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[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]Let’s look at perspectivism from another digital point of view (digital angle)
Problem of Evil
Two Versions: The Logical Problem of Evil and Empirical Problem of Evil
Logical Problem of Evil
What is meant by "evil?" Proponents of the argument suggest two distinct kinds of evil.
1. Moral Evil- Wickedness. The evil that humans do or will.
2. Physical Evil- pain and suffering. (this can include both humans and non-human animal suffering). Might be brought about by wicked willful action (result from moral evil) or natural disasters, sickness, etc.
This version claims that Evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. This is, it is logically impossible that the universe contain evil and the O-God. Evil coexisting with the O-God is as logically contradictory as there being a married bachelor. Therefore, given that there IS evil, we can be absolutely certain that there is no O-God.
1. If O-God existed then He would want to eliminate all evil
From the definition of “O-God,” specifically, Omnibenevolent
2. If O-God existed then He could eliminate all evil.
From the definition of of O-God, specifically, Omnipotent
3. If O-god existed then evil would not exist.
From 1& 2
4. Evil does exist.
Evident from our experience of the world.
5. The O-God does not exist.
From 3 &4 (Modus Tolens)
Leibnitz claimed:
If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
God exists. (He gave a separate, independent ontological proof.)
Therefore:
This is the best of all possible worlds.
However the problem of Evil starts with the same conditional premise, but…
Logical Problem of Evil suggests that
If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
This is not the best of all possible worlds. (We could easily imagine a better one.)
Therefore:
God does not exist.
Three possible Non-traditional or Non-orthodox Responses.
1. Deny that God is omnibenvolent. This would explain the evil. God is in some part malevolent.
2. Deny that God is omnipotent. This would explain the evil. He simply is not powerful enough to eliminate all evil. (This was William James’ view.)
Note: #1 & #2 concede that there is no O-God. They acknowledge that evil gives us sufficient reason to believe that there is no O-God. However, they counter that this is not sufficient evidence that there is no God whatsoever.
3. Deny that evil is real. (Like Spinoza, one might claim that what we call evil might be called good from another perspective and that all things ARE good from God's perspective. Or like some Christian Scientists who claim that evil is an illusion which does not fool the spiritually mature.)
These are non-orthodox because these contradict the traditional view of God taught by the major Western monotheist religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam).
Problems with these responses.
1 & 2 would be deemed heresy by most Western monotheistic religions. Also they may render a "god" who falls short of a "fit object of worship." (i.e. an imperfect, dependent being)
#3 would also be deemed heresy. Monotheistic religions claim that evil, whatever its ontological status, is a real force in the world to be resisted and opposed- e.g. feed the hungry, heal the sick, comfort the lonely, etc.
Also what would "Omnibenevolent" mean if not "opposed to human suffering or human wickedness?" Such a response weakens our grasp on the meaning of “good” as well as “evil.” Further still, the difference between illusory suffering and real suffering is unclear since it would seem that suffering is perception dependent. If I think that I am in pain, then I’m in pain.
Traditional Responses: Theodicy
Theodicy: An attempt to defend the character of God against the problem of evil. An attempt to show that there is a morally sufficient reason which explains why the O-God permit evil or otherwise why the existence of the O-God and the existence of evil are logically compatible.
Four Standard Theodicies:
1. Free Will ‑ God permits evil because evil is necessary for free will. Free will is such a good thing that it is worth the price. (Most often used as an explanation for moral evil.)
2. Soul Making ‑ God makes the world a rough, dangerous, violent place because only in such an environment can we develop our character and make something noble of ourselves. In a "perfect world" there would be no need for, nor opportunity for, ministry, charity, bravery, generosity, perseverance, etc.. Further, these opportunities are worth the price. (Most often used as an explanation for physical evil.)
3. Knowledge of Good & Evil. In a perfectly good world we would be surrounded by goodness but have nothing to contrast it with. Consequently, God permits evil because it is necessary in order for us to come to know the difference between Good & Evil and that knowledge is worth the price.
4. Evil is Necessary for Good. Some have argued that even an omnipotent God could not create "good" without at the same time allowing for evil. Good and evil are logical counterparts they claim, (like big and small; even an omnipotent God could not create a big thing without as the same time allowing the something small exist). Therefore, for there to be anything that is big, there must be something that is small. If so, then for there to BE any good there must BE evil.
Challenges to these Theodicies
A) 1,2,& 3 is it really worth the price?
"It's not that I don't accept God, it's the world created by him I don't and cannot accept."
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan to Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 3 - The Brothers Make Friends.
"Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? I don't want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return him the ticket."
"That's rebellion," murmered Alyosha, looking down.
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan and Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 4 - Rebellion.
"Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance - and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell me the truth!"
"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan to Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 4 - Rebellion.
B) Contra #1. Evil is not necessary for free will, only the possibility for evil. Is there a possible world in which humans do not behave immorally? Yes. Then an O-God would have created that world, not this one. Therefore the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil.
C) Contra #2. While “first order” evils allow for the possibility of “second order” goods (like charity and compassion) second order evils also are created (selfishness, indifference, cowardice, etc.) Leads to infinite regress ‑ about levels of goodness; pain (1st order) allows for compassion (2nd order) but also indifference (2nd order). Does indifference allow for some 3rd order good? Even if it did, this would open the door to some 3rd order evil, and so on. Therefore the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil.
D) Contra #3. How much evil would be necessary? Presumably, not as much as we have. Therefore the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit (surplus) evil.
E) Contra #4. (Same as D and…) If we understand "evil" merely as suffering and wickedness, then the claim that any world where there is "good" there must be "evil" is simply false. We can imagine a Garden of Eden where there is no suffering. Here we have goodness without evil (i.e. suffering, perhaps wickedness).
Reponses to B:
1. No such possible worlds are actualizable by an omnipotent God. Such worlds are only co-create-able with the free agents themselves. (Alvin Plantinga) Imagine two possible worlds, one where Professor Harris is needlessly cruel to a student and other where is not. What could God do to create one and not the other? Nothing. It’s up to Professor Harris to create one and not the other.
2. Given the above, there may be no such possible worlds. So, even if God could know in advance which potential free beings would only do what it moral, it may be that as God surveys all possible free beings he sees that none of them do only that is right.
3. If an action is really free however, even an omniscient being cannot know in advance. (The objective truth IS that the choice is not yet made.) (Richard Swinburne)
4. Some have argued that God need not create the best of all possible worlds. ( McCord Adams) Maybe some better possible world does exist; it just not our world, and we are in no position to complain since were the other world the only one which existed, we would not. God has no obligations to people who do not exist. God harms no actual existing person by creating them, even if they do not always do what’s right.[1]
Each of the Theodicies we have examined is trying to show that there is a Morally Sufficient Reason (MSR) that explained why the O-god would permit physical and/or moral evil. So far they all seem to have problems. Still, defenders of theism counter that there still might be some reason that a 0-God permits evil and that we just haven't thought of yet. The fact that there could be a reason demonstrates that it is not logically impossible that the O-God exist given evil.
The Theodicist's response to the Logical Problem of Evil seems to rest here:
“For any evil E, there is a greater good that even an omnipotent being could not bring about without allowing E.”
Since we cannot prove this above claim is false, (It may be, but it is not clear that we can prove it to be so.) the logical problem of evil fails. Keep in mind that even and Omnipotent Being is limited by the laws of logic. So, we cannot know that there is no greater good logically entailed by any given evil E.
It is pretty easy to say that there are some evils which do not entail any greater good that we can think of. But that is not to say that there are none conceivable. [2]
Therefore, the Logical Problem of Evil fails to prove what it claimed to prove.
Stray Note:
Some have suggested that the evil and suffering we confront makes sense only when taken in context with the promise of an afterlife. Evil doers are brought to justice and the suffering in this world is inconsequential when compared with the infinite bliss of the afterlife.
Nevertheless, that there is any evil as all, still requires some justification. Further, independent of faith, what reason do we have to think this IS an afterlife, etc.
The afterlife answer was called “a very curious argument” by the philosopher Bertrand Russell in Why I’m Not a Christian.
“If you looked at the matter from a scientific point of view, you would say, ‘After all, I only know this world. I do not know about the rest of the universe, but so far as one can argue at all on probabilities one would say that probably this world is a fair sample, and if there is injustice here then the odds are that there is injustice elsewhere also.'
Supposing you got a crate of oranges that you opened, and you found all the top layer of oranges bad, you would not argue: ‘The underneath ones must be good, so as to redress the balance.’ You would say: ‘Probably the whole lot is a bad consignment;’ and that is really what a scientific person would argue about the universe. He would say: ‘Here we find in this world a great deal of injustice, and so far as that goes that is a reason for supposing that justice does not rule in the world; and therefore so far as it goes it affords a moral argument against deity and not in favor of one.’”
Stray Note 2:
J. L. Mackie talks about various attempts to explain existence of evil; finds that all the explanations give up one of the properties of God
Mackie raises the problems that maybe concept of omnipotence is incoherent; the very idea of all powerful is maybe an incoherent idea. Can an omnipotent being create a creature whom it cannot control (a Free willing being)? No matter how you answer it would seem to lead to a contradiction.
Could God create a rock so heavy that he couldn't lift it? No matter how answer question seem to be denying God's omnipotence; The Greek's had a similar idea. That is why they held that either there is an unmovable object or irresistible force, but not both.
Empirical Problem of Evil
Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Part XI, 210)
On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present.
To those who claim the evil is necessary in ANY world, Hume is making two distinct replies. First a world without sentient creatures would contain neither moral evil nor physical evil. So the claim that any world would have to contain SOME evil is simply false, at least when “evil” is understood as suffering and/or wickedness. Further, we could easily imagine a possible world in which there were some sentience and volition, but not nearly as much suffering or wickedness. (one where animals have greater powers than merely those strictly required, or an environment with a more stable, friendly climate, for instance.)
What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it.
Here Hume is saying that, for all we know, maybe the better world he is envisioning is in fact impossible. That is, if we had independent reason for thinking that there is a God and that He is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then we might have to conclude with Leibnitz that, appearances to the contrary, this is the best of all possible worlds. God knows why it could not be any better, but we do not.
But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.[3]
But absent strong evidence for an O-God, we are left to ask then, are the ills of this world evidence of such a being or evidence of the absence of such a being. Fact-set “F” is evidence for hypothesis H if F is more probably given H and given ~H.
Pr (F + H) > Pr (F + ~H)
What Hume is suggesting is that the suffering in nature and seeming indifference of nature is just what you would expect if there were no God, but not at all what you would expect if there were a God. Consequently, these constitute empirical evidence against the hypothesis “God” and for the hypothesis “No God.”
Empirical problem of evil ‑ given the existence of evil God is (highly) improbable;
Claims that while the existence of evil and the existence of O-God might be logically possible it is unreasonable to believe there is one and far more reasonable to believe that there is no such being. (Remember, it is logically possible that there are aliens form outer space living underneath my house who only come out at night when I’m sleeping, but it would be unreasonable for me to believe such a thing, given the wealth of evidence to the contrary.)
Image someone guy on Talk Radio called the host and said:
"Neil, I knew that there was going to be an earthquake in Haiti on that day and I could have warned everybody, but I didn't.”
"Well then, you are a monstrous person!" Neil responds.
"No, no, I'm not. I have a really good reason why I didn't tell any one."
Now is it possible that this person knew about the earthquake, could have warned us but didn't and that he has a really good reason why he didn't? I suppose it is possible. But is it likely?
No.
It is far more likely that either this person didn't know, or that he couldn't have told or that he is a rotten person for not having done so.
Well the theist is in exactly the same position. He is claiming that the Universe contains a person who knew about the earthquake, could have warned us (even subtly) and didn't but has a really good reason why he didn't. Is it possible? Perhaps. But the empirical problem of evil claims that it is implausible and therefore, irrational to believe such a thing. It is rational to believe what the evidence most strongly suggests, that there is no O-God.
Leibnitz claimed:
If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
God exists. (He gave a separate, independent ontological proof.)
Therefore:
This is the best of all possible worlds.
The problem of evil starts pretty much with the same claim, but rather then a modus ponens, does a modus tollens.
Logical Problem of Evil suggests that
If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
This is probably not the best of all possible worlds. (We could easily imagine a better one.)
Therefore:
Probably God does not exist.
Empirical Problem of Evil suggests that
The antecedent probability of evil (horrendous suffering) existing on the hypothesis of God is very, very low.
Evil exists.
Therefore:
Evil provided strong disconfirming evidence against the hypothesis of God relative to the hypothesis of No God.
It would seem that the probability of “O-God exists” and the probability of “This is the best of all possible world” are inversely proportional.
William Rowe: Perdue University
· Friendly Atheist
o Is confident that there is no God, based on the evidence he has surveyed so far but is open to the idea that further evidence may change his mind.
· Believes that one might rationally believe in God, but personally believes that the weight of evidence (Problem of Evil) is telling.
A. The Argument
1. There exist horrendous evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. An all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.
Therefore
3. An all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good being does not exist.[4]
Rowe believes that the second premise of this argument is certainly true and the first premise is, independent grounds for belief in God aside, probably true. If he is right, then the conclusion of the argument follows inductively from its premises. Thus it follows that the conclusion of the argument is, grounds for belief aside, very probably true. This is why Rowe says that the argument is not an attempt to show that God does not exist. It is an attempt to show that, positive arguments for God aside, it is very likely that God does not exist and hence atheism is rationally justified (over agnosticism).
[1] This line of argument has always seemed suspicious to me, sophisticated legalism which evades rather than resolves the issue. It is as if, due to the curious circumstances, no one exists to press charges. Therefore God is blameless. But surely this is a question of “character” not rights. What sort of God would create a broken and suffering world? Even if we grant that a “less than perfect world is logically necessary” the question would remain, “Why this less than perfect world?” "Why this evil?" We can (and do) quibble about the details.
[2] One way around this might be to say that no “good” can be “greater” than some existent evil. Thus this claim would be false. One might show that the whole project of counter-balancing evil with good couldn’t be made out.
[3] Hume, David Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Second Edition) ed. Richard H. Popkin, Hackett Publishing, 1998
[4] But we might, nevertheless retain faith in a Non-omnipotent God. Rowe defines God as O-God. But Cleanthes resolves the matter by lessening the attributes of God.
“If we abandon all analogy to humanity, then we retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. But if we preserve human analogy then we cannot reconcile the evil in the world with infinite attribute. But suppose the Author Of Nature to be finitely perfect but far exceeding mankind... benevolence governed by wisdom but limited by necessity might produce just such a world”
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The Invisible One
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