popular polemics (e.g., Hacker 1992: 7) and the usage of evolutionary biologists (e.g., E. Wilson 1978: 48–49) refers to birthplace of ancestors, although the precise form to give this definition depends on the best theory of human origins. Let us assume the chronology currently favored by anthropologists and molecular biologists (Stringer and Andrews 1988; Stringer 1990; Gibbons 1995; Horai et al. 1995; Aiello 1993, more cautiously; also see Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1993), according to which man evolved in Africa, branched off into Europe 110,000+ years ago, and branched off from there into Asia about 70,000 years later.
The branches have interbred in historical time, Africa’s isolation having ended two millennia ago. So, letting 25 years mark a single generation, a “Negroid” may be defined as anyone whose ancestors 40 to 4400 generations removed were born in sub-Saharan Africa. “Mongoloid” and “Caucasoid” are defined similarly, with Asia and Europe in place of Africa. Because comparisons of blood group frequencies in the white, African, and conventionally identified American black populations indicate a white admixture of about 25% in the blacks in the American North and 10% in blacks in the American South,1 an “American Negroid” can be defined as anyone 75% or more of whose ancestors 40 to 4400 generations removed were born in sub-Saharan Africa. These definitions can be adapted to “polygenic” theories of human origins. If blacks, whites, and Asians evolved separately over (say) the last million years, a Negroid is anyone (75% or more of) whose ancestors 40 or more generations removed, with no upper bound, were born in Africa, and likewise for Mongoloids and Caucasoids.
Defining race by place of ancestry, although covering most humans, omits certain mixtures, such as Melanesians.
Also, counting 75% African ancestry as Negroid will tend to understate any Negroid/Caucasoid genetic differences.
Still, the fact that it is recognized as appropriate for American blacks to call themselves “African-Americans,” or to call the dominant culture “European,” shows that most people have the geographical conception of race in mind.
While race is conventionally equated with skin color, its familiar observable criteria, which also include lip eversion, hair texture, facial bone structure, and timbre of voice, do not define “race.” Rather, these traits serve as contingent indicators of ancestry. They are “stereotypes” in Putnam’s (1975; also see Kripke 1973) technical sense that they fix the references of “Negroid,” “Mongoloid,” and “Caucasoid.” Moreover, because people are grouped by a number of traits combined into gestalts, everyday ascriptions of race are highly reliable. Indians, although dark-skinned, are seldom confused with Negroids; some Caucasoids may have thinner hair than a few Negroids, but no Caucasoid has thin curly hair, dark skin, everted lips, and a broad, flat nose. The passers-by classified as black, white, and Asian in our thought experiment would almost certainly turn out to be of predominantly African, European, and Asian ancestry, respectively.
It is sometimes objected that the ordinary indicia of race do not “relate inherently to behavior and potentials” (Yee 1992: 110), but they do not have to. They are observable correlates of geographical origin, used to identify that less observable trait. Having certain facial features, say, picks out individuals of Asian ancestry, just as being the first heavenly body visible at dusk picks out the planet Venus. The look of members of a given race bears the same relation to the race’s inherent properties that prominence in the evening sky bears to such inherent properties of Venus as its mass. Racial appearance associates with further genetic differences, if such associations exist, because the environments that differentiated appearance also differentiated gene pools. A characteristic appearance and (let us assume) level of genotypic intelligence would then be co-effects of a common cause, not causes one of the other—just as the evening star does not have the mass it does because visibility at dusk causes it to, but because visibility at dusk and that particular mass are co-occurring attributes of the single entity Venus.2
The geographical definition of race is operational; there is a routine procedure for applying it not subject to dispute by competent speakers of English. Everyone understands “ancestor” and “Europe,” so everyone understands “having European ancestors.” It does not matter that the ancestries of some individuals are unknown, and unguessable from the usual indicators. “Molybdenum is harder than chalk” is fully operationalized as “a sample of molybdenum will scratch a sample of chalk,” even though few people can recognize samples of molybdenum.
When “race” is operationalized geographically, generalizations about races acquire clear empirical meaning.
Ascribing a trait to the members of a racial group, whether to all or merely a disproportionate number, and whether the trait is physical or mental, overt or hidden, behavioral or genetic, amounts to ascribing that trait to all or adisproportionate number of people whose ancestors were born in a certain part of the world. To say the mean intelligence of whites exceeds that of blacks is to say that the mean intelligence of people of European descent exceeds that of people of African descent. Every such generalization may be false, but they are uniformly meaningful.
One might object (as does Diamond [1994]) that the race concept is nonetheless arbitrary, it being possible to group people in many ways other than ancestry—by the presence of a designated gene, say, or the ability to digest milk, or fingerprint whorls. Still, given a classificatory criterion, it becomes a matter of empirical fact, not human choice, whether that criterion correlates with further, independently specified traits. There is no objectively “right” way to classify land areas, which may be grouped by latitude, rainfall, height above sea level, or fauna, but once a principle of grouping is adopted—rainfall, say—the correlation of this variable with others, such as crop yield, does become a completely objective question. Nor does the greater genetic diversity of Negroids (defined geographically) compared to all other populations combined make talk of Caucasoid/Negroid differences “senseless” (Gould 1995). Once again, there is more genetic diversity among dogs than giraffes, yet it makes perfect sense to say that giraffes are taller than dogs. It remains possible that certain patterns hold across all populations of African ancestry.
In rather the reverse direction, it has been argued (by, e.g., Hoffman 1994) that, since the races as defined by ancestry differ in genetic material by only .0012%, their differences must be insignificant. This figure is misleading, to begin with, for, after all, humans and chimpanzees share 98.5% of their genes (Caccone and Powell 1989; Gibbons 1990)—because humans and chimps agree in having arms, legs, lungs, and other large gene-built structures. More important, subtle genetic differences can have large “non-linear” effects. The nervous system of a virtuoso pianist differs very little in number of shared genes from that of the average person. The consequences of an .0012% difference in genetic material between ancestral lines is an empirical question that cannot be answered by a priori numerical considerations.
To anyone bent on denying come what may that race is a useful concept, I surrender the word “race.” Such an individual may read what follows not as a discussion of race differences at all, but of differences between descendants of Africans and Eurasians. Nothing is lost but a word.

Why Race matters - Race Differences and what they Mean


Levin, Michael wrote:
Despite the interaction of genes and environment, it is an error to infer that environmental manipulation can make any genotype express itself in any way and therefore that genes really don’t matter. This non sequitur is particularly common in connection with race differences, and is discussed in chapters 4 and 8. True, no gene expresses itself without an environment, but a given gene’s range of expression may be quite limited, and exclude some phenotypes altogether.
Good nutrition aids growth, but no diet can make a man 10 feet tall, and there may be genes from which no diet can coax heights greater than 6 feet. Moreover, while the phenotypic expressions of each of a pair of genes may be plastic, the difference between their expressions need not be. One diet may elicit a height of 5’ 10” from Mr. A’s genes and another diet a height of 6’ 2”; the same pair of diets may elicit heights of 5’ 4” and 5’ 8” from Mr. B’s genes. The heights of both men vary, but in any one environment their height difference is a constant 6”. Even restricting the favorable diet to B and imposing the unfavorable one on A will leave B 2” shorter. A related error is that of regarding a phenotypic difference as somehow unreal if it expresses the same gene in different environments. Should A be genetically identical
to B but 2 inches taller because of better nutrition during childhood, A really is 2 inches taller than B. All that follows from A and B having the same gene for tallness is that they would have been the same height had they been raised alike, not that they (“really”) are. Similarly, if A has an IQ of 120 and B an IQ of 100 for purely environmental reasons, A really does have more of whatever IQ measures.

Why Race matters - Race Differences and what they Mean

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri May 01, 2020 6:36 pm

Levin, Michael wrote:
5.1. “BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM”
Determinism is the thesis that everything has a cause, or equivalently, that everything can be explained, or again, that every event falls under some natural law. Were God to return the universe to precisely the state it occupied at the Big Bang, determinists hold, all would unfold just as before. Put literally, determinism maintains that, for every variable x, there are variables x1, …, xn such that the value of x at time t is a function of the values at some earlier time t’ of x1, …,xn.1
Determinism is less restrictive than it might at first appear. For one thing, it in no way restricts the variables x1, …, xn on which a given variable x may depend. A determinist may regard social effects, in particular, as determined by any combination of factors whatever—biological, environmental, familial—as long as there are some factors which determine these effects. Determinism is not inherently “biological.” For another, calling x a function of x1, …, xn does not deny that other factors are at work in the world. What determinism says is that, once values for suitable xi are fixed, only one value for x is possible regardless of the values of any other variable. Thus, the claim that genes and physical environment determine phenotypic intelligence no more repudiates the social environment than it repudiates quasars.
Most scientists outside the field of quantum mechanics, and reflective nonscientists, are determinists. We all presume there are reasons for everything, including human behavior. Environmentalist accounts of behavior are as deterministic as hereditarian, for they assume, as do hereditarian accounts, that identical initial conditions yield identical results. The difference between environmentalists, social environmentalists and hereditarians is that environmentalists take the conditions relevant to behavior to be exclusively environmental, social environmentalists take only social factors to be relevant, while hereditarians include biological factors as well. If being deterministic is a flaw, it mars all accounts of social phenomena.
An easier target is “biological” determinism, the thesis that social phenomena are functions of biological variables
only, so that, in particular, race differences depend on biology alone, to the exclusion of environment. The boldest form of biological determinism, namely “genetic” determinism, holds that, given an ensemble of genotypes, only one society can emerge from them whatever the environment.
Biological and genetic determinism are indeed implausible, but they are not implied by the view that genes contribute significantly to race differences. They are not even implied by setting h2 = 1 or H2 = 1. So long as genes interact with environment, social phenomena, including those involving race, depend on both genotypic and environmental variables.
No sensible position—including the one adumbrated in chapter 4 that the character of a society is determined by the expressions of the genotypes of its members in a given physical environment—holds that outcomes flow from genotypes alone; to explain a society, the (physical) environment in which the genes of its members develop must also be specified, a tenet that might be called “bio-environmental determinism.” By way of comparison, the principle that gravity controls all motion near the Earth does not mean the final velocity of a falling rock follows from the law of gravity alone. The rock’s final velocity also depends on the height from which it was released, a factor independent of gravity itself. A physical determinist need not be a “gravitational” determinist.
“Genetic” and “biological” determinism are thus straw men. The traits of a society are “genetically determined” only when they are functions of genotypes with flat reaction ranges expressed as phenotypes whose heritabilities are 1. If everyone in group G1 in Figure 5.1 has the same genotype for intelligence, and this genotype expresses itself as IQ 80 in all environments, genes alone dictate a mean group IQ of 80. Contrast G1 with genetically uniform group G2, in which the heritability of intelligence is also 1, but whose reaction range stretches from 90 to 100. Although h2 is also 1 for G2, its mean phenotypic IQ depends on its mean environment. Likewise, genetic determinism can be false even when genetic variation explains all group differences in a phenotype. Suppose Hfor groups G2 and G3 is 1 but the reaction range of the genotype of G3 is 110–140. In both environments E and E’ the mean G2 – G3 difference is due wholly to genes, but the size of the difference varies with environment; G3(E) – G2(E) ≠ G3(E’) – G2(E’). For a group difference to be “genetically determined,” h and H must both be unity and the reaction ranges of the genotypes of both groups
must be congruent, as are those of G3 and G4; here G3(E) – G4(E) = G3(E’) – G4(E’) (again see Figure 5.1).
Although broader than biodeterminism, bio-environmental determinism is narrower than determinism per se. Holding the characteristics of a society to depend on the genotypes of its members and the physical environment excludes culture itself as an explanatory variable, a ban prompted by the patent circularity of using cultural variation to explain variation in cultures. Baker illustrates this circle in connection with numeracy. The Arunta Australids, according to an anthropologist he cites, did not develop counting because “The Arunta … has no need of a system of numbers comparable to ours. He possesses nothing that he must necessarily count, no domestic animals, no merchandise, no money.” “But why,” asks Baker, “had they nothing to count? Why were they content with this situation?” (1974: 527).
When in the same vein it is asked why the Greeks invented science and philosophy, bio-environmental determinism rejects “Their culture encouraged speculation” as a non-answer. Viewing culture as a phenotype concedes the impact of abiological contingencies like disease and encounters with other groups, taken as features of the environment in which a population develops. But bio-environmental determinism denies that culture itself is an abiological contingency, and
holds open the likelihood that group responses to historical accidents—for instance, which of two warring groups will dominate the other—reflect evolved presocial dispositions.

Gene/environment accounts of culture are noncircular because physical environment—climate and natural resources—are independently explainable, by geophysics and evolution respectively. These factors may be used to explain culture because they are known to exist and have causes other than culture, just as the egg may be said to precede the chicken when there is an account of eggs independent of chickens—for instance that the first chicken egg came from a protochicken. Had science been bestowed on mankind by extraterrestrials á la 2001—a seemingly nonbiological source—we would still want to know why the extraterrestrials but not humans were able to develop science on their own. The answer would likely be an endogenous difference between us and them.
One weak form of purely biological determinism may be tenable, however. Look again at Figure 5.1. While the
phenotypic values of G2 and G3 and the value of G2 – G3 both depend on the environment, G3 > G2 throughout the indicated range. In such a case the environmental variable does cancel out, and we can say that G3 > G2 is determined by genes alone.2

5.2. WHY GENETIC EXPLANATIONS ARE DISTURBING
A puzzling aspect of the race issue is the depth of feeling provoked by genetic explanations. People “obsess about nature versus nurture,” chide Herrnstein and Murray (1994: 131), a compulsion they trace to the erroneous equation of “genetic” with “unalterable.” This diagnosis is surely superficial; practical worries about the difficulty of raising black intelligence cannot explain the rage and disdain mere mention of genes can provoke. The diagnosis that talk of genes evokes Hitler does more justice to the emotional tone of the debate, but it does not explain why ordinarily acute individuals—capable, one would think, of seeing that hereditarianism is one thing, the Third Reich another—lose all perspective when genes are mentioned.
The true cause, I suggest, is a felt connection between genes and personal identity. Most informed persons in the late twentieth century conceive genes as part of a person’s essence, what makes him what he is. Flaws due to genes are consequently considered constitutional in a way that phenotypically indistinguishable flaws due to environment are not.
Some such thought must be imputed to anyone who calls talk of genetically lower intelligence an insult to blacks yet insists that blacks do poorly in school because deprivation stunts their mental growth, since the second hypothesis as much as the first implies that blacks are less intelligent than whites and is therefore no less negative. It is not simply a case of people ignoring unwelcome implications of their own words; in denouncing genetic explanations while embracing environmental ones, people are responding to a difference between them. The difference is this: if a child, neonate, or fetus suffers brain damage from an environmental cause like malnutrition or trauma, it makes sense to say that he might have been more intelligent, and that he would have been more intelligent under other circumstances. But if his neurological condition was in his genes, he could not have been more intelligent, even with different genes, since different genes would not have produced him. Genes are of the essence of personal identity, so talk of a genetic black intelligence deficit seems to ascribe a defect to the black essence. Most people are reluctant to draw so harsh-sounding a conclusion.
This fear could be allayed by decoupling genes from identity, but the connection is tenacious.3 The average person would almost certainly agree that he could have been born with different arms or legs. He would probably agree that, if the very sperm and egg that produced him had met in a different place and time, and the person they produced went on to lead a life wholly unlike the life he has actually led, this person would still have been him. Finally, the average person would probably agree that, had the sperm and egg that actually produced him never fused, but another zygote in his mother’s womb had grown into an adult with his appearance and personality, that person would not have been him.
Judgments of identity track genotypes.
Kripke (1973) compares the relation of a person to his genes to that between a physical object and its constituent atoms. Once your kitchen table has been destroyed, a table made of different atoms, no matter how similar, cannot be that very table redivivus. Judgments of physical identity track atomic constituents. As to why identity works this way, Kripke (1973) considers these relations “metaphysically necessary,” while empiricists suspect they are byproducts of linguistic convention (Ayer 1982, Levin 1987a). A conventionalist analysis of identity intuitions might draw some of the sting from genetic differences in highly valued traits, but as things stand the widespread albeit inarticulate belief that genetic traits (hence genetic flaws) are essential is one more disturbing aspect of race.

5.3. REDUCTIONISM I
The question now shifts from the existence of laws connecting (individual) genotypes to phenotypes, to the possibility of explaining social phenomena via the genetically determined phenotypes of individuals. The case against this “reductionist” goal rests on the idea that social phenomena are autonomous, explanatorily and ontologically. Thus Natalie Bluestone:

All biological explanations of culture suffer from the impossibility of reducing an independently valid domain with valid explanatory principles of its own to what are considered more basic principles. But just as it does not make much sense to “explain” that the table represented in Cezanne’s painting “The Card Players” is “really” only a system of electrically charged particles, it does not make sense to assert that women do not paint great pictures for biological reasons. (1987: 189)

This claim is immediately suspect, since it seems perfectly sensible to say that, for biological reasons, no fat man has ever won a marathon—an event in the “domain” of culture—or that, for biological reasons, chickens do not paint great pictures.4 So far as I am aware, though, the anti-reductionist literature does not respond directly to concrete examples of successful reduction. Rather, it presses two abstract arguments.
The first (Winch 1958) points out, correctly, that social phenomena are specified by rules and norms. What counts as a crime, for instance, is defined by legislative decision; there is no physical characteristic common to all crimes. A hand movement may constitute forgery in one social context, yet a physically similar movement in another context—as that of an actor in a historical drama writing “John Hancock”—may be licit. Conversely, any hand movement whatever could be wrongful in some context or other (see Fodor 1974). But only physical traits can be programmed genetically, the argument continues, so “gene-based” and “social” categorize behavior in disparate ways. This mismatch between social and biological categories prevents biology from explaining social behavior like crime. There can’t be a gene for criminal hand movements because genes cannot determine or anticipate external norms.
An analogy may clarify this argument. Multiplying is an abstract mathematical operation defined by the rules of
arithmetic, not a physical process. You can’t learn it by watching what happens inside a computer. Trying to understand society by studying genes, say anti-reductionists, is like trying to learn to multiply by looking inside a computer.
As might be expected, this first argument is too good to be true. In the first place, while in principle “crime” does not coincide with any one type of bodily movement, in practice certain movements are almost always criminalized, and many criminal acts consist of specific movements. The physical act of striking another human being with one’s fist is criminalized in every society with a formal legal code, and informally sanctioned in all others. Readiness to punish such behavior is apparently found even among nonhuman primates (Ellis 1987a). Striking another human being is acceptable on occasion, as a boxing match, but a disposition to throw punches eventually violates the norms of any group. And, since genes can program behaviors like punching, there can be genetic explanations of crime consisting of such behavior. Thus, while it may make no sense to speak of a “crime gene” or to call blacks genetically more crime-prone than whites, it does make sense to say that blacks are genetically more prone to behavior that is in fact criminalized in virtually all societies.
In terms of our analogy: while “multiplying” cannot be defined in terms of computer hardware events, certain
hardware events characteristically amount to multiplying. Once you understand what is going on inside a computer, you can see how it embodies multiplication (how, in particular, some series of events in the computer parallels the steps in the abstract multiplication program). In this way, a seemingly mathematical phenomenon, computer multiplication, can be “reduced” to physics.5
In the second place, the genes of more developed organisms program learning as well as specific behavior. A pitcher plant’s genes simply tell it to secrete digestive fluids when its cilia are touched, but a squirrel is told to return to where it has previously found acorns. Human genes set even more sophisticated learning tasks, such as determining what skills impress local females. Since human genes can program learning, there is nothing to keep them from programming an impulse to identify, and refrain from, locally proscribed behaviors.6 And if there can be innate impulses to identify and follow rules, there can be biological explanations of individual and group differences in the strength of those impulses.
It therefore becomes meaningful to conjecture that an innate tendency to follow certain rules, or rules in general, is stronger in one group than another. This offers a precedent for reducing race differences in social behavior to genetic differences.

5.4. REDUCTIONISM II
The second major anti-reductionist argument runs that social facts concern relations between individuals that
transcend their individual traits, and since genes program only individual traits, they cannot explain social facts. A standard example: the behavior of a mob emerges from the interaction of its members and cannot be predicted from the traits of those individuals alone. Indeed (the argument goes) social roles shape their occupants: people are the way they are because of their places in society, not vice versa, leaving the heritability of phenotypes doubly irrelevant to social behavior.
Although this argument does not appear especially relevant to race, its application turns out to be quite far-reaching.
Once again, the factual basis of the argument is incontestable. Collective behavior does transcend and constrain individuals; an isolated Robinson Crusoe cannot vote or be rude, and a normally well-behaved man caught up in a riot may smash a window because of his proximity to other rioters. Moreover, social groups like mobs have lives of their own, persisting despite the loss of individual members. Yet, while a mob’s existence is independent of any one of its members, it is not independent of all of them. Once all the rioters disperse the mob perishes. In contrast, the existence of an individual does not depend on any of the groups he belongs to, or all of them together; a mob’s erstwhile members survive its dissolution, and all men could live, albeit unhappily, as isolated Robinson Crusoes. So social phenomena depend ontologically on individuals in a way that individuals do not depend on social phenomena. And social phenomena depend on their individual constituents in a further sense: if all the individuals in one society behave exactly like their counterparts in another, the two societies being isomorphs, the same social facts will be true in both.7 Group properties are thus “reducible” to the properties of individuals in the strong sense that the traits of a group are functions of the traits of its members.
Furthermore, because the traits of a group depend on the character of the individuals composing it, not just any
individuals can generate just any social fact. No matter how many penguins congregate on an ice floe, or for how long, they will never form a constitutional monarchy. It therefore makes perfect sense to seek to explain a group phenomenon via the characteristics of the group’s constituent individuals, and equally good sense to suppose that some of those characteristics are genetically influenced. There can therefore be two-step genetic explanations of group phenomena:
from genes to individual traits, and then from individual traits to group traits. This is the structure of genetic
explanations of cultures, and cross-cultural differences—in particular, differences between cultures composed of
different races.
The belief that society is “emergent” confuses two kinds of trait an individual may possess: what he is like when he is alone, and how he relates to others.8 This confusion plays itself out in the following way. Emergentists and reductionists agree that society consists of people standing in social relations (see May 1987); their disagreement, or apparent disagreement, concerns the basis of these relations, why they hold. Were reductionism the claim that social facts follow from individual traits of the first sort—that the nature of society is predictable from the properties people exhibit when alone—it would obviously be false.9 How someone reacts to others cannot be inferred from how he acts in isolation. But social facts may still follow from an inventory of individual traits that includes relational ones. An individual’s behavior in a mob can be inferred from his individual properties, when those properties include his tendencies to react to others.
If one of Smith’s relational traits is that he starts throwing things when others around him do, his throwing rocks during a riot is a consequence of (one of) his individual traits. It is this sort of reduction of social to individual behavior that sophisticated reductionists aspire to.
Sophisticated reductionism recognizes “intrinsically social” phenomena. It can accept Greenwood’s suggestion that these are phenomena “constituted by or constructed out of—and maintained and sustained by renewed and fresh commitments to—arrangements, conventions and agreements” (1994: 95), and that “intrinsically social” psychological explanations are those that refer to the “recognition and acceptance” of such conventions. Reductionists insist, only, that recognition of a convention or an agreement is an individual (relational) psychological state, and that such states explain the tenure of conventions and agreements.10
It would be cheating to classify reactive tendencies as traits of individuals rather than as traits which “emerge,” were that distinction well drawn. But it isn’t (see Hempel 1965a, Levin 1989c). Just as a sugar cube in splendid isolation on the Sahara is disposed to dissolve in water, a mute castaway on a desert island may be disposed to chat in company. That disposition is as intrinsic to him as his height, needing others to trigger it but not to exist. Whether social behavior “manifests latent individual traits” or “emerges in relations” collapses into a verbal issue.
The arbitrariness of the property/relation line goes to the heart of biosocial explanation. No one doubts that genes influence the traits of individuals, so once it is understood that these traits include tendencies to form social relations, it becomes clear that social relations too can be influenced by genes. The point, although perhaps not this terminology, is doubtless already familiar to the reader. He has probably heard of Konrad Lorenz’s week-old ducklings programmed to “imprint” on the most salient figure in their environment (in the wild usually their mothers), forming thereby a life-long attachment. In other words, ducklings are genetically disposed to form a rudimentary social relation. Genetically programmed dispositions to form human social relations become an obvious possibility that cannot be ruled out by a priori arguments.

5.5. REIFICATION
Since biological reductionism accommodates social relations, it denies nothing that plainly exists. But antireductionism, which treats society as autonomous, often affirms what plainly does not. “Society” is a collective name for interacting individuals and the upshot of their actions, perfectly harmless so long as it is not taken to explain those actions. But taking “society” to name a thing in its own right yields pseudo-explanations of a sort that seems particularly common when the topic is race.
Take this sentence: “The country has watched passively for more than a generation as its urban cores have devoured the people who live there” (Deparle 1992). Its author is treating the place where blacks reside as an entity with causal powers (which, it is implied, whites have negligently failed to restrain). Yet, speaking literally, urban cores devour noone.
When different people lived in those places, there was no “devouring”; blacks there now are being victimized by
other predatory blacks. Or consider the oft–heard remark that black children misbehave in school because they “bring the streets with them.” Black children don’t literally bring pavement into the schoolroom, nor the values taught by pavement. They bring the values of the children who live on those streets; which is to say, their own. The equally familiar diagnosis of black teenage crime and destructiveness as a product of “peer pressure” is also reification, disguising the very phenomenon that needs to be explained—the source of the malign “peers,” who are, after all, merely other black youths. Peer groups are not things in their own right. Accounts attributing the disadvantages of blacks to life amidst “crime,” “poverty” or “drugs” are equally obscurantist. “The Carter family is being stalked here by what the clan’s 54-year-old matriarch, Regina, calls a monster—crack cocaine. She has watched it swallow her daughter, and now she is fighting it for her grandson’s soul” (Terry 1995: A12) is so luridly dishonest as to need no further comment.
The essential emptiness of these reifying explanations is distilled in the following brief description of Chicago’s
Robert Taylor Homes, a virtually all black public project of 60,000:
Garbage, human waste and graffiti have reduced the project to a high-rise hovel. For the Taylor residents who are trying to provide proper homes for their children, the deterioration of the buildings is both maddening and frustrating. “We complain,” one mother notes. “Complain to whom?” (Ruth, 1989)

Use of the active voice, abetted by focus on nondestructive residents, represents filth as a natural force. This force wreaks havoc, such wording suggests, because the Chicago Housing Authority is not stopping it.11 In reality, of course, the filth is produced by Taylor residents who urinate and defecate in its hallways—not all the residents, to be sure, but sufficiently many to create the conditions described. No doubt these conditions disinhibit further destructive impulses, establishing the feedback loop characteristic of genotype/environment correlation.12 Still, the ambience of public housing cannot explain the behavior of Taylor residents, since the behavior explains the ambience.
Scholars as well as journalists make similar mistakes. Fischer et al. (1996) propose the vacuous “community
conditions” (18) as a way to explain poor black outcomes. Like a great many other writers, they assert that segregation “reduced living standards and housing quality” (180), without explaining how the sheer proportion of black people in a region can effect housing quality unless black people either individually or collectively tend to squalor. Most absurdly, they explain the educational difficulties experienced by blacks in allblack neighborhoods in terms of greater exposure to crime and lower levels of safety (see 196), as if crime were a force independent of blacks themselves.
Reification also obscures the causes of impoverishment in areas left by whites, with concomitant job growth in white suburbs, often ascribed to whites “taking jobs with them.” One writer describes the feelings of “the minority community” in Connecticut this way:
Some complain that they were bypassed by the wealth that surged through Fairfield County in the 1980’s, giving rise to sprawling office parks and roadways crowded with luxury cars.… For tenants of Carlton Court, a privately owned project that is almost entirely black and Hispanic, a telling sign of that disparity is the waterfront district.… “When you live in a place like Carlton Court, there is a lot of wealth and opportunity around you, but you can’t partake of it,” said Robert Burgess, executive director of Norwalk Economic Opportunity Now. (Levy 1993)
“Jobs,” “wealth,” and “opportunities” are here treated as things that surge through neighborhoods, build roads, and magically produce luxury cars, and that unnamed (but easily identified) forces prevent blacks from “partaking of.”
This is a muddle. The occupational tasks characteristic of a group are determined by its members’ abilities and
preferences, and can no more exist apart from it, or be “left behind” when the group leaves, than can the social structure of a wolf pack stay in place when the wolves migrate. Certain abilities allow performance of certain highly valued tasks.
When an ability is so widespread that a group comes to rely on its being exercised, and those with the ability come to rely on its exercise being rewarded, the resultant feedback creates an occupational role. The “job” of whittling darts presumably took hold among the Yekuana of South America because enough Yekuana could whittle darts for other Yekuana to hunt monkeys with blowguns, and for each generation of craftsmen to train the next. The Yekuana could “leave” this skill by teaching it to any group that replaces them, should their replacements have sufficiently many craftsmen and a taste for monkey meat. But dart-making does not exist in the jungle apart from the Yekuana, and is not, like a bar of gold, physically transferable. If the Yekuana are replaced by fishermen, they will not have “taken” anything they could have left. It would be absurd for a community of fishermen near the Yekuana to complain that hunting was “surging” through the Amazon Basin but bypassing them.
White flight “takes” jobs in the sense that tasks characteristic of whites cease being performed in the absence of whites. There is no reason to expect these tasks to be performed, in light of the differences between black abilities, preferences, and levels of persistence and those of the group that created them. When colonial whites left Africa, the roads they built began to disintegrate in the absence of engineers to maintain them. Detroit fell into similar disrepair when whites left (see Chafetz 1990). The reified entity “Detroit” ceased manufacturing automobiles because too few of the blacks who remained were able or inclined to manufacture cars on their own.

5.6. “RACISM”
“Racism” is a Janus word (see section 3.Cool whose evaluative face predominates; calling someone or something
“racist” automatically condemns him or it. In fact, the fierce emotions accompanying “racism” suggest that its core meaning is “grossly improper race consciousness.” Yet at the same time “racism” is freely used of an enormous range of beliefs, attitudes and practices, many of which seem in no way grossly improper, or improper at all. That is why the word serves only to obscure.
The chief problem the word creates is that of begged questions. Precisely because things racist are bad by definition, it is tempting to try to force condemnation of an attitude or practice by labeling it “racist,” when in point of logic the attitude or practice in question must first be shown to be bad by some independent standard before it can be so labeled.
In legal language, “racism” is conclusory, and cannot be used as a premise. Yet, because incessant denunciations of “racism” has made the epithet unchallengeable, that is often just how it is used.
Natural Janus-words, which inherit their evaluative force from a social consensus about the value of their referents, do not lend themselves to this kind of abuse. Since everyone agrees and is known to agree about what sort of butter is fit to eat, no one would try to condemn perfectly fresh butter by calling it “rancid.” But “racism” as currently used did not inherit its negative force from a universal dislike of its referent. It might once have denoted Hitlerian racial beliefs while also encoding rejection of those beliefs—and when it did, less egregious racial offenses were called “bigotry” or “prejudice.” In that usage, racism was a systematic theory; this theory entailed certain attitudes and modes of behavior, but those attitudes and behaviors did not by themselves constitute racism. By contrast, today’s “racism” was coined for the purpose of condemnation (in part by summoning up emotions evoked by the old word), and for the condemnation of anything belonging to almost any category. I trust the reader will agree that all he can conclude when he hears “racist”
employed today is that its referent is something to do with race that the speaker dislikes. “Racism” is not so much uttered as shouted; its conversational function is to shut conversation down. This torrent of unpleasantness saturates whatever the word is attached to, however arbitrary the attachment. What has created an aversion to “racism” is less disapproval of what the word denotes than a wish to avoid anti-racist wrath.
Calling claims of genetic race differences “racist,” in particular, begs not one but four questions: (1) Are race
differences in themselves bad? (2) Is believing in race differences bad? (3) Is saying there are race differences bad? (4)
Is studying race differences bad? Once it is realized that an affirmative answer to each of these questions must be established before the charge of racism can be made to stick, the charge itself collapses.
Consider question (1) first. Race differences, as facts of nature, have no moral dimension. They either exist or do not exist. Reality may frustrate our wishes, but it is not in itself bad or good. Since a thing must be bad to be racist, race differences, if they exist, are not racist.
The only challenge I can think of to this seeming truism is the contention that facts—about race, or society, or the world in general—do not exist apart from belief in them, but rather are “socially constructed,” that is, exist only insofar as we believe in and value them. (Devotees of this view have lately insisted that the medium of construction is discourse.) The quickest way with such Berkeleyan idealism is to observe that if all facts about race are constructed, so must be the fact that anyone believes in race differences.13 On the constructionist theory, there are hereditarians only because there are people who believe in and talk as if there were hereditarians. Were this so, constructionists could end belief in race differences merely by ceasing to believe, and convincing others to cease believing, that anyone believes in race differences. Their constant inveighing against “racism” shows that not even constructionists themselves take their theory seriously.
Turning to (2), factual beliefs in themselves are merely true or false, not good or evil. Therefore, belief in race
differences cannot, in itself, be racist. The motives for holding such beliefs may be bad—some people may believe whites more intelligent than blacks from a desire to find blacks inferior—but there is nothing wrong with believing in race differences from estimable motives, such as intellectual persuasion. Precisely the same assessment applies to assertions, which, like beliefs, are merely true or false, not good or bad. A maliciously motivated act of asserting that blacks are less intelligent than whites may be bad, and possibly racist, but I have repeatedly pointed out good reasons for
making this assertion, such as a desire for justice. Calling attention to race differences, considered apart from the motives for doing so, is not inherently racist.
Finally, research into race differences is bad, and potentially racist, only if driven by bad motives, such as active
enjoyment of humiliating blacks. But, once again, such research can just as easily be driven by good motives, such as curiosity or a desire for justice. So research into race differences is not in itself racist.
Many people grudgingly admit that discussing race differences may not be inherently bad, but warn that it risks bad consequences, including distress to blacks and encouragement of hate. The question is then whether blindness to these possibilities is so negligent and “insensitive” as to be “racist.” This is a matter of judgment, of course, but a strong case can be made against the “racism” verdict. After all, frank discussion of almost any important issue is bound to offend somebody. Talking about evolution bothers religious fundamentalists, yet is morally permitted. And how sensitive must one be to avoid being a “racist”? To judge from their blanket condemnation of all talk of race differences, many people accept only silence as adequate, turning “sensitivity” into a demand for self-censorship. All told, “racism” is so strong a word that only active malevolence can merit it, not unintentional disregard of black feelings.
That empirical beliefs cannot be criticized on moral grounds may have eluded Jaynes and Williams (1989):

For some people, racism means any form of race recognition, especially instances in which members of privileged groups act in a manner injurious to a disadvantaged group. Others, however, reserve the term for patterns of belief and related actions that overtly embrace the notion of genetic or biological differences between groups. Still others use the term to designate feelings of cultural superiority.… We use the term racism to denote biological racism, as in the second interpretation above. Societal racism, borrowing from Frederickson (1971), is used to denote negative racial attitudes or outcomes that lack a clear basis in a belief in inherent racial inferiority [sic]. Mere recognition of social groups based on “racial” characteristics is not treated here as a form of racism, but as being “race conscious.” Cultural preferences that do not include systematic ranking of social groups and clear hostility toward out-groups is termed ethnocentrism. The concept of racism, however qualified and defined, involves a value judgment. Racism of whatever variety is undesirable; racist outcomes are wrong; and people who advocate racist ideas are typically viewed as being morally deficient, if not dangerous. (556; there is no further analysis of “racism,” or index entry for “racism”)
Since they identify “racism” with “the notion of genetic or biological differences between groups,” an ostensibly
factual belief, Jaynes and Williams have at first glance so defined it as to avoid a “value judgment.” But they
immediately add that racism does involve a value judgment, and is, moreover, undesirable. They do not, it is true, infer the biological identity of all groups from the undesirable racist character of believing otherwise; rather, they bury the factual issue beneath an avalanche of pejoratives—”wrong,” “morally deficient,” “dangerous.”
Jaynes and Williams’ foray into semantics illustrates the conflict between the negative connotation of “racism” and its chosen referent. The repeated occurrence of this clash within commonly offered definitions suggests that no coherent
definition of “racism” is possible and the word consequently unusable.
Many people would adopt the third definition mentioned in the citation from Jaynes and Williams, namely that
“racism” is belief in racial superiority. The first point to make about this proposal is that it spares the belief that whites are more intelligent and self-restrained than blacks, for intelligence and time preference are empirically defined traits whose ascription implies no value judgment (again see section 3.Cool. One may well value intelligence and self-restraint, and anyone who does so, while also believing that whites typically possess these traits to a greater degree than blacks, is committed to believing that whites typically possess more of something valuable. But the belief that whites are more intelligent than blacks does not by itself imply this, so is not “racist” in the sense now under consideration.
In any event the definition is unsatisfactory. It takes belief in the superiority of one race to another to be inherently bad, whereas, or so I argue in chapter 7, such beliefs are typically “operationalized” as factual beliefs. As factual beliefs are not good or bad per se, “operationalized” judgments of racial superiority are not good or bad either. Moreover, as we will also see, these beliefs are supported by the evidence (and probably accepted by the reader), so since there is nothing wrong with accepting reasonable beliefs, do not deserve to be stigmatized. Indeed, there seems nothing inherently wrong with thinking one’s own group better in a frankly cheer-leading sense. Most individuals experience this impulse, and, when black-white comparisons are not at issue, it is considered healthy. I am not talking of venomous emotions like hatred, but the feeling that “British is best,” the vicarious satisfaction many Jews take in the number of Jewish Nobel laureates, and other forms of ethnic pride. Racists “are typically viewed as being morally deficient, if not dangerous,” say Jaynes and Williams, yet an American who thinks the Japanese are crazy to risk their lives eating fugu is not dangerous, nor is a German calmly citing Beethoven to prove the superiority of German culture morally deficient. It is hard to see why these attitudes are bad enough to be “racist.”
Now the fact is that, whether they should or not, most people do value intelligence, so the statement that blacks are typically less intelligent than whites, no matter how intended, is usually perceived as derogatory. (“Intelligence is valuable, and blacks are inferior to whites in respect of this valuable trait” is an “operationalized” value judgment.) And, while unflattering beliefs about groups held on good grounds are acceptable, what of “stereotypers” who hold such beliefs because they want to, and use evidence selectively to confirm what they want to believe?14 Defining “racism” as the desire that blacks lack highly-valued traits15 captures how such people think, and, as this desire is unattractive, it appears consistent with the negative force of “racism.”
Yet this definition, too, is unsatisfactory. For one thing, while racism is commonly said to pervade American society, there is relatively little racism in this sense. Once bad motives are required, negative beliefs stemming from observation rather than animus are excluded. “Unconscious” and “institutional” racism become contradictions in terms. Finally, and less apt to be noticed, there are many noninvidious—hence non-“racist”—reasons for wanting blacks to have disvalued traits. Whites may hope for a genetic black IQ deficit to absolve them of guilt for black failure, just as any defendant in a liability suit hopes the plaintiff’s case will unravel. Or else, whites may be indulging the understandable impulse to resist those who willfully personalize every disagreement. It is human nature to oppose whatever the office blowhard is for, and whites, weary of blame for every black failure, naturally want the blame-mongers shown up by the existence of innate black shortcomings. These impulse are not bad, let alone “racist.”
Similar problems face the broader definition of “racism” as hatred of racial groups other than one’s own. Without
denying the existence or corrosiveness of race hatred, this attitude must be distinguished from numerous milder ones.
Hatred implies a desire to destroy, yet, just as it is possible to sneer at pro wrestling fans or readers of supermarket tabloids without hating them, it is possible to dislike black music without wanting it banned, or dislike the black
personal style and wish to avoid blacks altogether without wanting to see blacks suffer. One may avoid black
neighborhoods for fear of crime while sympathizing with black victims of black criminals. None of these feelings are
“racist” if racism implies hatred—yet anyone who confesses distaste for black music or admits wishing to minimize contact with blacks will surely be branded “racist.” Those who bandy “racism” in this way use it too broadly to mean “race hatred.”

“Racism” is stretched to its snapping point when defined, as it often is, as “treatment of individuals on the basis of their race.” More so than any other, this definition is too sweeping to support the negative overtones of “racism,” and condemns legitimate practices virtually by word magic. There is nothing obviously wrong with sending Asian policemen to infiltrate Asian gangs, or casting a white woman as Desdemona, or preferring to marry someone of one’s own race, all counted as “racist” by this definition
A few writers have tried to salvage the word by neutralizing it, defining it as race-consciousness of any sort while dropping the axiom that all forms of racism are bad. D’Sousza’s (1995) term “rational racism” is a stab at neutrality.
Such attempts are unlikely to succeed, in my view, for the pejorative connotations of “racism” have become too deeply entrenched. In fact, contemporary discourse combines the worst of both worlds, using the neutral and the pejorative senses of “racism,” often in the same breath. The unfortunate result is guilt by equivocation. Something is labeled “racist” in the neutral sense; there is a switch to the pejorative sense; and what is innocent stands condemned. One victim of this gambit was Dale Lick, a candidate for the presidency of Michigan State University. Years prior to his candidacy he had said, a propos the recruitment of basketball players, “A black athlete can actually outjump a white athlete, so they’re better at the game. All you need to do is turn to the N.C.A.A. playoffs in basketball to see that the bulk of the players on those outstanding teams are black.” Once made public, this remark and Lick himself were instantly called “racist” and Lick was denied the job (New York Times 1993b, 1993c). His statement had indeed been “racist” in the neutral sense—it was a generalization about race—but not “racist” in the bad sense, since there seems nothing wrong with citing well-known facts, about basketball or anything else, in aid of a conclusion they support. Yet Lick’s statement was treated as “racist” in the bad sense. Jaynes and Williams write: “Many people question any scholarly use of this concept because it is so manifestly value laden” (1989: 556), a question very much in order. The elasticity of “racism” permits denunciation of virtually anything, including whites doing on Tuesday what was demanded of them on Monday. Ignoring the racial impact of higher academic standards for college athletes is racist, but so (as Dale Lick discovered) is noting the racial composition of college basketball teams. It is racist to treat black executives as if they are special, racist to forget their isolation. Media coverage of slum crime is racist, yet the media turning a blind eye to slum crime is racist indifference to black victims.
Too few police in black slums is also indifference—while more police, when white, are an occupying army, or, when black, are Uncle Toms. It is racist to overlook the deprived upbringing of black criminals, racist to insult the spiritual richness of black life by pointing out these deprivations. Failure to act decisively against drugs lets them ravage the black community; treating drug dealers harshly is an assault on black males. Movie and TV depictions of blacks as jivetalking pimps are racist, but so are sugar-coated depictions of blacks as middle-class. (Gates [1989] makes both complaints; DeMott [1996] calls media representation of equality repellent.) Racist colonial powers exploited tribal rivalries in Africa, racist colonial powers imposed the European concept of nationhood on rivalrous tribes. It is racist to say that black children differ cognitively from white, and racist to ignore the black learning style.16
Jettisoning “racism” will not by itself end such nonsense, but nonsense is easier to spot when shorn of verbal
camouflage. There would remain the problem of labeling the position that race differences exist and are important determinants of human affairs; Christopher Brand (1996) has suggested “racial realism.” The important obligation is removal of verbal obstacles to clarity.

Why Race Matters

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyMon May 04, 2020 5:40 pm

2019 article, so I think I've read it before
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyWed May 06, 2020 10:16 am

Levin, Michael wrote:
Calling black crime, drug use, illegitimacy and academic failure “pathologies” may just be a way of saying that these behaviors are maladaptive in the contemporary American environment. However, behavior is literally maladaptive only if it retards reproductive success, and the total reproductive rate of 2.2 for American blacks (Wattenberg 1987: 77)
exceeds the population replacement rate of 2.1. In fact, despite a lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality, black fertility is greater than white. Brody (1992: 278), following Vining’s somewhat different analysis, puts the white fertility rate at 1.46 and the black at 1.94. Hacker estimates that black women have 1.3 babies for every baby born to a white woman (Hacker 1992: 71; also see Jaynes and Williams 1989: 513–514); the fertility rate for the United States population as a whole is 1.8 (Wattenberg 1987: 142), also yielding a white rate below 1.5. Moreover, it is hard to see how black fertility could be higher if illegitimacy, drug use, and crime were lower. Thirty-three percent of all black children (and their mothers) are now supported almost entirely by the resources of genetically unrelated whites in the form of public assistance, rather than by their biological parents. Black success at inducing whites to divert resources
from their own children to the children of unrelated blacks is successful exploitation of the environment rarely matched in nature.
Black behavioral norms might eventually become maladaptive. On the standard theory, r-populations are subject to collapse when environments turn unfavorable, for instance by the exhaustion of resources. Specific scenarios are hard to project, but one may speculate about what might happen should the tax base for welfare erode at the same time that white and Asian food retailers withdrew from black neighborhoods. Nonetheless, at the moment black norms are highly adaptive.

Black behaviour is successful as long as Whites protect them, or absorb the costs that would and did inhibit their developing a sophisticated system.

Similarly to how female promiscuity - sluttish behaviour - persists because the system absorbs the costs so that the individual does not suffer them.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyWed May 06, 2020 10:20 pm



See how easy it is to become white?
All you need is the right skin hue.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyTue Mar 30, 2021 3:43 am




just as there was an anglo-saxon / jewish evolutionary convergence, there can be convergences towards other directions
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Satyr

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Apr 17, 2021 6:43 am



I.Q. = pattern recognition, is part of the biological category "race," i.e., breed of homo sapient.
Appearance is the interpretation of presence - of what exists; is dynamic, interactive.
Ergo interactivity is existence and organic interactivity, i.e., life, is both physical and psychological, i.e., mental.
So, when I use the term "apparent" I am not only referring to that which is experienced visually, but I include that which I experience (interact with) through all the senses; and I do not only mean what I am lucidly aware of, i.e., conscious of, but also all the data I experience - interact and translate automatically - on a subconscious, intuitive, level.

Only the human manimal develops the proclivity to doubt its own senses, and may develop it into a psychosis and schizophrenia.
Only the human manimal can claim that what it perceives to be happening, what appears to be occurring, is really contrary to what "truly is".
Only the human manimal can claim that hat appears to be different is one and the same, or that it "ought to be so" if it is not.
Only the human manimal can desire to unload its personal responsibilities upon an-otherness.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri Apr 23, 2021 8:46 pm

Satyr wrote:

I had watched this video earlier and wanted to skim-watch it again, so that I could comment on it.. when this happened:

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

My comment, is that physical ethnic differences aren’t being denied, but the non-physical differences.. IQ, EQ, etc.
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptyFri Apr 23, 2021 9:00 pm

Mind/body divide.
What applies to the body applies to the mind.

If it doesn't you have a real/surreal divide and you get insane twits like you know where.
Body/Mind are manifestations of the same experienced in different contexts.
Body precedes mind, as there are physical beings with no brain and no mind.
Race is about inherited potentials.

Genotype = determined past - inherited potentials.
Phenotype = determining present - presence interpreted as appearance - the dynamic present where the inherited is cultivated and interacts - exists.


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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Apr 24, 2021 4:01 pm

Satyr wrote:
Mind/body divide.
What applies to the body applies to the mind.

If it doesn't you have a real/surreal divide and you get insane twits like you know where.

..in a place called hyperreality.. where not going out, means staying in, creating a heightened sense of technology-induced awareness and instincts. Living a certain lifestyle doesn’t mean not knowing One’s reality from the manufactured reality of the electronic world.. except for those who don’t get out.

Quote :
Body/Mind are manifestations of the same experienced in different contexts.
Body precedes mind, as there are physical beings with no brain and no mind.
Race is about inherited potentials.

Genotype = determined past - inherited potentials.
Phenotype = determining present - presence interpreted as appearance - the dynamic present where the inherited is cultivated and interacts - exists.    

The world being One’s oyster, of those whom possess both potentials and qualities.
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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Apr 24, 2021 4:11 pm

Datura wrote:

..in a place called hyperreality.. where not going out, means staying in, creating a heightened sense of technology-induced awareness and instincts. Living a certain lifestyle doesn’t mean not knowing One’s reality from the manufactured reality of the electronic world.. except for those who don’t get out.
Someone can be enclosed - immersed - into an artificial reality without knowing it.
Someone, for example, who has lived his entire life in urban environments, and only experiences nature in documentaries or in parks, or, someone, who has encased himself in linguistics because he cannot cope with the world or because the real world seems insufficient for his huge ego or in comparison to his artificial reality, in his mind or in computer simulations or in inter-subjective echo-chambers - just look at Abrahamism.

When your entire world-view is based on words/symbols that refer to more words/symbols, or to idols, or to fantastic obscure icons, or to abstractions and have no referents in the experienced world, then you begin living in your head, where you can be omnipotent, omniscient, god, or slave, innocent victim, or whatever you prefer - inter-subjectivity is about supporting another's delusion so as to enjoy reciprocal; support of your own.

Defining words in reference to experienced reality where even a simpleton can validate or falsify, is traumatic...especially when you are the simpleton.

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PostSubject: Re: Race Race - Page 10 EmptySat Aug 14, 2021 7:53 am


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